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SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
CHALLENGE FOR THE PATENT AND ANTITRUST
LAWS
♦

DARYL LIM*
Abstract
Few patented inventions challenge the traditional boundaries of the
patent and antitrust laws like those that are capable of multiplying as
they are used. These self-replicating technologies are embedded in our
food, fortify our vaccines, and form the computer code upon which the
information age is based. These inventions create an inherent conflict
between patentees and their customers. The conflict arises because
every customer could become competitors as the product replicates,
potentially making every first sale the patentee’s last. They also
challenge how we think about fundamental issues of ownership as well
as innovation and market competition, and make it necessary to identify
what downstream uses are or should be permissible.
This struggle culminated recently in the Supreme Court case of
Bowman v. Monsanto. There, the Court had to determine what rights a
farmer had over the genetically modified seeds he had bought. At the
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notice and grant of permission be included in all copies.
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core of Bowman v. Monsanto was the scope of patent exhaustion, a
judge-made doctrine designed to end the patent owner’s control over
downstream commerce once its patented goods or methods were sold.
Monsanto had also been accused of monopolizing the market, leading to
upward spiraling prices and a drought of seed varieties. The Article
examines the patent and antitrust issues arising in agro-biotechnology,
and analyzes their impact on other self-replicating technologies.
In looking at patent issues, this Article first explains how courts
can apply a technology neutral three-step test to distinguish between
permissible “uses” and impermissible “making” of patented articles.
Second, it explores the benefits of five alternatives to patent
infringement as a means of appropriating returns to innovation, and
explains why their limitations vindicate the Court’s conclusion in
Bowman v. Monsanto. Third, it discusses thorny matters left unresolved:
inadvertent and “incidental” infringement, as well as the “conditional
sale” doctrine.
In looking at the antitrust issues, the Article first explains why the
controversial essential facilities doctrine could prove to be a useful tool
for courts to ensure adequate access to standard essential patents over
traits like Roundup Ready. Second, it explains why Monsanto’s win
over Bowman may hold an unexpected promise of a better future for
farmers as its customers. Third, it argues that legislation similar to
Paragraph IV challenges under the Hatch-Waxman Act can serve to
incentivize greater competition in agro-biotechnology and other fields
of technology.
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INTRODUCTION
Few patented inventions challenge the traditional boundaries of the
patent and antitrust laws like those that are capable of multiplying as
they are used. These self-replicating technologies (“SRTs”) are
embedded in our food, fortify our vaccines, and form the computer code
upon which the information age is based.1 These inventions create an
inherent conflict between patentees and their customers. The conflict
arises because every customer could become competitors as the product
replicates, potentially making every first sale the patentee’s last.2 They
also challenge how we think about fundamental issues of ownership as
well as innovation and market competition, and make it necessary to
identify what downstream uses are or should be permissible.
The recent Supreme Court case of Bowman v. Monsanto became
the arena for this conflict. Monsanto, an agricultural biotechnology
company headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, has won more than $23
million from hundreds of farmers accused of replanting seeds bearing
Brief for Respondents at 2–3, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796),
2013 WL 179941; id. at 31–32 (“Other inventions and technologies with similar characteristics
would also be at risk: a software product that is replicated by a machine, a 3-D printer that can be
used to print components for more 3-D printers, or a synthetic molecule that can be used to
produce copies of itself.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance
at 16–17, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 137188; id.
at 16 (“Like soybeans, computer software can be reproduced in materially identical form with
limited human intervention. It is often impossible, moreover, to use computer software for its
intended purpose without making another copy.”); id. at 18 (“The Court’s decision could also
affect the enforcement of patents for man-made cell lines, DNA molecules, some
nanotechnologies, and other technologies that involve self-replicating features.”).
2 Brief of Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n in Support of Respondents at 11, Bowman v.
Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 267019; see also id. at 13 (“If the
doctrine of patent exhaustion were improperly extended to the routine growth of recombinant
host cells, this could have a devastating effect on investment in the production of new biologic
drugs made from recombinant cells. If patents on recombinant cells used to make new drugs
could be easily circumvented by reliance on the exhaustion doctrine, the deleterious effects on the
pharmaceutical industry could be even greater than in the agricultural arena.”).
1
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its modified germplasm.3 In 2007, Monsanto accused Vernon H.
Bowman, a seventy-five year old farmer from Knox County, Indiana, of
patent infringement.4 First as a pro se, then as a pro bono defendant,
Bowman tried to convince the courts that he should be allowed to plant
and harvest crops grown from seeds he had bought from a local grain
elevator.5 The Supreme Court, in affirming both the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and the district court below, found that every one
of the eight generations of his crop grown without Monsanto’s
permission was infringing.6
The narrative of Monsanto’s patent litigation would be incomplete
without also discussing its antitrust dimension. In 2007, state attorneys
general reportedly launched an investigation against Monsanto for
anticompetitive seed trait licensing practices that locked out competitor
genetic trait providers.7 When DuPont sought to offer a stacked gene
containing Monsanto’s herbicide resistant gene, it was sued by
Monsanto.8 DuPont responded with a private antitrust suit, accusing
Monsanto of using its monopoly in the provision of genetic traits both
to exclude rivals and to gain advantage in the market for the breeding
and retail of seeds.9 Other allegations include tie-in restrictions
requiring farmers to apply only herbicide containing expired patents on
CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, SEED GIANTS VS. U.S. FARMERS 1 (2013),
available
at
www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/seed-giants_final_04424.pdf;
Alessandro
Garofalo, Monsanto Takes Home $23mln from Small Farmers, Seeks to Maintain ‘Seed
Oligarchy’, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2013), http://rt.com/usa/monsanto-seeds-trial-bowman-123/.
4 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Heidi Ledford, Seedpatent case in Supreme Court, NATURE (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.nature.com/news/seedpatent-case-in-supreme-court-1.12445.
5 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (2013).
6 Id. at 1769.
7 Geoffrey Manne, The Seeds of an Antitrust Disaster in Iowa, FORBES, (Mar. 11, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/streettalk/2010/03/11/the-seeds-of-an-antitrust-disaster-in-iowa/; see
also Lina Khan, How Monsanto Outfoxed the Obama Administration, SALON (Mar. 15, 2013,
9:37 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/03/15/how_did_monsanto_outfox_the_obama_administra
tion/ (“State officials uncovered agreements that, in one form or another, required seed breeders
and retailers to favor Monsanto over its competitors. One provision, for example, prohibited seed
companies from combining Monsanto’s genetic traits with the traits controlled by its rivals,
unless given explicit written permission from Monsanto. Since the vast majority of U.S. corn and
soybean crops contain Monsanto’s genes, the company could effectively lock out competitors.”).
8 Monsanto Co. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:09CV00686(ERW), 2009 WL 3012584
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2009).
9 Id.; see also Monsanto Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:09CV00686(ERW), 2012
WL 5397601, at *1 n.4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2012) (“Pioneer also asserted a number of antitrust
counterclaims, alleging that Monsanto has abused its patent monopolies, has inserted
anticompetitive restrictions into its license agreements with seed producers, and is attempting to
employ an anticompetitive ‘switching strategy’ by using new licensing agreements to shift
independent seed companies from the current RR trait seed lines to Roundup Ready 2 Yield®, in
order to prevent generic entry into the market and extend Monsanto’ [sic] patent protection
through 2020. On September 16, 2009, this Court entered its Order concluding that a separate
trial of Pioneer’s antitrust counterclaims was warranted.”).
3
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its Roundup technology to Roundup Ready crops containing its patented
genes, and loyalty rebates for stocking up on Monsanto’s inventory.10
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) followed up with its own
investigations in 2010, and released a report in May 2012 highlighting
the fact that farmers faced high prices and increasingly limited options
for seeds as a result of companies’ merger activities.11 It warned that
firm dominance in the agro-biotechnology industry promotes a “high
degree of concentration, high and rising prices, limited choice, stagnant
innovation.”12 In a decade, Monsanto had acquired thirty companies at
the cost of $12 billion.13 Those companies that remain compete with the
company they depend upon—Monsanto—for their supply for genetic
traits, limiting their product offerings.14
By November 2012, however, the DOJ decided to close its
investigations without explanation.15 In a terse response to inquiries on
the reasons for this closure, it stated that its investigation into “possible
anticompetitive activity” in the seed industry was superseded by
“marketplace developments that occurred during the pendency of the
investigation.”16 The state attorneys general followed suit in
discontinuing their own investigations.17
While not explicitly acknowledged, two events were responsible
for keeping Monsanto out of further trouble with the antitrust enforcers.
The first was Monsanto’s participation in a remarkable private sector
initiative led by the Biotechnology Industry Organization (“BIO”) and
the American Seed Trade Association (“ASTA”), a voluntary
framework called the Accord, created to facilitate better and cheaper
access to seed varieties and manage the potential trade disruption from
patent expiration.18 The Accord went into effect on November 15,
2012.19 The second was Monsanto’s billion-dollar settlement with
Monsanto Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:09CV00686(ERW), 2012 WL
5397601, at *1 n.4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2012).
11 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND AGRICULTURE: VOICES FROM THE WORKSHOPS ON
AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN OUR 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY AND
THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD 13 (2012), 2012 WL 1828869.
12 Tom Philpott, DOJ Mysteriously Quits Monsanto Antitrust Investigation, MOTHER JONES,
(Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/tom-philpott/2012/11/dojs-monsantoseed-industryinvestigation-ends-thud.
13 Khan, supra note 7.
14 Id.
15 Id. (“The DOJ released no written public statement.”).
16 See Philpott, supra note 12.
17 Khan, supra note 7 (“The state attorneys general who initiated the probe five years ago also
closed their inquiry and have chosen not to comment.”).
18 Factsheet, AM. SEED TRADE ASS’N & BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG. (Oct. 31, 2012),
http://www.agaccord.org/include/facts.pdf; see also Khan, supra note 7 (“Months after the Justice
Department followed suit in 2009, Monsanto announced it would allow farmers to continue using
its leading soybeans, Roundup Ready 1, even after its patent expired in 2014.”).
19 The Accord: Generic Event Marketability and Access Agreement Is Now Effective, BIO (Nov.
10
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DuPont, which was publicly announced in March 2013.20 As part of that
settlement, Monsanto agreed to license DuPont’s subsidiary Pioneer the
rights to stack its next-generation herbicide resistant gene, Roundup
Ready 2 Yield, in its seed offerings for $1.75 billion.21 In return,
Monsanto will gain access to DuPont technology related to crop disease
resistance.22 These developments are a promising start to ensuring better
access to seed varieties as well as cheaper seeds. More, however, can
and should be done to promote competition in the industry for seeds and
other SRTs.
This Article discusses the key patent and antitrust controversies
relating to SRTs. Part I describes Monsanto’s path to the Supreme
Court. The last century witnessed a dramatic transformation in the
relationship between farmers and the crops they tend. It is a
transformation closely linked to a shift in using patents to protect agrobiotechnology. While farmers can now tap into the unlocked secrets of
genes, they can no longer freely replant seeds, even from their own
harvest. Instead they must return to biotech companies each season for
new seeds at ever-higher prices or risk being sued for patent
infringement, as Bowman was.
The Court’s decision in Bowman v. Monsanto affirms that the law
favors giving companies like Monsanto broad rights to control the use
of SRTs. However, its brief ten-page judgment23 serves more as a data
point than a roadmap for those seeking guidance in this important area
upon which our subsistence and sustenance depends.
Part II fills that gap by examining the traditional doctrinal and
policy underpinnings of patent exhaustion, and the extent to which they
may be applied to SRTs. First, it explains how courts can apply a
technology neutral three-step test to distinguish between permissible
“uses” and impermissible “makings” of patent articles. Second, it
explores the benefits and limitations of five alternatives to patent
infringement: contract law, technology “locks,” natural inducements to
15,
2012),
http://www.bio.org/media/press-release/accord-generic-event-marketability-andaccess-agreement-now-effective. As of June 2013, the ten signatories are the American Farm
Bureau Federation, the American Seed Trade Association, the American Soybean Association,
BASF Plant Science LP, Bayer CropScience, Dow AgroSciences L.L.C., Dupont Pioneer, Gro
Alliance, L.L.C., Monsanto Company and National Corn Growers Association. Generic Event
Marketability and Access Agreement (GEMAA), AGACCORD.ORG, http://www.agaccord.org/
?p=GEMAA (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
20 Carey Gillam, Monsanto, DuPont strike $1.75 billion licensing deal, end lawsuits, REUTERS
(Mar.
26,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/26/us-monsanto-dupont-gmoidUSBRE92P0IK20130326.
21 Andrew Pollack, Monsanto and DuPont Settle Fight Over Patent Licensing, NYTIMES.COM
(Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/business/monsanto-and-dupont-settlefight-over-roundup-ready-technology.html.
22 Gillam, supra note 20.
23 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 420 (2013).
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innovation as new herbicide-resistant weeds evolve, compulsory
licensing, and protection under patent-specific legislation. Third, it
examines the Court’s concern with “innocent” infringement. It discusses
unintentional infringement by organic farmers and the limitations of
disclaimers against litigation, labeling and state laws in protecting
unintentional infringers. It then discusses incidental infringement and
the impact of Bowman v. Monsanto on other forms of SRTs such as
stem cells, genetically modified microorganisms, eukaryotic cells and
plasmids. Finally, it looks at the third group of infringers who may
remain vulnerable to patent infringement suits through post-sale
licensing restrictions. It argues that patent owners should not be allowed
an end-run around exhaustion using such restrictions, and that only
contractual remedies should be allowed subject to the restrictions not
falling afoul of federal preemption, patent misuse and the antitrust laws.
Part III examines the debate through an antitrust lens. First, it
explains why the controversial essential facilities doctrine (“EFD”)
could prove to be a useful tool for courts to ensure adequate access to
standard essential patents over the Roundup Ready soybean trait and
SRTs. Second, it discusses the Accord’s relationship with antitrust law
and why Monsanto’s win over Bowman may hold an unexpected
promise of a better future for farmers. Third, it argues that the drug
industry holds important lessons for making the agro-biotechnology
more competitive. In particular, steps should be taken to prevent
protection of undeserving patents through “product-hopping.” In
addition, Congress should consider enacting legislation similar to the
Hatch-Waxman Act to incentivize challenges of poor quality patents.
I. BOWMAN V. MONSANTO
Agriculture in the United States is largely a private sector
enterprise, with innovation fueled by a variety of plant-related
intellectual property rights, each decidedly more robust than the last.
Bowman was an archetypal Midwestern soybean farmer. His decision to
replant seeds saved from an earlier harvest, however, caused him to
become ensnared in Monsanto’s web of patent rights over those seed.
The question of how far Monsanto’s control could reach was argued to
a Supreme Court whose decision left unresolved questions that future
courts will have to grapple with.
A. The Privatization of Agriculture
Soybeans are the second-most planted field crop in the United
States, covering seventy-seven million24 acres over 280,000 farms in
24

Background, USDA (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/soybeans-oil-crops/
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thirty-one states.25 They account for a tenth of agricultural production
and generate $43 billion in sales revenue.26 Soybeans can be consumed
by humans as edamame, or processed into a variety of food products,
including soymilk, tofu, and soy sauce.27 Soybeans are also used to feed
livestock.28 Central to the discussion, soybean seeds can be planted and
cultivated into new soybean plants.29
Monsanto is the largest seed company in the world.30 Ninety-three
percent of soybean farmers in the United States use Monsanto’s flagship
glyphosate-resistant technology, “Roundup Ready,” which compliments
Monsanto’s glyphosate herbicide, Roundup.31 Roundup kills competing
vegetation by inhibiting the metabolic activity of 5enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthase (“EPSPS”), an enzyme
necessary for plant growth.32 Roundup Ready technology was claimed
under the asserted “U.S. Patent Nos. 5,352,605 (‘‘605 patent’) and
RE39, 247E (‘‘247 patent’).”33 Roundup Ready is “by far the most
background.aspx#.Um7d9PmsiM4.
Kevin E. Noonan, It Ain’t Necessarily So Down on the Farm: Not All Farmers Agree with
Farmer Bowman in Bowman v. Monsanto, PATENT DOCS (Jan. 31, 2013), http://
www.patentdocs.org/2013/02/it-aint-necessarily-so-down-on-the-farm-not-all-farmers-agreewith-farmer-bowman-in-bowman-v-monsant.html; National Agricultural Statistics Service et al.,
Acreage 15 (2012), available at http://www.usda.gov/nass/PUBS/TODAYRPT/acrg0612.pdf;
Ted Covey & Kevin Patrick, Cash Receipts By Commodity Group, USDA Economic Research
Service (USDA ERS), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/.aspx#.UeiugY21GSp
(“Corn is the most widely produced feed grain in the United States, with most of the crop
providing the main energy ingredient in livestock feed.”).
26 Soystats: 2012 Highlights, THE AMERICAN SOYBEAN ASSOCIATION, http://soystats.com/2012soybean-highlights/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
27 See Brief of CropLife Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 2–3, Bowman v.
Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 314456.
28 Id. at 2.
29 Id. at 3.
30 Greg Stohr, Monsanto Seed Patent Case Gets U.S. Supreme Court Review, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-05/monsanto-seedpatent-case-gets-u-dot-s-dot-supreme-court-review.
31 Brief of Am. Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7, Bowman v.
Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 315223.
32 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
33 See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The ‘605 and ‘247E
Patents cover different aspects of the Roundup Ready® technology . . . . The invention of the
‘605 Patent relates to the use of viral nucleic acid from the cauliflower mosaic virus (‘CaMV’), a
virus capable of infecting plant cells, as a vector for incorporating new genetic material into plant
cells (a ‘transformation’ of the plant cells). To accomplish this transformation, the CaMV
promoter region is isolated from the CaMV genome and combined with a heterologous proteinencoding DNA sequence, forming a chimeric gene to be expressed in the plant cell . . . . The
invention of the ‘247E Patent involves the transformation of plant cells—using, for example, the
CaMV promoters disclosed in the ‘605 Patent—to transform plant cells with novel proteinencoding gene sequences that encode for EPSPS, a glyphosate-tolerant enzyme. These genetically
modified plants express EPSPS and exhibit glyphosate resistance. ‘247E Patent, col.1 ll.15–46.
The advantage of this technology, which can be incorporated into a variety of crops, is that
farmers can treat their fields with glyphosate-based herbicide to control weed growth without
damaging their crops.”).
25
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widely used” genetic trait in American agriculture making up more than
$11.7 billion or 75% of Monsanto’s net annual income.34
Roundup Ready has benefited farmers in a number of ways. It has
allowed for aerial spraying for weeds, instead of manual scouring, and it
has matched specific herbicides to the weeds, thus reducing labor costs
by $6.50 per acre and herbicide costs by $8.68 per acre.35 This
technology allowed farmers to reduce soil tillage compared with
conventional methods.36 The reduced soil tillage has enabled farmers to
plant in narrower rows and has increased the number of plants grown
per acre.37 Many amici briefs supporting Monsanto assert a positive
correlation between progressively stronger patent protection and
innovation.38
Others are more skeptical. For instance, the Center for Food Safety
and Save Our Seeds argued that the “vast majority” of plant innovation
was accomplished without inducement by the patent system.39 Indeed,
according to the Center, “[f]or the first two centuries of this country’s
history, Congress consistently refused to authorize patents on staple
food crops.”40 The Center also stated that the current regime was formed
“under increasing pressure and marketing from agrichemical
companies, seed patent and intellectual property law,” and that this
pressure had resulted in “policies [which] have enshrined corporate
interests instead of safeguarding farmers and small, independent
businesses.”41
The impetus for advancing agro-technology was evident early in
the nation’s history. In 1800, Thomas Jefferson declared that “[t]he
greatest service which can be rendered any country is, to add an [sic]

Monsanto: The Parable of the Sower, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2009), http://
www.economist.com/node/14904184; Joseph M. Purcell, Jr., Note, The “Essential Facilities”
Doctrine in the Sunlight: Stacking Patented Genetic Traits in Agriculture, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1251, 1252 (2011).
35 Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 2–3.
36 Wade A. Givens et al., Roundup Ready® Crops Have Major Positive Impact on Tillage
Practices (2009), available at http://www.monsanto.com/weedmanagement/Documents/
Benchmark-TillageSummaryRept2.pdf.
37 Janet Carpenter & Leonard Gianessi, Herbicide Tolerant Soybeans: Why Growers are
Adopting Roundup Ready Varieties, 2 AGBIOFORUM 65, 65–72 (1999), available at
http://agbioforum.org/v2n2/v2n2a02-carpenter.pdf.
38 Brief of Am. Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 31,
at 5 (“During the past few decades, enormous progress has been made in improving new seed
varieties based upon the protections initially afforded by the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970.
Genetic innovation in soybeans grew exponentially, like Jack’s magical beanstalk, after this
Court’s 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, which confirmed the
applicability of utility patent protection to qualifying organisms.”).
39 CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 3, at 4.
40 Id.
41 Id.
34
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useful plant to its culture.”42 During colonial times, wealthy merchants
brought seeds from Europe to America.43 Successful crops were shared
among the select few who belonged to agricultural societies.44 Given the
yoke of patent lawsuits that farmers have borne in more recent years, it
is perhaps ironic that it was the then Commissioner of Patents, Henry
Ellsworth, who in 1839 obtained federal funds to collect and distribute
new plant varieties to farmers for free.45 The Department of Agriculture
was later established to carry on this task, among others.46 Farmers who
benefited from the system in turn donated their seed to a seed bank that
freely distributed approximately a billion seed packets a year to other
farmers.47
A small private seed industry existed even then, but it was limited
to vegetables and flowers grown by home gardeners.48 Early breeders
lacked the incentive to invest in developing more productive plants.49 In
addition to their inability to control the commercial exploitation of their
genetic material, the free seed program crowded out private breeders
from the marketplace.50
As early as 1885, private interests successfully lobbied the
government for a plant patent system.51 Seed companies began to invest
in plant variety research, increasing their ability to express desirable
traits.52 Hybrid crops were a particularly lucrative source of investments
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 703 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 247, 262 (2003).
44 See ALFRED CHARLES TRUE, A HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENTATION AND
RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES 6–7 (1937); see also Nathan A. Busch, Jack and the
Beanstalk: Property Rights in Genetically Modified Plants, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 9
(2002) (“Because the common farmer could not gain membership to these agricultural societies
he had either no or limited access to these new and exotic varieties. The common farmer was then
economically disadvantaged in a system that granted an exclusive interest to those who could
afford to develop the plant varieties best suited to agriculture in the United States.”).
45 Aoki, supra note 43, at 265.
46 An Act to Establish a Department of Agriculture, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387 (1862); Busch, supra
note 44, at 10–11 (“To rationalize and continue the centralized control of germplasm
development and distribution, Congress in 1862 established the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to ‘acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful
information in subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and comprehensive sense
of that word, and to procure, propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds
and plants.’”).
47 See Busch, supra note 44, at 14.
48 Id. at 16 (“By the beginning of the twentieth century, the seed manufacturing industry had
gained only a small fraction of the market for field crop seeds, a market that was almost
exclusively dominated by on-farm production of the seed and sale of the seed through inter-farm
commerce.”).
49 Aoki, supra note 43, at 268.
50 JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY (1988).
51 Id.
52 See also Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, The Seed Industry in U.S. Agriculture: An Exploration of
42
43
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because their high yields did not carry forward to subsequent
generations.53 Having tasted a bountiful harvest, farmers returned each
year for seeds for their next season.54 This led to a progressive shift
from seed saving to seed buying for replanting.55 The technologies were
kept as trade secrets.56 However, self-pollinating crops, such as
soybeans, could not be feasibly protected by trade secrets because,
unlike inbred parent lines of hybrid crops, which could be kept off
market and thus kept secret, self-pollinating crops were selfdisclosing.57
One commentator noted that “the private seed industry was
occupied with efforts to eliminate governmental seed distribution.”58 By
1924, the Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) turned its focus to basic
agricultural research and ended its seed program.59 In 1930, Congress
passed the Plant Patent Act (“PPA”).60 The PPA recognized that
asexually bred plants, produced via budding, cutting and grafting, could
be protected under patent law.61 Under the PPA, breeders can prevent
buyers from asexually reproducing a patented plant, even after an
authorized sale.62 The passage of the PPA also confirmed that plant life
was patentable subject matter.63 PPA protection was conferred under
less stringent standards than utility patents.64 In addition, farmers were
Data and Information on Crop Seed Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research and
Development 41–42, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib-agriculturalinformation-bulletin/aib786.aspx#.UmHdsRbvNSU (From 1960 to 1965 U.S. private research
and development (“R&D”) expenditures increased by around $514 million while public R&D
expenditures remained flat, resulting in a marked “shift of more R&D activity to the private
sector.”).
53 Aoki, supra note 43, at 250.
54 Id.
55 Fernandez-Cornejo, supra note 52.
56 Rita S. Heimes, Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented Seeds: Which Law Governs?, 10 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 98, 105 (2010).
57 See Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property Protection and its Impact on the U.S. Seed Industry, 4
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297, 308–09 (1999) (“Trade secret laws require that the information to be
protected be held confidential and without disclosure to the public. . . . [Thus,] inbred lines used
to create hybrids can be protected as trade secrets.”).
58 Jennifer Wai-Shing Maguire, The Seed 2.0: Evolving Intellectual Property Rights of
Agricultural Germplasm, 8 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 51, 56 (2012).
59 Id. at 56.
60 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1954) (providing patent protection for “[w]hoever invents or discovers and
asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant.”).
61 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 125 (2001) (“The 1930
PPA amended the general patent provision to protect only the asexual reproduction of a plant.”).
62 Id. at 136 (noting that statute’s purpose was to protect covered plants from being “regularly
copied, draining profits from those who discovered or bred new varieties”).
63 Id. at 127. In J.E.M., the Court noted that moving plant protection provisions to § 161 was
statutory “housekeeping.” Id. at 133. It does not follow that Congress intended § 161 to be the
exclusive provision governing plant patents. Id.
64 Id. at 125 (“Plant patents under the PPA . . . have very limited coverage and less stringent
requirements than [35 U.S.C.] § 101 utility patents.”).
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minimally affected by the passage of the PPA because their crops were
produced via sexual reproduction.65
This changed when Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection
Act (“PVPA”) in 1970.66 Similarly to the PPA, the requirements for
obtaining a plant variety protection certificate are less stringent, and the
protection provided to the patentee is less extensive than a utility
patent.67 The PVPA empowered the USDA to grant Certificates of
Protection for novel sexually protected plant varieties grown from
seed.68 Certificate holders had exclusive marketing rights.69 Under the
PVPA, breeders could restrict buyers from sexually reproducing the
plant “as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety,” and
from selling progeny seed for replanting beyond the amount needed to
replant the farmer’s own acreage.70
As a concession, farmers were allowed to save seeds for
replanting, known as the “bin run” or “brown-bag” sales.71 Brown bag
sales enabled farmers to go directly into the business of selling PVPAprotected seeds alongside the plant breeders.72 In addition, the PVPA
See Blair, supra note 57, at 308–10.
7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2006).
67 Utility patents, in turn, have more stringent standards including usefulness, novelty,
nonobviousness, enablement, and written description; and they also confer greater rights,
including the elimination of “brown bag” and seed saving exemptions. See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at
142 (In contrast to the requirements for obtaining a utility patent, “a plant variety may receive a
PVP certificate without a showing of usefulness or nonobviousness.”). Seed must also be
deposited in a public depository; however, “neither the statute nor the applicable regulation
mandates that such material be accessible to the general public during the term of the PVP
certificate.” Id. at 143. By contrast, a utility patent protects “any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1952) (including inventions embodied in sexually and asexually reproduced
plants). See also J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 143 (“Because of the more stringent requirements, utility
patent holders receive greater rights of exclusion than holders of a PVP certificate [or a plant
patent under the PPA].”).
68 7 U.S.C. §§ 2421, 2422, 2481–83.
69 The PVPA protects rights in “sexually reproduced . . . plant variet[ies].” 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)
(1996). This includes the right to exclude others from “sexually multiply[ing], or propagat[ing]”
the variety. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(3) (1994).
70 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(3); see Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 186 (1995) (quoting
7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(3)).
71 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2003); see Asgrow Seed Co., 513 U.S. at 184 (permitting farmers to “save
seed produced by [them] from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of
the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and [to] use such saved seed in the production of a
crop” and “a person, whose primary farming occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other
than reproductive purposes, to sell such saved seed to other persons so engaged, for reproductive
purposes”); see also Asgrow Seed Company, 513 U.S. at 182 (“A brown-bag sale occurs when a
farmer purchases seeds from a seed company, ... plants the seeds in his own fields, harvests the
crop, cleans it, and then sells the reproduced seed to other farmers (usually in nondescript brown
bags) for them to plant as crop seed on their own farms.”).
72 Asgrow Seed Co., 513 U.S. at 182 (“A brown-bag sale occurs when a farmer purchases seed
from a seed company, such as Asgrow, plants the seed in his own fields, harvests the crop, cleans
it, and then sells the reproduced seed to other farmers (usually in nondescript brown bags) for
65
66

Lim-galleyed-FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES

12/21/13 12:55 PM

143

also allowed “bona fide research” involving “use and reproduction” of
PVPA protected seeds.73 Congress thus intended the PVPA to
encourage research and marketing of new varieties with the guarantee of
enhanced protection while recognizing the partnership between breeders
and farmers.74
In the case of soybean seeds, bin runs have been compared to a
“robust version of copyright law’s ‘first sale’ doctrine” because a
breeder “gets exactly one chance to sell the information ‘encoded’ in
PVPA-certified seed to any individual farmer.”75 In 1983, the Fifth
Circuit noted that brown-bag exemptions were deemed incompatible
with the purpose of the PVPA.76 The PVPA failed to achieve these
goals because “withering competition from brown-bag sales prompted
commercial plant breeders to shift their research from self-pollinated
crops to hybrids . . . [which] enjoy a biological immunity from easy
duplication.”77
Reflecting on the PVPA, Professor Jim Chen noted that it
“represents a rare instance in the annals of contemporary intellectual
property law in which proprietary protection is not excessive, but rather
insufficiently robust.”78 He observes that it “provided at most modest
incentives for private investment in agricultural research and
development . . . [and has not] generated significant improvements in
crop quality, crop yields, or any other measure of agronomic
performance.”79 More broadly, Professor Chen noted that the “distortion
of agricultural research brings with it a lamentable preference for the
law of trade secrets over the PVPA and patent law. Whatever their
flaws, federal intellectual property laws boast the singular virtue of
forcing inventions into the public domain once their terms of protection
them to plant as crop seed on their own farms.”).
7 U. S. C. § 2544.
74 See Asgrow Seed Co., 513 U.S. at 181; Brief of Am. Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, supra note 31, at 5 (“[E]normous progress has been made in improving
new seed varieties based upon the protections initially afforded by the Plant Variety Protection
Act of 1970.”).
75 Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in
Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 128 (2005).
76 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1983) (“In purpose
and operation, the farmer exemption appears to be at odds with the primary purpose of the Act.
While the main body of the Act assures developers of novel varieties the exclusive right to sell
and reproduce that variety, the crop exemption dilutes that exclusivity by allowing individual
farmers to sell the protected variety without liability. The broader the construction given the
exemption, the smaller the incentive for breeders to invest the substantial time and effort
necessary to develop new strains. The less time and effort that is invested, the smaller the chance
of discovering superior agricultural products. If less time and effort is invested, long-term
benefits to the farmer in the form of superior crops and higher yields will be lost.”).
77 Chen, supra note 75, at 155–56
78 Id. at 157.
79 Id. at 155.
73
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expire.”80
By 1994, the PVPA was amended to prohibit farmers from selling
PVPA-protected seed to other farmers for planting.81 Congress intended
this additional enhancement to both meet international treaty obligations
and incentivize research and commercialization of seed.82 In 1995, the
Court in Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer limited brown-bag sales to
“only such seed as [a farmer] has saved for the purpose of replanting his
own acreage.”83 Professor Rita Heimes observed that:
[This] signaled a shift in enforcement of plant intellectual property
rights from litigation against corporate competitors to lawsuits
against the end-user farmer. The [Asgrow] case also marks the
“transformation of the seed as a good that was purchased with no
strings attached into a good subject to numerous statutory and
contractual conditions. The seed is not only a commodity, but may
also be licensed, as opposed to only purchased.84

Concurrent with these developments, in 1980, the Court in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty held that genetically engineered
microorganisms were eligible for a utility patent.85 This was particularly
significant for soybean-related research. Unlike hybrid crops like corn,
sorghum, and sunflowers, soybean plants are self-pollinating and
produce genetically identical progeny.86 Without utility patent
protection, soybean seed can be replanted for multiple generations
without losing its beneficial traits.87 The inability of biotech companies
to appropriate those benefits discouraged them from investing in

Id. at 156.
Id. at 129.
82 See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349, 108 Stat. 3136
(amending the PVPA for conformance with the UPOV (International Union for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants) Convention).
83 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192 (1995).
84
Heimes, supra note 56, at 109 (quoting Keith Aoki & Kennedy Luvai, Seed Wars:
Controversies over Access to and Control of Plant Genetic Resources, in 2 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 265
(Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
85 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
86 See generally Rattan Lal Agrawal, Fundamentals of Plant Breeding and Hybrid Seed
Production (1998).
87 Jon Entine, Bowman v Monsanto: Genetic Innovation in the Crosshairs?, GENETIC LITERACY
PROJECT (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2013/02/18/bowman-vsmonsanto-genetic-innovation-in-the-crosshairs/ (“Genetic innovation in soybeans grew
exponentially, like Jack’s magical beanstalk, after this Court’s 1980 decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, . . . which confirmed the applicability of utility patent protection to qualifying
organisms.”); see also Brief of Am. Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 31, at 6 (“Innovation spurred by the Chakrabarty decision resulted in
impressive gains in nutrition and environmental stewardship.”).
80
81
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soybean seed research.88
After Chakrabarty, “plant breeders began developing new varieties
and traits with the confidence that their intellectual property would be
protected.”89 These super-crops resist herbicides, pests, and disease,
allowing them to thrive under conditions that previously would have
decimated entire crop populations.90 Growers also enjoyed higher yields
and the environment benefited from less degradation.91
In J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,
the Supreme Court held that the PPA and PVPA did not exclude those
who wanted to protect seed technology with utility patents, so long as
the requirements for patentability were met.92 It observed that, unlike
the PVPA, utility patents conferred no seed-saving or research
exemptions.93 In order to read rights conferred under the PVPA and
PPA coherently alongside protection for utility patents, patentees must
be allowed to prevent buyers from reproducing the traited plants. The
Court found that farmers had no right to save seeds or use them for
research without the patentee’s authorization, a point reiterated in
Bowman v. Monsanto.94 J.E.M. adhered to the policy that was “sought
by seed producers as a means of assuring a return of the research and
development costs required to create and patent the modified seed.”95
Since Chakrabaty, the privatization of agriculture has displaced
public sector research because Congress deemed it more efficient.96
Brief of Am. Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 31,
at 15–16 (noting that “[a]bsent clear utility patent protection, soybean breeders had little incentive
to invest resources in developing new varieties.”).
89 Id. at 16.
90 For example, in 1999 a major freeze cost California’s citrus growers $600 million in crop
losses. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Seed Trade Ass’n in Support of Neither Party at 10,
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL
3353100; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Seed Trade Ass’n in Support of Respondents
at 6, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 267021. While it
is also possible to develop these traits through cross-breeding, scientists estimate that it would
take upwards of fifteen years. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Seed Trade Ass’n in Support
of Neither Party, supra at 6.
91 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 13; see also Madison Smith, Who Owns Your
Dinner? A Discussion of America’s Patented Genetically Engineered Food Sources, and Why
Reform Is Necessary, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 182, 196 (2010) (“It has been suggested that
use of herbicide tolerant crops can reduce total production costs by 6% in some cases.”).
92 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001). Notably the
PVPA only requires that the plant variety is new, distinct and uniform; it does not require
showing utility and nonobviousness. See id. at 154.
93 Id. at 143.
94 Id. at 140 (“The utility patent statute does not contain . . . exemptions” for saving seed and for
research.); see also Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1767 (2013).
95 Marcella Downing-Howk, Comment, The Horns of a Dilemma: The Application of the
Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion and Licensing of Patented Seed, 14 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV.
39, 50 (2004).
96 United States Department of Justice & United States Department of Agriculture, A Dialogue
on Competition Issues Facing Farmers in Today’s Agricultural Marketplace (Mar. 12, 2010),
88
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Once the backbone of seed germplasm research, public expenditure
leveled off in the 1970s and began to decrease by the mid-1990s.97 In
contrast, private investment in seeds and genetic trait research doubled
from $146 million to $305 million between 1979 and 1980, and
domestic soybean production has increased 96% and yields per acre
have increased 55%.98 By 2010, private investment rose to $2 billion.99
Private spending continues to outpace government spending.100
The trend toward a greater reliance on utility patents is clear.
Between 2004 and 2008, Monsanto owned a third of all utility plant
patents but only a fifth of all PVPA certificates.101 This trend is
mirrored by its closest rivals, as shown below.102 The six largest seed
companies today invest $2.2 billion annually on crop research and
development, nearly ten times the amount of the USDA, and three
(Monsanto, Syngenta and Pioneer) account for 75% of all utility patents
on plant varieties and only 44% on PVPA certificates.103 “[E]conomists
say that an industry has lost its competitive character when the

http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/AT800006/relatedresources/AnkenyIowaTra
nscript.pdf (“[I]f you look at the wheat example, there is public sector research on wheat, but I
think university professors are not real good at making cold sale calls and meeting deadlines and
forming teams, and so probably we’re not as good as we could be, as the private sector is, at
taking that basic research and turning it into a sales product. And therefore, I think there’s a
natural break-even point, and that is the public sector does a lot of basic research and should get
funding for that, but when it gets to the point where a private sector company can do it more
efficiently, then I think we need to turn it back over.”).
97 KEITH O. FUGLIE ET. AL., RESEARCH INVESTMENTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE IN THE FOOD
PROCESSING, AGRICULTURAL INPUT, AND BIOFUEL INDUSTRIES WORLDWIDE 132 fig.10 (2011)
available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/120324/2/err-130.pdf.
98 Brief of Am. Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 31,
at 6 (“Innovation spurred by the Chakrabarty decision resulted in impressive gains in nutrition
and environmental stewardship. Since 1980, total domestic soybean production has increased
96% and yields per acre have increased 55%. Soybean production has also become more
environmentally friendly. On a per-bushel basis, the land needed to produce a bushel of soybeans
declined by 35%, soil erosion decreased 66%, irrigation water applied declined by 42%, fuel
consumption decreased 42%, and greenhouse gas emissions declined by 41%.”).
99 KEITH O. FUGLIE ET. AL., supra note 97.
100 Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo & Margriet Caswell, The First Decade of Genetically Engineered
Crops in the United States 2 (2006), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/
255908/eib11_1_.pdf (“Private spending on crop variety R&D increased fourteenfold between
1960 and 1996 (adjusted for inflation), while public expenditures changed little.”); see also
GianCarlo Moschini, Competition Issues in the Seed Industry and the Role of Intellectual
Property 1 (Iowa State Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 10015, 2010), available at
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/sites/default/files/publications/papers/p11611-2010-06-08.pdf (“[I]n
agriculture, private R&D has exceeded public R&D expenditures since the early 1980s.”).
101 See infra Figure 1.
102 Id.
103 Hope Shand, The Big Six: A Profile of Corporate Power in Seeds Agrochemicals and Biotech,
THE HERITAGE FARM COMPANION (2012), available at www.seedsavers.org/site/pdf/
HeritageFarmCompanion_BigSix.pdf; see infra Figure 1; see also KEITH O. FUGLIE ET. AL.,
supra note 97, at 19.
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concentration ratio of the top four firms . . . is 40 percent or higher.”104
“As smaller, independent companies vanish from the landscape, farmers
see fewer options and higher prices in the marketplace.”105
Today, agro-biotech companies have applied for and received
patents for genes related to abiotic stress tolerance, insect resistance,
and improved yields.106 Monsanto itself is expected to introduce a
stocked soybean variety to resist herbicides needed to counter weed
varieties that have developed glyphosate resistance.107

FIGURE 1: U.S. Applications for IP Protection on Plant Varieties (2004–2008).108

With the move towards utility patents, patent owners increasingly
licensed rather than sold their seeds.109 A report by the Center for Food
Safety and Save Our Seeds summed up that:

KRISTINA HUBBARD, OUT OF HAND: FARMERS FACE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A
CONSOLIDATED
SEED
INDUSTRY
4
(2009),
available
at
http://
www.farmertofarmercampaign.com/Out%20of%20Hand.FullReport.pdf.
105 Id.
106 See ETC GROUP, CAPTURING ‘CLIMATE GENES’: GENE GIANTS STOCKPILE ‘CLIMATEREADY’ PATENTS 5 (2010) (traits related to environmental stress, such as drought, salinity, heat,
cold, chilling, freezing, nutrient levels, high light intensity, ozone, and anaerobic stresses).
107 CROPLIFE INT’L, PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY PIPELINE (2011), available at www.croplife.org/
view_document.aspx?docId=3457.
108
ETC GROUP, GENE GIANTS SEEK “PHILANTHROGOPOLY” 7 (2013), available at
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/ETCCommCharityCartel_March2013_fina
l.pdf.
109 Elizabeth I. Winston, Note, What if Seeds Were Not Patentable?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 321,
327 (2008) (“Given the limitations inherent in any form of public protection for agricultural
innovation, seed companies turned to private ordering to protect their research and development.
No longer is seed sold; now it is licensed, and with these licenses, the seed market has
fundamentally changed.”).
104
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Henceforth, plants and plant parts became eligible for utility patents,
setting the stage for prohibition of farmer seed saving and breeding
as forms of patent infringement. Today, utility patents have largely
superseded PVPA Certificates of Protection as the preferred vehicle
for intellectual property rights to new plant varieties, particularly
those developed with use of genetic engineering.110

With patent protection, crop prices have also increased. According
to the Center for Food Safety and Save Our Seeds, “[t]hese price hikes
are chiefly attributable to a ‘technology fee’ premium that the
companies charge for each GE ‘trait’ introduced into a seed line.”111
Between 1995 and 2011, the average cost of planting one acre of
soybeans rose 325%, as illustrated below.112 In particular, the cost of
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready trait has risen from $4.50 per bag in 1996
to $17.50 over a decade.113 Between 2009 and 2010, the price of
Monsanto’s seeds rose 42%.114

FIGURE 2: Crop Seed Cost Over Time (1975–2011).115

One reason for this price increase is market consolidation through
vertical integration between trait developers and seed companies.116
Independent seed companies, which have been an important channel to
get competitively priced seeds to famers, have dramatically decreased in

CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 3, at 15.
Id. at 17.
112 See infra Figure 2.
113 HUBBARD, supra note 104, at 22.
114 Jack Kaskey, Monsanto to Charge as Much as 42% More for New Seeds (Update3),
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2009, 5:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aLW8VZBkP3PA.
115
CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, SEED GIANTS VS. U.S. FARMERS 16 (2013),
available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/seed-giants_final_04424.pdf.
116 Kyle W. Stiegert et al., Innovation, Integration, and the Biotechnology Revolution in U.S.
Seed Markets, CHOICES, http://www.choicesmagazine.org/magazine/pdf/article_119.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2013).
110
111
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size over time.117 Over the years, Monsanto acquired dozens of
companies, expanding its patent portfolio and increasing its market
power. As Professor Philip Howard explained,
Monsanto was not heavily involved in the seed industry before the
mid-1980s, but is now the world’s largest seed company. Patented
technologies played a key role in this rapid takeover. US-based
Monsanto developed a leading position in transgenic traits through
both research & development, and acquisitions of biotechnology
companies. In order to deliver these technologies to farmers, as well
as increase their access to germplasm, the company made additional
acquisitions focused on seed companies, including more than 50
during the study period, [as shown in Figure 3.] . . . . Monsanto’s
near monopoly on commercial transgenic traits gave the corporation
leverage to vertically integrate industries both upstream and
downstream of farmers, through acquisitions, joint ventures and
strategic alliances.118

FIGURE 3: Monsanto Seed Company Ownership Ties.119

CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 3, at 15.
Philip H. Howard, Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996–2008, 1
SUSTAINABILITY 1266, 1274 (2009), available at http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/4/1266/pdf.
119 Id. at 1275.
117
118
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At first blush, it seems that farmers have been undeterred, with
38% of American soybean farmers using Roundup Ready seed in
1998120 to 93% in 2012.121 An amici curiae brief filed by the
Association of Soybean Farmers stated that the swift adoption by
farmers “attests to the value of biotechnology to growers . . . in
efficiency, yield and profits,” despite the requirement of annual
purchases and prohibitions on seed saving.122 More than 90% of
America’s soybean fields contain beans with the Roundup Ready
trait,123 as shown in Figure 4, with the top soybean states being
Nebraska, Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa, and most relevant here, Indiana
shown in Figure 5.

FIGURE 4: Adoption of GE Crops in the U.S.124

Janet Carpenter & Leonard Gianessi, Herbicide Tolerant Soybeans: Why Growers Are
Adopting Roundup Ready Varieties, AGBIOFORUM (1999), http://agbioforum.org/v2n2/v2n2a02carpenter.htm.
121 Roundup Ready Soybeans, SOURCEWATCH (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.sourcewatch.org/
index.php/Roundup_Ready_Soybeans; Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, Adoption of Genetically
Engineered Crops in the U.S., U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV. (July 3, 2012), available
at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-the-us.
aspx#.UmK0phbvMlI.
122 Brief of Am. Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 31,
at 18.
123 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Genetically Engineered (GE) Soybean varieties by State and United
States, 2000-2011, USDA (July 7, 2012), http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-ofgenetically-engineered-crops-in-the-us.aspx.
124 Economic Research Service, Recent Trends in GE Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (July 9,
2013), http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-theus/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption.aspx.
120
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FIGURE 5: Pounds of Glyphosate Applied in Top Soybean States.125

B. The Road to the Supreme Court
Monsanto commercializes its technology in two ways. First, it
licenses the Roundup Ready gene to seed companies that insert the trait
into the germplasm of their own seed, paying a royalty for each fifty
pound bag of seed.126 Seed companies then sell Roundup Ready seed to
farmers.127 Second, seed companies execute a license with each sale to
farmers.128 The seed companies are contractually restricted to selling
recombinant seeds only to farmers licensed by Monsanto.129
Monsanto’s license with farmers restricts them to single-season
planting, and prohibits them from supplying the seed to others for
planting as well as from saving harvest seed for replanting by
themselves or anyone else.130 Farmers typically sell their soybean

KRISTINA HUBBARD, OUT OF HAND: FARMERS FACE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A
CONSOLIDATED SEED INDUSTRY 38 (2009), available at http://farmertofarmercampaign.
com/Out%20of%20Hand.FullReport.pdf.
126 CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 3, at 17.
127 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
128 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
129 Id. at 1334–45 (“Under the Technology Agreement, the licensed grower agrees: (1) ‘to use the
seed containing Monsanto gene technologies for planting a commercial crop only in a single
season;’ (2) ‘to not supply any of this seed to any other person or entity for planting;’ (3) ‘to not
save any crop produced from this seed for replanting, or supply saved seed to anyone for
replanting;’ and (4) ‘to not use this seed or provide it to anyone for crop breeding, research,
generation of herbicide registration data, or seed production.’ Monsanto restricts the grower’s use
of the licensed Roundup Ready® seed to a single commercial crop season because the patented
Roundup Ready® genetic trait carries forward into each successive seed generation.”) (citation
omitted).
130 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, at 1339.
125
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harvest directly to processors or through grain elevators.131 Grain
elevators do not typically sell those seeds to farmers for replanting.132
Grain elevators buy a farmer’s harvested crop and test the grain for
weight, moisture, and impurities.133 If acceptable, the grain is routinely
co-mingled with grain of the same variety and sold as commodity grain
used for animal feed.134
Patent law confers on Monsanto the ability to charge a fee from
those seeking access to its technology. It follows from the ability to
exclude that Monsanto can also control who can get access and on what
terms. About 75% of agricultural patent infringement cases have
involved Monsanto. 135 It aggressively protects its technology by suing
competitors and farmers alike for patent infringement.136 By January
2013, Monsanto had filed 144 infringement lawsuits against 410
farmers and 56 small businesses or farm companies, “in at least 27
different states.”137 Vernon Bowman, a soybean farmer from Knox
County, Indiana, was one of them.
Bowman took a license from Pioneer Hi-Bred, one of Monsanto’s
licensed seed companies.138 Each year Bowman bought seed from
Pioneer for first planting of the season.139 That sale was subject to a
Technology Agreement restricting planting to a single season.140
Bowman did not replant any of that seed.141 Bowman also bought grain
from a local grain elevator for more risky late season planting, as shown
in Figure 6.142

See Brief of CropLife Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 27, at 3.
Id.
133 Brief for Amicus Curiae CHS Inc. in Support of Respondents at 4, Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 315222.
134 Id.
135 DIANA L. MOSS, TRANSGENIC SEED PLATFORMS: COMPETITION BETWEEN A ROCK AND A
HARD PLACE?, AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE WHITE PAPER 25 (Oct. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/content/american-antitrust-institute-says-competitiontransgenic-seed-industry-impaired-monsanto (“About 55 percent of those cases involved
Monsanto as the plaintiff and about 20 percent as the defendant. This means that the company has
been involved in about three-quarters of all agricultural biotechnology litigation over the last ten
years.”).
136 Id.
137 See CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 3, at 30.
138 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
131
132

Lim-galleyed-FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES

12/21/13 12:55 PM

153

Figure 6: Relationships Between Parties in Bowman v. Monsanto.143
Commodity grain is considerably cheaper than Monsanto’s seed.144
Monsanto had not required the grain elevator to differentiate the
seeds.145 Neither Monsanto nor the grain elevator imposed restrictions
on Bowman’s purchased grain.146 Bowman applied glyphosate-based
herbicide to the fields where he had planted the grain.147 It is undisputed
that Bowman intentionally planted the seed he bought from the grain
elevator to grow a new crop of soybeans.148 Bowman confirmed that
many of the plants he planted in his fields in Indiana were indeed
Roundup resistant.149 He saved some of the crop to replant the next
growing season, and continued to do so for eight successive harvests,
while deliberately using the glyphosate-resistant properties.150 He did
not attempt to hide his activities and explained his practices to
Judith U. Kim & Jorge A. Goldstein, In Oral Arguments During Bowman v. Monsanto the
Supreme Court Struggles with Exhaustion Doctrine for Patented Seeds, STERNE, KESSLER,
GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://skgf.com/media/pnc/1/media.1921.pdf.
144 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
145 See Brief for Amicus Curiae CHS Inc. in Support of Respondents, supra note 134, at 9.
(“Grain is by far less expensive than seed because it is undifferentiated, commingled, being used
for a different purpose and performs a different function than seed. Seed has a much higher
margin than grain because it is certified, tested and tracked.”).
146 Daniel Winston & Margaret E. Ives, How Bowman V. Monsanto May Wreak Havoc On
Biotechnology, LAW360 (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.choate.com/uploads/113/doc/How%
20Bowman%20V.%20Monsanto%20May%20Wreak%20Havoc%20On%20Biotechnology.pdf.
147 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
148 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (2013).
149 Id. at 1769.
150 Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 7 (“Beginning in 1999, petitioner purchased
commodity soybeans from a grain elevator and used them to grow ‘second crop’ soybeans—i.e.,
soybeans planted and harvested after another crop. As petitioner hoped and expected, most of
those soybeans carried the Roundup Ready® trait. Petitioner then took advantage of the
soybeans’ glyphosate tolerance by spraying his fields with glyphosate, thereby killing not only
the weeds but also all of the soybean plants that did not contain Monsanto’s patented
biotechnology. Petitioner sold most of his harvested crop to a grain elevator but saved some to
plant the following year. He repeated this practice for the next eight years, adding to his stock of
saved seeds by making periodic additional purchases of commodity soybeans from the grain
elevator and killing off all plants that lacked the patented biotechnology by spraying his fields.”).
143
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Monsanto’s representatives.151
The district court granted summary judgment on patent
infringement in Monsanto’s favor and the Federal Circuit affirmed for
two reasons.152 First, Monsanto neither made, nor permitted an
unconditional sale of modified soybeans.153 Rather, seeds for planting
were only sold through authorized channels and subject to a license
defining allowed uses.154 Further, the grain sold to Bowman had various
uses, including use as feed.155 Second, even if exhaustion applied, each
new soybean seed that Bowman grew violated Monsanto’s exclusive
right to “make” its invention.156 The Federal Circuit justified its
conclusion with the policy rationale that applying patent exhaustion to
SRTs would eviscerate the rights of patent holders.157 Monsanto won
$84,456 from its suit against Bowman.158 Ironically, it was Bowman’s
bankruptcy that provided the financial insulation and impetus for
continuing his struggle against Monsanto, first by representing himself
pro se, and eventually through pro bono representation at the Supreme
Court.159
On December 3, 2012, Bowman filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court, placing before the Court two questions
for consideration: “[w]hether the Federal Circuit erred by (1) refusing to
find patent exhaustion in patented seeds even after an authorized sale
and by (2) creating an exception to the doctrine of patent exhaustion for
self-replicating technologies?”160
The Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing
the government’s views on the issue.161 The Solicitor General
recommended against taking the case, warning of unforeseen
consequences for other SRTs such as “man-made cell lines, DNA
molecules, [and] some nanotechnologies,” advising instead that the
Court allow case law to develop further before deciding on the limits of
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1346.
Id. at 1343.
153 Id. (holding that the exhaustion doctrine was not implicated since the sales were conditional).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1348.
156 Id. (“Even if Monsanto’s patent rights in the commodity seeds are exhausted, such a
conclusion would be of no consequence because once a grower, like Bowman, plants the
commodity seeds containing Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® technology and the next generation of
seed develops, the grower has created a newly infringing article.”).
157 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348.
158 See Garofalo, supra note 3.
159 Id.
160 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (Dec. 20, 2011), 2011
WL 6468161.
161 See U.S. Supreme Court Seeks Input from Solicitor General in Monsanto Patent Exhaustion
Case, V&E IP INSIGHTS E-COMMUNICATION (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.velaw.com/resources/
SupremeCourtSeeksInputSolicitorGeneralMonsantoPatentExhaustionCase.aspx.
151
152
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patent exhaustion in this area.162 Moreover, the brief urged Congress
was “better equipped” to resolve competing policy considerations.163
One such concern was the likelihood that Monsanto would be limited to
charging for a single sale if exhaustion indeed applied, as farmers would
be able to save and plant seeds from their harvests thereafter.164 At the
same time, while the issue did not arise in Bowman v. Monsanto, the
brief implicitly cautioned that the Federal Circuit should scrupulously
adopt the Supreme Court precedent in favor of the Federal Circuit’s
own earlier precedent to avoid fueling a petition for review in some
future case.165
Despite the Solicitor General’s recommendation to the contrary,
the Court granted Bowman’s petition. The significance of the Court’s
getting it right in the Bowman v. Monsanto case was not lost to Solicitor
General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., who noted at a public forum that the
Court had “some very significant questions before it” and “its
determination about whether a company’s patent for a geneticallymodified seed extends to the seeds’ successive generations, which may
have far-reaching implications beyond the soybean industry.”166
The case attracted an unusually large number of amicus briefs—
twenty-three, filed by a wide range of interests, from companies selling
software to those selling spare parts.167 Eighteen briefs sided with
Monsanto. Some of the briefs were from predictable sources—patentcentric businesses and associations, and Monsanto’s rival and licensee,
Pioneer.168 Notably, the American Soybean Association (“ASA”),
representing 22,000 farmers in thirty-one states, was counted among the
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 19 (“The Court should allow the
case law to develop further before considering whether to adopt a more restrictive definition of
“making” that could have unforeseen consequences for other present and future self-replicating
technologies.”).
163 Id. at 18.
164 Id. at 17–18. For example, the brief recognized the reality that adopting the view that
exhaustion applied to progeny seeds could mean that “[t]he incentive to invest in innovation and
research might well be diminished if the patent term for genetically modified crops was
effectively reduced from 20 years to a single year or even a single growing season.” Id. at 18.
165 Id. at 32–33.
166 Danielle Dellerson, Past, Present Solicitors General Shine Light on Overshadowed Cases, 85
PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 649, 673 (2013); see Clement and Verrilli: “Supreme
Court Review: The Most Important Cases Affecting Business and Their Implications,”
GEORGETOWN LAW (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/clement-and-verrillisupreme-court-review.cfm.
167 See Brief Amici Curiae of Auto. Aftermarket Indus. Ass’n et al. in Support of the Petitioner,
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2012 WL 6203694; Brief of the
BSA | The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Bowman v.
Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (Jan. 23, 2013), 2013 WL 267020.
168 Some of those predictable sources include the American Intellectual Property Law
Association, Biotechnology Industry Organization, CropLife International and CropLife America,
Intellectual Property Owners Association, New York Intellectual Property Law Association,
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.
162
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ranks of Monsanto’s supporters.169 The ASA declared that “[w]eeds are
the most significant economic challenge to global food production,”170
and that farmers “readily adopted” Roundup Ready seed even though it
was “more expensive than conventional seed” because it “simplified
weed management.”171 Bowman’s supporters included after-market
interests, food-related non-profits, and the American Antitrust Institute
(“AAI”).172 One issue that parties on both sides agreed on was that
exhaustion or infringement was an inappropriate means to address the
issue.173 Another was that Congress would be better placed to devise
exceptions to the rule.174
Patent blogger and attorney Gene Quinn, in reflecting on the oral
arguments on February 19, 2013, wrote “[i]n what can only be
characterized as a VERY hot Supreme Court, the questions and banter
did not cease.”175 A key recurring theme was raised by Chief Justice
John Roberts at the very start: “Why in the world would anybody spend
any money to try to improve the seed if as soon as they sold the first one
anybody could grow more and have as many of those seeds as they
want?”176
Justice Kagan noted that contracts seem an insufficient means for
patent owners to appropriate their investments “because all that has to
happen is that one seed escapes the web of these contracts, and that seed
because it can self-replicate in the way that it can, essentially makes all
the contracts worthless.”177 She also noted that a buyer does not have
the right to make a copy of the article and Bowman was looking for an
exception.178
169

See Brief of Am. Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note

31.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 18.
172 See Brief of Amici Curiae the Am. Antitrust Inst. et al., Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No.11796), 2012 WL 6208274; Brief of Auto. Aftermarket Indus. Ass’n et al. in Support of the
Petitioner, supra note 167; Brief for Amici Curiae Ctr. for Food Safety & Save Our Seeds in
Support of Petitioner, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No.11-796), supra note 110.
173 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 1,
at 17 (“Rather, if petitioner’s approach were adopted, the first authorized sale of a single Roundup
Ready soybean would extinguish all of respondent’s patent rights to that soybean and to all of its
progeny.”).
174 Id. (“The carefully tailored exemptions and defenses Congress has enacted in similar contexts,
including the PVPA, are simply unavailable to this Court.”).
175 Gene Quinn, Argument Summary: Supreme Court Hears Bowman v. Monsanto,
IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 20, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/20/argumentsummary-supreme-court-hears-bowman-v-monsanto/id=35787/. Mark Walters represented
Vernon Bowman, Melissa Arbus Sherry represented the United States (supporting Monsanto’s
position) and Seth Waxman represented Monsanto. Id.
176 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (Feb. 19, 2013).
177 Id. at 19.
178 Id. at 14. Justice Breyer seemed to concur: “[w]hen you create a new generation, you have
made a patented item, which you cannot do without the approval of the patent owner.” Id. at 16.
170
171
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In response to deference to Congressional action, Justice Ginsburg
suggested that the issue of SRTs “need not be left to Congress because
this issue had not come up before and the Court had never found that an
exception does or does not apply and would therefore not be going
against precedent in deciding the case.”179 She replied that “the seeds
are owned by the farmer. But when he uses them to grow more seeds,
he’s infringing on that patent. So I don’t think that the ownership has
anything to do with it.”180 Echoing the Federal Circuit, the U.S.
government argued that exhaustion was not at issue and that applying
exhaustion would reduce twenty years of exclusivity conferred by
patent law to a one-time sale.181 In response, Chief Justice Roberts
reiterated Justice Ginsburg’s willingness for the Court to speak on the
issue and said that merely because the Court had not applied exhaustion
in the context of SRTs did not rule out its applicability here.182
Justice Scalia expressed concern about “innocent” infringers, who
did not intend to plant traited seeds, being sued,183 a concern shared by
Justices Kennedy and Kagan,184 the latter noting that it was a
“worrisome thing” because Monsanto’s position had “the capacity to
make infringers out of everybody. And that is highlighted actually in
this case by how successful this product is and how large a percentage
of the market it has had.”185 Justice Kagan also wanted the
government’s view on whether the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale
doctrine was “causing trouble as it presently exists in the Federal
Circuit.” Again the government replied that the Court need not do
anything about it in this case.186
The performance of former Solicitor General Seth Waxman, who
represented Monsanto, was described as “a tour-de-force.”187 Waxman
argued that Roundup Ready was like a vaccine and that “it’s
unsupportable to say that you cannot sell a quantity of that vaccine

Krista Cox, SCOTUS Oral Arguments in Bowman v. Monsanto; Court to Decide Application
of Patent Exhaustion to Self-Replicating Technology, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL
(Feb. 19, 2013), http://keionline.org/node/1654; see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 176,
at 13.
180 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 176, at 17.
181 Id. at 27.
182 Id. at 25–26.
183 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (Feb. 19, 2013).
184 Id. at 54–55; id. at 41.
185 Id. at 41.
186 Id. at 34. The “conditional sale” doctrine, as articulated by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, allowed the patent owner to retain the right to sue for patent infringement as long
as the payment received was less than the full value of the rights embodied in the patent sold.
187 Dennis Crouch, Oral Arguments in Bowman v. Monsanto, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/02/bowman-v-monsanto.html [hereinafter Crouch, Oral
Arguments in Bowman v. Monsanto].
179
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without exhausting all of your rights in it.”188 Chief Justice Roberts
pointed out that was “not quite on point because it’s not a situation
where the intended use of the vaccine necessarily results in regeneration
of it.”189 Justice Breyer wanted to know if there was a patent law
provision that dealt with SRTs that “end[s] up inadvertently all over the
place.”190 Waxman conceded that infringement was a strict liability tort
but required volitional conduct which was absent if infringement was
truly inadvertent.191
C. Judgment
Leading newspapers and intellectual property blogs guessed that
the ruling would be unanimous.192 And so it was.193 The Court held that
buying seed that had been legitimately sold did not confer on Bowman
the right to replant and make new seeds without Monsanto’s
permission.194 What the patent exhaustion doctrine allowed Bowman to
do was to “resell the patented soybeans he purchased from the grain
elevator” and “consume the beans himself or feed them to his
animals.”195 It did “not enable Bowman to make additional patented
soybeans without Monsanto’s permission (either express or
implied).”196 In doing so, the Court recognized that a “use” that
impinged on the “make” right was an impermissible use since the

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 176, at 51. Contra Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 1, at 18 (“[These patents] would lose much of
their value if purchasers of patented bacteria or other self-replicating products could reproduce
and sell those items free from the restraints of patent law.”).
189 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 176, at 52.
190 Id. at 44.
191 Id.
192 Crouch, Oral Arguments in Bowman v. Monsanto, supra note 187 (“My expectation here is
that the court will side with Monsanto and find that a sale of patents [sic] seeds does not exhaust
the patent rights as to progeny seeds that are grown. I will not be surprised if that result is 9-0.”);
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Appears to Defend Patent on Soybean, NYTIMES.COM (Feb. 19,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/20/business/justices-signal-a-monsanto-edge-in-patentcase.html (“A lawyer for Monsanto, Seth P. Waxman, a former United States solicitor general,
was allowed to talk uninterrupted for long stretches, which is usually a sign of impending
victory.”); Quinn, supra note 175 (“While one can never know for certain how the Supreme
Court will rule, even a casual observer has to conclude that the Supreme Court seems poised [to]
rule in favor of Monsanto.”).
193 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (2013).
194 Id. at 1764 (2013) (“Under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the authorized sale of a patented
article gives the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, a right to use or resell that article. Such a
sale, however, does not allow the purchaser to make new copies of the patented invention.”); see
also id. (“The question in this case is whether a farmer who buys patented seeds may reproduce
them through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission. We hold that he
may not.”).
195 Id. at 1766.
196 Id.
188
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“make” right was not exhausted by Monsanto’s authorized first sale.197
This conclusion also accords with the notion that exhaustion applies
only to the particular article sold.198 The Court noted that it would be
contrary to its own precedent in J.E.M. which denied farmers the right
to save harvested seed for replanting where the technology was
patented, unlike protection under the PVPA, which allowed
replanting.199
At its core, the judgment sought to ensure that Monsanto’s
inventive concept was adequately protected against unjustified
freeriding. The Court rejected Bowman’s “blame the bean” defense.200
According to the Court, Bowman was not a passive observer, nor did
his seeds spontaneously create successive soybean crops.201 Since most
of the local farms use Roundup Ready soybean seeds, Bowman “could
anticipate that many of the purchased soybeans would contain
Monsanto’s patented technology.”202 Over eight successive harvests, he
openly “planted Monsanto’s patented soybeans solely to make and
market replicas of them, thus depriving the company of the reward
patent law provides for the sale of each article. Patent exhaustion
provides no haven for that conduct.”203
The Court reasoned that if Bowman could make and sell endless
copies of Monsanto’s seed, the patent would effectively protect just a
single sale.204 Here Bowman faced the difficult task of convincing the
Court that his conduct was a fair exploitation of a legal loophole that, if
upheld, would not critically undermine a system of appropriation that
underlies innovation in crops upon which farmers like Bowman
depend.205 The Court thereby drew a line at “making” the seeds by
using them, finding that such a “use” would cause patents to “plummet
in value after the first sale of the first item containing the invention.”206
The Court also addressed the broader issue of SRTs, albeit
obliquely. It recognized that such technologies were “becoming ever
Id. at 1764.
Id. at 1766 (“Consistent with that rationale, the doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights only as to
the “particular article” sold . . . . “).
199 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768.
200 Id. at 1769 (“But we think that blame-the-bean defense tough to credit.”).
201 Id. (“In all this, the bean surely figured. But it was Bowman, and not the bean, who controlled
the reproduction (unto the eighth generation) of Monsanto’s patented invention.”).
202 Id. at 1765.
203 Id. at 1769.
204 Id. at 1766.
205 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013) (“Our holding today is limited—
addressing the situation before us, rather than every one involving a self-replicating product.”).
206 Id. at 1768 (“Reproducing a patented article no doubt ‘uses’ it after a fashion. But as already
explained, we have always drawn the boundaries of the exhaustion doctrine to exclude that
activity, so that the patentee retains an undiminished right to prohibit others from making the
thing his patent protects.”).
197
198
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more prevalent, complex, and diverse,” and sought to find the correct
balance between innovation and reward.207 On one hand, it seems clear
that the Court recognized that siding with Bowman may result in more
robust rights for farmers and users of patented technology in general. At
the same time, interpreting this “first sale” doctrine too broadly could
destabilize innovation incentives in these industries.
Recognizing the potential for unintended consequences, the Court
stressed the limited nature of its holding. It noted that in another case,
reproduction “might occur outside the purchaser’s control” or “might be
a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose.”208
An example of the former would be pollen drift. The threat of
transgenic contamination troubled organic farmers sufficiently for them
to seek a declaratory action for invalidity against Monsanto.209 An
example of the latter would be replicating pluripotent stem cells,
plasmids or recombinant genes for diagnostic or therapeutic uses.210
This issue is discussed further in the next part of the Article.
One commentator, troubled by the Court’s lack of guidance in
these areas, observed that “the question persists as to whether such
replication will be permitted or considered an unlicensed
‘remanufacture’ or new making of the original, patented item.”211
Commentators have uniformly regarded the cabining of Bowman v.
Monsanto to its particular facts as more illusory than real.212 More
Id. at 1769.
Id.
209 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
210 See, e.g., Tony Dutra, Unanimous Supreme Court Says No Patent Exhaustion for Monsanto
Roundup Seeds, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 14, 2013), http://www.bna.com/unanimous-supremecourt-n17179874022/.
211 Chris Jeffers et al., How Monsanto Applies to Nonagricultural Biotechnology, LEXOLOGY
(May 23, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=014a4e9a-35fa-4010-a8d1f2ddcbf33fd2 (“Biotechnology inventions such as cell lines, bacteria, and other living material
often must exist in a condition of continuous self-replication simply to be maintained for any use.
Vectors, plasmids, etc., replicate within cells, and from generation to generation within host cells,
allowing for production of vastly more nucleic acid copies than initially used for transfection.
Even small linear nucleic acids such as those used for primers and probes may be ‘replicated’ to
generate large quantities relatively easily using PCR or other methods in molecular biology. In
each case, (cells, viruses, vectors, probes), something analogous to planting, watering, cultivating,
is required.”).
212 Dutra, supra note 210 (“Though she acknowledged that the court explicitly limited its
decision to the facts of this case, Jean [Patrice P. Jean of Kenyon & Kenyon, New York] asserted
that the court’s language related to the economic benefit concern “suggested that the court can
and might apply an exclusion of the exhaustion doctrine to other self-replicating technologies on
a case by case basis depending on whether it believes application of the doctrine would stifle
innovation.”); see also Paul Warden-Hutton & Nigel J. Parker, Fe fi fo fum—Bowan [sic],
Monsanto and the Soybeanstalk, LEXOLOGY (May 22, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=d52ab8de-b571-4365-ae66-85c993f6a206 (“[T]he Decision in this US case
has broader application than just the field of biological sciences because self-replication occurs in
other arts, such as the electronic arts, in for example, code replication and in the Chemical arts in,
for example, polymerization reactions. . . . [T]he Court’s rationale should be of benefit to future
207
208
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fundamentally, the Court seemed to be carving out judicial exceptions
for SRTs. The patent statute establishes strict liability for patent
infringement.213 The intent of those using, making, or selling the
patented plant without authorization is irrelevant. If industry-specific
exceptions to infringement are warranted for incidental or unintentional
reproduction of the patented article, then Congress rather than the courts
must be the appropriate forum for the balancing of competing
interests.214
Another issue that remained unresolved in the wake of Bowman v.
Monsanto was the Federal Circuit’s “conditional sale” doctrine, which
would have allowed patent owners to sue for patent infringement if a
purchaser breached a contractual term restricting it from reselling or
using the article in a specified manner.215 In its brief, the U.S.
government had expressly noted that the doctrine allowed “patent
holders to retain control over the use or resale of a patented article even
after an authorized sale of that article has occurred—the very thing the
exhaustion doctrine is intended to prevent.”216 Justice Sonia Sotomayor
had asked whether the Court was “explicit enough in Quanta” that it did
not “have to address whatever lingering confusion the Federal Circuit
may have with respect to conditional sales at all in this case[.]”217
Monsanto’s counsel, Seth Waxman, avoided the issue by responding
that the Federal Circuit did not rely on it in Bowman v. Monsanto, and
nothing was said about it in the Court’s opinion.218
As early as at the end of the oral arguments, it was clear that the
biggest question was not who would win. Rather, it was why the
Supreme Court had even taken the case. Against the Solicitor General’s
advice, at least four justices wanted to hear the case.219 Yet both the oral
arguments and judgment showed that Bowman’s attorney, Mark
Walters, seemed alone on the view that the patent rights of Monsanto
should not extend to the progeny of seeds that it had sold with its full
considerations of self-replicating technologies, regardless of the technical field, because a
determination of whether or not the alleged infringing act has derived the benefit of the patented
invention will be pertinent to a finding of infringement or otherwise.”).
213 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010) (intent or fault are not listed as elements of patent infringement);
see also Jessica Lynd, Comment, Gone with the Wind: Why Even Utility Patents Cannot Fence in
Self-Replicating Technologies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 663, 666 (2013) (“Patent infringement is a
strict liability offense, and, as such, intent or fault on the part of the alleged infringer is irrelevant.
In addition, courts have not found it relevant to infringement that the GM contamination actually
causes financial and legal harm to the alleged infringer by contaminating his or her conventional
crop and trespassing onto his or her land.”).
214 See infra note 278.
215 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
216 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 1, at 7.
217 Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (Feb. 19, 2013).
218 Id. at 3.
219 On the “rule of four”, see generally Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 521 (1957).
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permission, and which had been bought by Bowman without any
restrictions for over eight years.
The answer may well be that Bowman v. Monsanto was never just
about Bowman. In Bilski v. Kappos, the Court was asked to determine
whether a method of risk hedging was patentable subject matter.220
Observers largely agreed that the case was straightforward on facts but
called into question broader issues which the Court wanted to
address.221 In Bilski, it was the rejection of the Federal Circuit’s
“machine-or-transformation” test as the sole test for determining patent
eligibility.222
What about Bowman v. Monsanto? The oral arguments and
judgment indicate that there are three themes that concerned the Court.
First, the Court sought to draw a workable distinction between the
exclusive right to “use” and “make” in the context of SRTs.223 Second
and relatedly, the Court sought to determine whether there was a more
appropriate business model to reconcile the competing interests of the
owners and users of SRTs.224 Third, the Court was concerned about how
the strict liability nature of patent infringement would potentially
ensnare those who unknowingly or even unwillingly “make” the
invention in the course of normal business or social activities.225 It is to
these that the discussion will now turn.
II. THE LIMITS OF EXHAUSTION
Patent exhaustion is over a hundred and fifty years old.226 New
technologies continue to challenge its limits, and those that selfreplicate join a long line of predecessors. Part A highlights three
important lessons that may be gleaned about patent exhaustion: first,
that an authorized sale exhausts general “use” restrictions on a patented
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
See,
e.g.,
Patentable
Subject
Matter:
In
re
Bilski,
WILMERHALE,
http://www.wilmerhale.com/Patentable_Subject_Matteri_In_re_Bilskii_Current_Development/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (“As largely expected, the Supreme Court on June 28, 2010 held that
the claims of Bernard Bilski’s and Rand Warsaw’s patent application were not directed to
patentable subject matter.”).
222 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (“The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding
whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’).
223 See e.g., Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (2013) (“Reproducing a patented
article no doubt “uses” it after a fashion. But as already explained, we have always drawn the
boundaries of the exhaustion doctrine to exclude that activity, so that the patentee retains an
undiminished right to prohibit others from making the thing his patent protects.”).
224 Id. (“[I]f simple copying were a protected use, a patent would plummet in value after the first
sale of the first item containing the invention.”).
225 Id. at 1769.
226 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (“For over 150 years this
Court has applied the doctrine of patent exhaustion to limit the patent rights that survive the initial
authorized sale of a patented item.”).
220
221
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article; second, that post-sale restrictions are enforced under contract
law, not patent law; third, the sale of articles substantially embodying
patented technologies can exhaust those technologies, and even other
associated patented technologies associated with its use, if no creative
or inventive decision is required in practicing the invention.
An argument may be offered that no creative or inventive decision
was required to “making” new seed from the old in Bowman v.
Monsanto. But the Court was closed to a reading of uses of the seed that
would result in the reproduction of new seed. Part B examines the
dichotomy between “make” and “use”, and proposes a three-step test to
provide a commercially workable balance between the interests of
innovators in self-replicating technologies and their users. Part C
surveys five alternatives to patent infringement, and explains why their
limitations justify the Court’s holding in Bowman. Part D confronts the
externalities created by the Court’s holding—the risk of “innocent” and
“incidental” infringement, as well as those who remain liable for patent
infringement under the Federal Circuit’s “conditional sale” doctrine.
A. Three Lessons from History
Patent exhaustion dates back at least to the 1873 decision of
Adams v. Burke.227 Burke, an undertaker, bought coffin lids from a
company licensed to sell them only within a ten-mile radius of
Boston.228 The assignee sued Burke for using the lids he bought in its
territory, which fell outside the territorial restriction. In finding for
Burke, the Supreme Court recognized the separability of rights
conferred by the patent to sell, make, and use.229 At the same time, once
the patented article is sold, the patentee has received its reward, and the
buyer obtains a right to use it free of the restraint.230 In the context of
seeds and other SRTs it is significant that the Court noted that this
principle “must be much more applicable to an instrument or product of
patented manufacture which perishes in the first use of it, or which, by
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873) (“The question presented by the plea in this case is
a very interesting one in patent law, and the precise point in it has never been decided by this
Court, though cases involving some of the considerations which apply to it have been decided,
and others of analogous character are frequently recurring.”). “When a machine passes to the
hands of a purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly; it passes outside of it, and
is no longer under the protection of the act of Congress.” Id. at 460 (referring to the lower court’s
reliance on the principle enunciated in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852)).
228 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457 (1873).
229 Id. at 456 (“The right to manufacture, the right to sell, and the right to use are each substantive
rights, and may be granted or conferred separately by the patentee.”).
230 Id. at 455 (“[T]he sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell and use . . . a machine
carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be used in point
of time.”); id. at 456 (reasoning that the sale constitutes “all the royalty or consideration which he
claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or instrument”).
227
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that first use, becomes incapable of further use, and of no further
value.”231
Adams thus introduces the first aspect of patent exhaustion: that an
authorized sale exhausts general “use” restrictions on a patented article.
As Alfred Server and William Casey observe, a cornerstone of the
Adams Court’s decision—that the patent owner had received its
reward—“has been interpreted differently by the courts over the
years.”232 One interpretation is the “single reward” view expressed by
the Supreme Court in Hobbie v. Jennison, self-styled as “the true
interpretation of the decision in Adams v. Burke,” where the patent
owner is entitled to a single payment at the time of sale.233 Another is
the “conditional sales” doctrine articulated by the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., where the
patent owner retained the right to sue for patent infringement as long as
the payment received was less than the full value of the rights embodied
in the patent sold.234 Mallinckrodt re-animated, within articles that had
been sold, the rights of patent owners to control patented articles as they
made their way through downstream channels of trade.235 Only if it
“ventured beyond the patent grant and into behavior having an
anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule of reason” would
those conditions be prohibited.236 This split was central to the outcome
in Bowman v. Monsanto; the missed opportunity to clarify the issue will
mean that it will likely to resurface in future cases.
The second important proposition of law was articulated in 1895
by the Court in Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co.237 In holding that
patent rights over beds re-sold in Massachusetts were exhausted by a
first sale in Michigan, the Court recognized that post-sale restrictions
were enforced under contract law and not patent law.238 In 1938, the
Id. at 456.
Alfred C. Server & William J. Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented
Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 567 (2013).
233 Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355, 361 (1893).
234 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (1992) (holding that a manufacturer of
medical equipment could sue a company that refurbished equipment covered by “single use”
licensing restrictions for infringement). The Mallinckrodt court reasoned that because the sale
was conditional, patent exhaustion did not apply. Id. In B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
the court elaborated that with conditional sales, the patent owner did not receive “an amount
equal to the full value of the goods.” 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997). It was “more
reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the ‘use’ rights
conferred by the patentee.” Id.
235 Downing-Howk, supra note 95, at 53 (“Restrictions on sales which would have been
forbidden under the Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion were allowed as a result of the Mallinckrodt
decision if the sale was rewritten as a limitation on the scope of a license.”).
236 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
237 Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895).
238 Id. at 666 (“[O]ne who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to sell them
becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, unrestricted in time or place. Whether
231
232
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Court in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.
provided an important caveat to this proposition.239 The patentee in that
case restricted licensees in selling patented amplifiers to private home
radio users and not for commercial use in theatres.240 In finding that
exhaustion was not triggered because the patentee had expressly
prohibited sale for commercial use, the Court found both the licensee
and the buyer infringed the patents.241
In 1942, the Court articulated the third important proposition of
law in a case blending antitrust into the law of exhaustion.242 The Univis
Lens Company was licensed to make and sell lens blanks to other
licensees for use in eyeglasses at a price specified by the patent
owner.243 The government challenged the resale price maintenance
arrangement as a violation of the Sherman Act.244 The Court held that
the exhaustion of its patents removed any justification for controlling
the prices of the lens blanks sold, even though the lens blanks did not
fully embody the patent until they were finished as multifocal eyeglass
lenses.245 The Court found that the lens blanks embodied the “essential
features” of the patent and “has destined . . . to be finished by the
purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so far as
it . . . may be embodied in that particular article.”246 In light of the
Court’s recent decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., one might say that the last step amounted to
“insignificant post-solution activity.”247 Univis left open the question of
whether “essential features” meant all the elements recited in the
a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the
purchasers is not a question before us, and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however,
obvious that such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the
inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws.”).
239 Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), reh’g granted, 305 U.S.
124 (1938), reh’g denied, 305 U.S. 675 (1939).
240 Id. at 180.
241 Id. at 182.
242 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
243 Id. at 243–44.
244 Id. at 242–43.
245 Id. at 252 (“Whether the licensee sells the patented article in its completed form or sells it
before completion for the purpose of enabling the buyer to finish and sell it, he has equally parted
with the article, and made it the vehicle for transferring to the buyer ownership of the invention
with respect to that article. To that extent he has parted with his patent monopoly in either case,
and has received in the purchase price every benefit of that monopoly which the patent law
secures to him.”).
246 Id. at 251; see id. at 249 (“[E]ach blank . . . embodies essential features of the patented device
and is without utility until it is ground and polished as the finished lens of the patent.”).
247 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012) (quoting
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); see also id. (“[A]ny additional steps consist of
well-understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community;
and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts
taken separately.”).
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claim.248 This question had to wait half a century more for its answer.
Univis also showed that patentees who find themselves on the
wrong side of an exhaustion finding might be in peril of violating the
antitrust laws.249 In light of the more permissive view of resale price
maintenance agreements following from Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., while patent owners may find themselves
with exhausted patent rights, antitrust liability is no longer automatic.250
At the time, patent owners would do well to recognize from Univis that
acting within the scope of their patent rights is no bar to exhaustion.251
And indeed, as the Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.
recently held, neither will this justification shield them from antitrust
violations.252
These three propositions of law came together in 2008 in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.253 LG Electronics licensed
software patents to Intel Corp. with rights to “make, use, sell (directly
and indirectly), offer to sell, [or] import” products practicing its patents,
but restricted those rights to Intel and not to third party buyers.254
Ostensibly to avoid falling afoul of federal preemption, the license
noted that it was not intended to modify the principles of patent
exhaustion.255 Quanta Computer bought microprocessors and chipsets
from Intel and combined them with non-Intel components in violation
of a separate agreement between LG and Intel that the latter would
notify its buyers not to engage in the prohibited combination.256
The Court reiterated its earlier position in Univis, stating that
exhaustion applied even if the articles themselves did not fully embody
the patent as long as they embodied its “essential features” and their
“only reasonable and intended use” was to practice the patent.257 Intel’s
products had “no reasonable noninfringing use” because there was no
reasonable way to use Intel’s chipsets until the chipsets were connected
to buses and memory by computer manufacturers such as Quanta.258
Yuichi Watanabe, The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion: The Impact of Quanta Computer, Inc.
v. LG Elecs., Inc., 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 273 (2009).
249 See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942) (finding violation of the
Sherman Act for illegal price-fixing).
250 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
251 See also Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding
that the patent exhaustion doctrine also applies “to a sale of a patented product manufactured by a
licensee acting within the scope of its license”).
252 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
253 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
254 Id. at 623.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 624.
257 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 630 (2008).
258 Id. at 638; see also id. at 632 (“LGE has suggested no reasonable use for the Intel Products
other than incorporating them into computer systems that practice the LGE Patents. Nor can we
248
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The products also included “all the inventive aspects” of the patents.259
The only required steps to practice the patents involved connecting
buses and adding memory, both of which were routine and ancillary
steps.260 The item sold then carried with it the right to use it “to the full
extent to which it can be used.”261 Since Intel’s chipsets included all the
inventive aspects and “all but practiced” LG’s patents, the Court
concluded that LG’s patents were exhausted when Intel sold chipsets
practicing LG’s method patents to Quanta.262
Referring to Keeler, the Court held that LG had no patent remedy
against Quanta since its patents were exhausted.263 Unlike the infringerlicensee in General Talking Pictures,264 Intel was authorized to sell the
patented-laden chipsets to Quanta.265 The fact that Quanta went and
acted in violation of the agreement between Intel and LG was a matter
of contract law.266 While the Court refrained from discussing the
conditional sale doctrine, courts and commentators alike have read the
doctrine to be extinguished.267
From the foregoing one can conclude that the first authorized and
unrestricted sale of a patented article exhausts the rights in that article in
order to prevent patent owners from obtaining royalties by double
dipping.268 If patent owners like Monsanto could control every use, sale
or making of the seeds in the marketplace, the property rights of endconsumers such as farmers would be eroded, and intermediate service
providers such as seed cleaners and grain elevators could become
can discern one: A microprocessor or chipset cannot function until it is connected to buses and
memory.”) (footnote omitted).
259 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (“Intel’s microprocessors and
chipsets substantially embodied the LGE Patents because they had no reasonable noninfringing
use and included all the inventive aspects of the patented methods.”).
260 Id. at 637.
261 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873) (“[T]he traditional bar on patent restrictions
following the sale of an item applies when the item sufficiently embodies the patent—even if it
does not completely practice the patent—such that its only and intended use is to be finished
under the terms of the patent.”).
262 See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 634 (“Intel all but practiced the patent itself by designing its products
to practice the patents.”).
263 Id. at 637, n.7. (“We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not necessarily
limit LGE’s other contract rights. LGEs complaint does not include a breach-of-contract claim,
and we express no opinion on whether contract damages might be available even though
exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages.” (citing Keeler)).
264 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938).
265 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636 (2008).
266 Id.
267 See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585
(E.D. Ky. 2009) (“After reviewing Quanta, Mallinckrodt, and the parties’ arguments, this Court is
persuaded that Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt sub silentio.”).
268 Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp., 846 F. Supp. 522, 539 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (recognizing that the
purpose of the patent exhaustion doctrine is to “prevent patentees from extracting double
recoveries for an invention.”).
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contributory infringers. The Court has been skeptical thus far of creating
exhaustion-free categories and a conclusion that exhaustion in some
form applies even to SRTs must then follow as logical. The ability of
buyers to transact in patented articles without fear of patent
infringement liability encourages vibrant downstream market
competition.269 Exhaustion also allows some consumers unable or
unwilling to pay the monopoly price demanded by a patent owner to
access its technology as it makes its way down the stream of
commerce.270
At the same time, an important difference exists between
technologies that self-replicate and others that do not. Patent owners of
SRTs face two sources of competition in every product they
commercialize: rival companies as well as customers. This is
particularly true with soybean seeds, where “the crop is the seed.”271
Being self-pollinating, soybeans can be saved and replanted without a
degradation of the Roundup Ready trait.272 A single acre of soybeans
produce enough seed to plant twenty-six acres the next year.273
Obtaining adequate protection is an existential issue for biotechnology
companies like Monsanto. Monsanto spends 2.6 million dollars daily on
research and development for a process that could take six to thirteen
years to develop and commercialize, and with a success rate of 5%.274
As Professor Jim Chen put it, “[d]irt and green thumbs come cheap.”275
If exhaustion applies to extinguish all patent rights in the traited seed,
trait developers like Monsanto would have little incentive to research
See Watanabe, supra note 248, at 273.
R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV.
577, 583-92 (2003).(Describing how the exhaustion defense to copyright infringement allows
expanded access to copyrighted work without unduly threatening the copyright owner’s ability to
charge that monopoly price.).
271 Asgrow Seed Co., 513 U.S. at 188.
272 See Brief of CropLife America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 27, at 3.
273 Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 5 n.4, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (Jan. 13,
2013), 2013 WL 179941.
274 Monsanto | Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-who-saveseeds.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2013); MONSANTO, ANNUAL R&D PIPELINE REVIEW 9 (2011),
available at http://www.monsanto.com/products/Documents/pipeline-brochures/ pipeline_2011_
presentation.pdf; ERNST & YOUNG, BEYOND BORDERS: GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 2011
37 (2011), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Beyond_borders_global_
biotechnology_report_2011/$FILE/Beyond_borders_global_biotechnology_report_2011.pdf
(noting that in 2010 alone, publicly traded biotechnology companies in the United States spent
$22.8 billion on research and development); see also Brief of the Biotechnology Indus. Org. as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6–7, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761
(2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 267024 (quoting NIH: Moving Research from the Bench to the
Bedside: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
108th Cong. 49 (2003) (statement of Phyllis Gardner, M.D., Senior Associate Dean for Education
and Student Affairs, Stanford University)).
275 Chen, supra note 75, at 110.
269
270

Lim-galleyed-FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

12/21/13 12:55 PM

SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES

169

and develop new traits, the result being that beneficial new plant
varieties would not be introduced. This begs the question: should SRTs
warrant a special set of legal rules?
Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley note “[p]atent law has a
general set of legal rules to govern the validity and infringement of
patents in a wide variety of technologies. With very few exceptions, the
statute does not distinguish between different technologies in setting
and applying legal standards.”276 The tension between sector specific
rules and rules of general applicability recently arose in CLS Bank
International v. Alice Corp., and Judges Linn and O’Malley recognized
that sector specific rules were for Congress and not the courts.277
Articulating the reason for this deference to Congress, the Court in
Chakrabarty noted:
The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for
resolution within the legislative process after the kind of
investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can
provide and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of
competing values and interests, which in our democratic system is
the business of elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the
contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political
branches of the Government, the Congress and the Executive, and
not to the courts. 278

In Mayo, the Court noted that “patent law’s general rules must
govern inventive activity in many different fields of human endeavor,
with the result that the practical effects of rules that reflect a general
effort to balance these considerations may differ from one field to
another.”279 In delineating the boundaries between permissible and
impermissible behavior, can the courts develop a rule that is technology
neutral yet supple enough to take into account the special challenges
arising from SRTs? The answer is yes, but it lies further afield.

Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002).
277 717 F.3d 1269, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Linn, J. & O’Malley, J., dissenting) (“Congress can,
and perhaps should, develop special rules for software patents. . . . While Congress may, this
court may not change the law to address one technological field or the concerns of a single
industry.”).
278 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980); see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
550 U.S. 437, 458–59 (2007) (“If the patent law is to be adjusted better ‘to account for the
realities of software distribution,’ the alteration should be made after focused legislative
consideration, and not by the Judiciary forecasting Congress’ likely disposition.”) (citation
omitted).
279 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
276
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B. The Make-Use Dichotomy
The Court in Bowman v. Monsanto identified a “making” and as
per se infringing.280 However, an opinion that responded to Bowman’s
argument that Quanta’s instruction that exhaustion terminates “all
patent rights to that item” necessarily includes the right to “make”
embodiments of SRTs because replication is an innate characteristic of
the invention would have been helpful in providing guidance to the
rights of users and owners of SRTs.281
Recently the U.K. Supreme Court, in Schütz v. Werit, had occasion
to consider and articulate a framework for what constitutes an
impermissible “making.”282 The patent claim covered a container
consisting of a pallet and a plastic bottle within a lattice metal cage.283
The aspect of the container that was considered to be inventive was the
particular construction of the lattice bars of the metal cage.284 The issue
was whether a third party’s replacing old bottles in used containers with
new bottles constituted the “making” of the patented container.285
The Schütz court held that “making” had to be interpreted
contextually, and provided three guiding principles.286 First, “making”
should be interpreted by reference to the facts of the particular case and
should be sufficiently clear and certain for patentees and others.287
Second, that interpretation should “protect the patentee’s monopoly
while not stifling reasonable competition.”288 In weighing this interest,
customary expectations are relevant.289 Where the article “embodies
essential elements of the inventive concept,” the expectation is that its
unauthorized recreation will fall within the scope of the patentee’s
legitimate rights.290 Third, it is “illogical and unprincipled” that whether
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013).
Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625; see also Kevin Rodkey, Exhaustion and Validity of Single-Use
Licenses for Transgenic Seeds in the Wake of Quanta v. LG Electronics, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 579,
602 (2010) (“Although transgenic seeds need water, sunlight, and nutrients to grow, none of these
alter the fact that the patented item, the transgenic gene itself, is already present (i.e. embodied) in
the product. The gene will be expressed once the seeds begin to grow, irrespective of the enduser’s actions.”).
282 Schütz v. Werit, [2013] UKSC 16. The Court has referred to foreign law on at least one
occasion. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Besides flowing from the same common law
tradition as the United States, the approach by the U.K. Supreme Court in Schütz is consistent
with the most recent direction by Supreme Court in its patent cases and in Bowman v. Monsanto
itself.
283 Schütz v. Werit, [2013] UKSC 16 at 2.
284 Id. at 5.
285 Id. at 7.
286 Id. at 8–9.
287 Schütz v. Werit, [2013] UKSC 16 at paras. 26–29; see, e.g., Brief of the Biotechnology Indus.
Org. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 274, at 24.
288 Schütz v. Werit, [2013] UKSC 16 at para. 27.
289 Id. at para. 17.
290 Id. at para. 42.
280
281
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a new article is made depends on “who carries out the work
involved.”291 Neither is it relevant “how a party views or markets its
products,” but instead the court should look at “how those products
should be characterized.”292 In doing so, the court found it “both
legitimate and helpful” to look at the relative life expectancies of the
patented and unpatented portions of the article.293
1. The Meaning of “Making”
As to the first factor, the Court in Bilski stated that absent some
contrary indication, a term in the Patent Act is presumed to have its
“ordinary, contemporary, [and] common meaning.”294 The ordinary
meaning of “making” encompasses the creation of new articles—
including the production of new soybeans through the act of farming.295
Thus, “making” and “using” need not be mutually exclusive.296 Since
the seeds sold by Monsanto to the unknown farmer were consumed in
the first planting, Bowman’s harvest constituted a “making” as part of
its use.297 This result is consistent with Adams, where the Court
recognized that because exclusive rights conferred by the Patent Act are
separate and independent, the effect of patent exhaustion does not affect
them all.298 Thus, a licensee with a right to “make and sell” obtains a
share in the patent monopoly only with respect to those rights and
cannot “use” the invention.299
Patent attorney Kevin Rodkey objected to this reasoning, arguing
that “if all of the patent owner’s rights on the first-generation are
exhausted, then the right to ‘make’ through common and noninventive
Id. at para. 46.
Id. at para. 47.
293 Id. at para. 61–66.
294 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182
(1981).
295 See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1363 (3d ed. 2002) (One
meaning of “make” is “to plant and raise (a crop).”).
296 Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 26–28 (“Courts customarily do not read two statutory
prohibitions as mutually exclusive, such that a violation of one provision cannot constitute a
violation of the other.”); see, e.g., United States v. Wright, 742 F.2d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1984)
(“However, the cultivation and possession provisions are not mutually exclusive but overlapping.
It is quite possible to possess with intent to distribute the marijuana that is being cultivated.”);
Ferrell v. United States, 963 F. Supp. 615, 621 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (“[J]ust because the
Defendant’s conduct may constitute ‘carrying’ under the statute does not mean that conduct may
not also be a ‘use’ within the definition of the statute.”).
297 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 1, at 6.
298 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873) (“The right to manufacture, the right to sell, and the
right to use are each substantive rights, and may be granted or conferred separately by the
patentee.”).
299 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 1, at 22
(“Case law exemplifies a critical qualification to the exhaustion doctrine—that, absent an express
or implied license, the authorized sale of an article embodying a patented invention does not give
the purchaser the right to make a new patented article.”).
291
292
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means (i.e., traditional farming techniques) is also exhausted.”300 The
reason, according to Rodkey, is that the Roundup Ready gene “has no
benefit to anyone who wishes to use the seed for any purpose other than
planting. It does not produce additional nutritional value or confer
disease resistance, so it does not benefit farmers to feed herbicide
resistant seeds to livestock.”301 It follows,
[That if farmers] did not use RoundUp [sic] herbicide (to which their
seeds were resistant), they would still have been practicing the
Monsanto patent by the very presence and expression of the gene,
along with the fact that the crops were resistant to the herbicide.
Therefore, the first-generation seeds include all the inventive aspects
of the patent.302

Rodkey concludes that farmers “would not have purchased the firstgeneration seed for any purpose other than growing crops.”303
This reasoning has intuitive appeal. One who buys a cow expects
to own her calf.304 Like Russian dolls, one who buys the doll really buys
a set of dolls, one embodied in another in the same way that “[a]
patented product always ‘substantially embodies’ the patent. Otherwise
it would not be patented,” as even the American Seed Trade
Association, supporting Monsanto, acknowledged.305
The problem with this argument is that both the buyer and seller of
a Russian doll know exactly how many baby dolls are sheathed within
its wooden bosom, and its market price is set accordingly. With SRTs in
general, and with soybeans in particular, no such number can be
determined ex ante, or can be assumed to be infinite. Such a conclusion
would make nonsense of the careful calibration that the Quanta Court
sought to achieve between the rights of the owner and the buyer.
In order for transactions to occur in the real world, an approach
that gives effect to these market expectations provides a better means of
calibrating the balance of interests between parties. Even if a price point
could be calculated, the quid pro quo of arguing that every seed
embodies the right to make every future generation inherent in that seed
is that the buyer must pay for every one of those generations as well.
Monsanto and its amici cautioned that if the Court held that patent
Rodkey, supra note 281, at 601.
Id. at 600. Unlike “nutritionally modified seed [that] may have a reasonable noninfringing
use,” seed traits that “confer insect-, herbicide-, drought-, temperature-, or other environmental
resistance” are limited to use as crops. Id. at 600–01.
302 Id. at 602.
303 Id. at 601.
304 See Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568 (1887).
305 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Seed Trade Ass’n in Support of Respondents, supra note 90,
at 22.
300
301
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exhaustion applied, then owners of patents over SRTs would be forced
to recoup their investments through a “billion dollar” first sale since the
initial sale price reflects only the value of first-generation seeds and the
attendant restrictions on use of progeny seeds.306 If exhaustion does
apply, progeny seeds will quickly compete with seed sold by Monsanto
or its seed company licensees, depressing the market price toward the
competitive price. Anticipating this, owners would charge a price for
the first sale based on the present discounted value of its expected future
income. The prohibitively high price would lead to market failure,
unless farmers formed a consortium wealthy enough to induce a sale.
Besides being inconsistent with the twenty-year monopoly patent
holders generally enjoy, telescoping Monsanto’s commercialization into
a single sale could lead to a less-competitive seed market and one that
discourages disclosure of new technologies. For example, instead of
licensing other seed companies, Monsanto might vertically integrate
downstream and keep plant technologies as trade secrets.307 Granted,
trade secret law is unsuitable for some technologies, since it does not
protect against reverse engineering.308 This is particularly true for
soybeans owing to their self-propagating nature.309 However, non-selfpollinating plant varieties and other SRTs may be more susceptible to
trade secret protection. With even intra-brand competition eliminated,
farmers can expect even higher prices and lower output in the traited
seed market.
Market expectations will play a role in determining when
unauthorized “making” has taken place, and some like Professor Dennis
Crouch correctly predicted that it “could win the day.”310 In Bowman v.
Monsanto, the proportion of soybeans used as feed far outweighs those
used as seed, and grain elevators are not meant to sell seed.311 Bowman
See, e.g., id. (“[T]hat a first generation of (patented) seed ‘substantially embodies’ all
subsequent generations of seed, such that the sale of one generation of seed exhausts all rights in
subsequent generations.”).
307 Jeremy N. Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 229, 245 (2013).
308 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (“A trade secret law,” generally
speaking, “does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means.”).
309 Sheff, supra note 307, at 242 (“[S]elf-replication is an extreme form of self-disclosure. Selfreplicating technologies don’t merely teach competitors how to practice a new invention, they
supply such competitors with a factory as well.”).
310 Dennis Crouch, Patent Exhaustion for GM Seeds, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 4, 2012),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/12/patent-exhaustion-gmo.html; see also Brief for the
New York Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 37,
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 287732 (“The position
taken by the parties in Intervet demonstrates the biotechnology sector’s acceptance and
reasonable expectation that each successive generation of a patented self-replicating biological
material is a separate “making” constituting an act of infringement under § 271(a).”).
311 Bowman v. Monsanto, at 1765 (“Grain elevators, as indicated above, purchase grain from
farmers and sell it for consumption; under federal and state law, they generally cannot package or
market their grain for use as agricultural seed.”).
306
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made deliberate choices, including where and when to plant the next
season’s crop, plant the seeds, apply insecticides and fungicides, control
for weeds, and finally harvest the progeny seed.312 Bowman’s use of
grain as seed therefore runs counter to those expectations. Further, the
existence of a market for grains and processed soybean products
indicates that traited seeds have substantial non-infringing uses
independent of their reproductive capacity, which distinguishes
Bowman v. Monsanto from Quanta. Finally, if sales of harvested
soybeans to grain elevators exhausted patent rights, “an engine of
gamesmanship” based on “pretextual transactions” could develop as
farmers sold seeds to the elevator and bought them back for planting.313
It may also be said that a patented feature that confers high yields
makes a compelling argument that duplication is necessary, whereas
another that confers fluorescence on plant cells makes for a less
compelling argument. Related to this issue is the question of whose
perspective the Court should use to calibrate market expectations?
Yuichi Watanabe suggests that a possible candidate is “one ordinarily
skilled in the art.”314 It may be added that post-KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., this individual would have the common knowledge and
common sense imbued in that case.315 These are among the residual
issues that the Court must grapple with.
The Bowman v. Monsanto Court’s reasoning is consistent with the
Canadian Supreme Court in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser.316 The
issue in Schmeiser was whether the farmer “used” Roundup Ready seed
to infiltrate his canola fields when he discovered their herbicide
resistance and saved the seed for replanting over subsequent seasons.317
It is worth noting that Monsanto’s Canadian claims were directed to
genes and not to seeds.318 Also, the Canadian case did not involve
“making” of articles obtained through an authorized sale and so invoke
Id. at 1769 (“Bowman devised and executed a novel way to harvest crops from Roundup
Ready seeds without paying the usual premium.”).
313 Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 49. As a commentator noted, “[p]atented seed goes in
at the top. When it comes out at the bottom, somehow, it is no longer protected by patents. A
farmer could sell his crop to the grain elevator, and buy some of it right back, and patents would
no longer apply.” Roy Zwahlen, Seed Patents: How Innovation May Get Lost in the Grain
Elevator, BIOTECHNOW (June 28, 2012), http://www.biotech-now.org/public-policy/patentlybiotech/2012/06/seed-patents-how-innovation-may-get-lost-in-the-grain-elevator.
314 Watanabe, supra note 248, at 284.
315 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
316 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.). See Arash Amouzgar et al.,
U.S. Patent Seed Case Ruling Aligns with Canadian Patent Protection Laws, BLAKES (June 3,
2013), http://www.blakes.com/English/Resources/Bulletins/Pages/Details.aspx?BulletinID=1746
(“Bowman v. Monsanto Co. et al. is broadly consistent with Canadian jurisprudence on the
subject of patented seeds.”).
317 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.), at para.60–62.
318 Id. at para. 17.
312
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exhaustion.319 The Canadian court wrote that the farmer had “used” the
seed even though the herbicide resistance was not actually used.320
“Use” was given a broad meaning: “utilization with a view to
production or advantage.”321 While less clearly articulated in the
Canadian case, in both instances, it is the making rather than the pairing
of the herbicide and seed that constitutes the offensive conduct.
Once it is accepted that Bowman did “make” the seeds, the inquiry
can then turn to whether that “making” constitutes the “normal use” of a
product.322 Does using the trait involve growing a new plant? Bowman
argued that the embodiments of SRT cannot be used by buyers without
creating new embodiments.323 Some commentators agree that “the only
likely ‘use’ of the purchased patented item, the seed, is planting.”324 In
the context of soybeans, because the crop is the seed, those seeds then
have purposes other than simply being replanted, a fact buttressed by
centuries of past practice.
2. Protecting the Inventive Core
As to the second factor, the policy inquiry of monopoly and market
competition raised in Schütz illuminates the rationale behind the
exhaustion doctrine. The Court, first in Mayo and more recently in
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetic, required the
consideration of the patent’s inventive concept in order not to preempt
future innovation and hamper innovation and competition.325
The doctrine of fair use in copyright and trademark law, and the
experimental use defense in patent law all recognize that not every iota

See Mark Pidkowich, U.S. Supreme Court Rules that the Authorized Sale of Patented Seed
does not Convey a Right to Produce a Crop—Comparison to the Canadian Approach,
LEXOLOGY (July 11, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4ae897eb-77204fa4-9934-a5130dd91f93.
320 Schmeiser, 1 S.C.R. 902 at para. 75.
321 Id. at para. 69.
322 Crouch, Oral Arguments in Bowman v. Monsanto, supra note 187.
323 Supplemental Brief, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2012
WL 3866466.
324 Yee Wah Chin, Inexhaustible: Patents on Self-Replicating Technologies, 3 LANDSLIDE 12, 16
(2011).
325 Mayo v. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. 1289,1305 (2012) (“Patent protection is, after all, a twoedged sword. On the one hand, the promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that
lead to creation, invention, and discovery. On the other hand, that very exclusivity can impede the
flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price
of using the patented ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly and timeconsuming searches of existing patents and pending patent applications, and requiring the
negotiation of complex licensing arrangements.”). See also id. at 1293 (“[T]oo broad an
interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law.”); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013) (“Groundbreaking, innovative,
or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the [§ 101] inquiry . . . [and] extensive effort
alone is insufficient to satisfy the demands of [§ 101.]”).
319
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of benefit derived from the intellectual property owner’s product must
be channeled back to the owner.326 Similarly, copyright exhaustion
“modifies the copyright owner’s distribution right, but not his
reproduction right.”327 A book buyer can distribute or destroy the book,
but cannot copy it because that action impinges on the reproduction
right of the owner, which the owner retains even as he parts with that
single copy. In each case, what exonerates defendants from
infringement is the effect on the owner’s market for the product.
The argument may be made that by preventing the reuse of seed
for growing, Monsanto is protecting its primary market from
competition. Such attempts to create market leverage have generally
been condemned under patent misuse or the antitrust laws.328 But, as
Professor Jeremy Sheff explains, the dichotomies in exhaustion protect
the ability of patent owners to protect their primary market in order to
secure the super competitive profits as returns on their investment.329
The law thus allows forays into the fringes of the patentee’s exclusive
right, but it cannot appropriate the basis of that right itself. The nature of
SRTs generate particular resistance to reading exhaustion to the “use”
right to include the “making” right as well. That resistance rests on the
ability to generate multiple copies of a patented invention. As Professor
Sheff notes, while each chipset can be used to make at most one
computer, each seed can generate an unlimited number of seeds.330 This
is especially true with self-pollinating soybeans.
Each soybean plant becomes a factory producing fungible products
acceptable to the market. To illustrate, those who buy corn cannot grow
it again and enjoy the same traits. They may use it for feed or process it
into food, but those uses form distinct secondary markets from the
primary market for corn. While soybean seeds may also be used as feed
or be processed, each seed is genetically identical to its parent. That
particular use makes farmers like Bowman more akin to purveyors of
pirated CDs than sellers of used parts, taking them closer to the heart of
what the intellectual property laws seek to protect.
Otherwise, as Monsanto pointed out “[e]ven the growers and seed
companies that currently contract with [it] would have no reason to
See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 124
(2004) (discussing fair use in the trademark context); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566, (1985) (noting that the effect on the potential market for the
original(and the market for derivative works) is “undoubtedly the single most important element
of fair use”); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing experimental use
in patent law).
327 Sheff, supra note 307, at 252 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (qualifying the distribution
right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), but not the reproduction right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(1))).
328 See, e.g., id.
329 Id.
330 Sheff, supra note 307, at 240.
326
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continue those contracts given how easy it would be to obtain a single
‘exhausted’ soybean that would eliminate the need to pay any royalties
to [it].”331 The Bowman v. Monsanto Court displayed some sensitivity to
this balance when it wrote:
[I]n the more ordinary case, when a farmer purchases Roundup
Ready seed qua seed—that is seed intended to grow a crop—he will
be able to plant it. Monsanto, to be sure, conditions the farmer’s
ability to reproduce Roundup Ready: but it does not—[and] could
not realistically—preclude all planting. No sane farmer, after all,
would buy the product without some ability to grow soybeans from
it. And so Monsanto, predictably enough, sells Roundup Ready seed
to farmers with a license to use it to make a crop . . . . Applying our
usual rule in this context therefore will allow farmers to benefit from
Roundup Ready, even as it rewards Monsanto for its innovation.332

The conclusion, as the Washington Legal Foundation points out in
its brief, is that the exhaustion doctrine aims to prevent unreasonable
restraints on trade while ensuring that a patentee “on average will
receive a fair royalty . . . each time one of his patented products is
placed into the stream of commerce.”333 The nub of the issue seems to
be whether Monsanto’s method of structuring its means of appropriation
is the least restrictive option to promote technological progress, a
balance articulated in 1995 by the antitrust agencies.334
3. Relative Lifespans
The third factor filters out the manner of making and focuses
instead on the relative lifespan of the components. The fact that the
original transgenic beans were produced using gene gun insertion,
compared to Bowman’s seeds coming into being through natural
propagation, is a distinction without significance.335 This argument
Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 51–55.
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (2013). See also Brief of CropLife America
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 27, at 22. (“[G]rain elevators [are]
persuasive evidence that soybean seeds have significant value independent of their reproductive
capacity.”).
333 Brief of Washington Legal Foundation As Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6-7,
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 267022.
334 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property (Apr. 6, 1995), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm (“The
existence of practical and significantly less restrictive alternatives is relevant to a determination of
whether a restraint is reasonably necessary. If it is clear that the parties could have achieved
similar efficiencies by means that are significantly less restrictive, then the Agencies will not give
weight to the parties’ efficiency claim. In making this assessment, however, the Agencies will not
engage in a search for a theoretically least restrictive alternative that is not realistic in the
practical prospective business situation faced by the parties.”).
335 Brief for Amici Curiae Ctr. for Food Safety & Save Our Seeds in Support of Petitioner, supra
331
332
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seeks an exception to the exhaustion rule when applied to SRTs without
offering “support for the position that normal exhaustion principles are
inapplicable merely because an invention is ‘made’ in one particular
way.”336 The exclusive rights of product patents, unlike process patents,
snare infringers regardless of the manner in which the articles are
made.337
As Professor Crouch observes, “Bowman’s statement that
‘Roundup Ready® seeds have been engineered to include everything
one needs to practice the invention’ is disingenuous.”338 Had those
seeds been left in the grain elevator from which they were bought,
Monsanto would have no cause to argue that there was an unauthorized
“making” since cellular division of the traited germplasm would not
have occurred. If Bowman’s logic prevailed, other industries that
require even less direct human intervention would be dramatically
affected; patent owners would receive less protection against the
copying of any commercialized invention embodied in living organisms
than other types of inventions.339
Unlike past cases where there was a market expectation that the
articles with longevity could have spare parts refurbished and those
which were expandable or consumable were to be repurchased, the
market expectation is based on the time-honored tradition of farmers
being able to replant seeds from earlier harvests.340 In looking at the
relative life spans of the patented and unpatented portions of the bean,
the dichotomy for repair and reconstruction is less useful because
Bowman did not reconstruct a worn out soybean. But, the fact that the
note 110, at 34–38.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 31 (“Under petitioner’s view, the fact that an invention
can be used to create more units of that invention renders normal exhaustion principles
inapplicable.”).
337 Dunn Wire-Cut Lug Brick Co. v. Toronto Fire Clay Co., 259 F. 258, 261 (6th Cir. 1919).
(“[T]he inventor of a new and useful product or article of manufacture may have a patent which
covers it and gives a monopoly upon it regardless of great variations in the method of making.”);
Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Found. et al. in Support of Affirming the
Federal Circuit at 24, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL
315226 (“There is, however, no support in this Court’s precedent for the notion that ‘making’ an
infringing article necessarily involves building that article from its starting materials or building
blocks . . . . Genetic modification is one way to ‘make’ Roundup Ready® seeds, but not the only
way.”).
338 CROUCH, supra note 310.
339 For example, microchip circuitry is “arranged by a computer and constructed by computerized
photolithography and etching equipment.” Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 26. Computer
software is “made entirely by a machine based on an instruction that may not even come directly
from a human.” Id. at 26.
340 Compare American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (reconstruction of the
patented tie for cotton baling, which was destroyed during its use, was held to be infringing) with
Aro Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 365 U.S. 336 (1961)
(repairing worn fabric on the patented convertible automobile was permissible based on the
purchaser’s right to maintain the patented article for its intended use).
336
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useful lives of both the trait and the bean are inextricably intertwined
adds logical force to the argument that while its use and making for
germination purposes are indistinguishable, the market expectation of
permissible use relates to non-patent-related uses such as feed and food
processing rather than reproduction. The better view is that in the
ordinary sense of the word, Bowman “made” those seeds; his actions
precipitated the seeds bought from the grain elevator germinating into
the soybean plants, which in turn bore those seeds.
C. Five Alternatives to Patent Protection
The outcome in Bowman v. Monsanto allows Monsanto to
continue metering farmers’ use of Roundup Ready seeds and promotes
a more efficient economic outcome as it spreads revenue over a larger
number of consumers who each pay only for each round of use.341
Professor Jay Kesan supports this form of differential pricing, which
“allows many more transactions to clear in the marketplace than is the
case if only unconditional sales were allowed[,] reduc[ing] some
deadweight losses leading to an increase in social welfare.”342 While
this may be a good reason to support the outcome in Bowman v.
Monsanto, it is worth considering five other alternatives to patent
protection.
1. Contract Law
The first alternative is contract law. It is useful to look from the
point of view of the patent owners and then from that of users and
buyers. Bowman v. Monsanto largely obviates the need for patent
owners to rely on express license restrictions to enforce prohibitions on
replication. In a footnote to the opinion, Justice Kagan made clear that
even in the absence of a licensing agreement, courts would imply a
license only to plant the first generation of seeds.343 Buyers and
subsequent sellers will be increasingly reliant on representations,
warranties, and indemnities from sellers to protect themselves from
potential liability for actual or contributory infringement.344
See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that the system of single season
authorization allows it to “incrementally recover its research and development investment through
multiple transactions over many years, making use of the invention affordable.”).
342 Jay P. Kesan, Licensing Restrictions and Appropriating Market Benefits from Plant
Innovation, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1081, 1084 (2006). See also Brief of
Washington Legal Foundation As Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 333, at
6–7, (noting that this efficiency-enhancing mechanism is inconsistent with the ability of a buyer
of a single seed to “parlay that seed into a thousand new seeds, the commercial use of those
thousand seeds will generate only one royalty for Monsanto.”).
343 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct.1761, 1767, n.3 (2013).
344 Lauren E. Sprouse & Jeff Wolfson, Monstanto Rounds Up Big Win for Self-replicating Tech,
341
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Server and Casey looked at the issue of whether a contract-based
post sale restriction on a patented product should be enforced under
contract law.345 They concluded the contractual restrictions may be
enforced under certain conditions. First, federal preemption requires
that restrictions do not frustrate a federal patent policy; for example, one
such frustration could be clawing back what is in the public domain.346
In this regard, they note:
[I]t is questionable that a patented product that is the subject of a
contract-based post-sale restriction truly enters the public domain
upon authorized first sale, where a valid, unexpired patent covering
the product is exhausted only with respect to the purchased product
and where the buyer is the only party that is contractually bound to
adhere to the agreed-to restrictions that are a condition of the sale.347

Second, restrictions would render patents unenforceable under the
patent misuse doctrine if they impermissibly broaden the scope of the
patent monopoly or violate the antitrust rules on vertical restraints.348
In their brief, Bowman and its amici argued that contract law
would serve to protect Monsanto’s incentives to innovate while
ensuring affordability.349 Antitrust attorney Yee Wah Chin agrees,
explaining that Monsanto could have conditioned seed sales on farmers
either consuming it or selling it only “to buyers who agree to either
consume the seed or isolate that seed from other seed and sell the seed
only for consumption” and include grain elevators in its web of license
restrictions on seed sale and replanting.350 Thus, grain elevators and
farmers can “require representations, warranties, and indemnities from
their suppliers, regarding the presence of any patented items in the
purchase and the existence of any conditions placed by the patent holder
on sales of the patented items that may be included in sale.” 351
The problem, as the Court pointed out, is that contractual remedies
AIPLA NEWSTAND (May 23, 2013), http://www.haynesboone.com/monsanto-self-replicatingtech/.
345 Server & Casey, supra note 232, at 599–640.
346 Id. at 604.
347 Id. at 607.
348 Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Patent misuse
is an affirmative defense to an accusation of patent infringement.”); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (applying the rule of reason to vertical restraints). See
generally DARYL LIM, PATENT MISUSE AND ANTITRUST: DOCTRINAL, POLICY AND EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVES (2013).
349 Brief for Petitioner at 55, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796),
2012 WL 6063892.
350 Yee Wah Chin, Licensing, Patent Exhaustion, and Self-Replicating Technologies: A Case
Study, 32 THE LICENSING JOURNAL 7 (Aug. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147155.
351 Id.
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are ineffective against downstream purchasers not in contractual privity
with the patent holder. As Monsanto stated in its brief, in a world where
soybeans “could be purchased from another grower or a grain elevator,
plucked from a field or road, or snatched off the back of a truck,” patent
owners would have to establish “contractual privity with every person
who might try to misappropriate its patented technology.”352 Contracts,
while similarly restraining alienation, would impose even greater
transaction costs.353 Further, since patent laws promote technological
progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an
incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts, that incentive
would necessarily be diminished if SRTs were only protected through a
single round of replication instead of its statutory entitlement of twenty
years.354
2. Terminator Genes
It has also been suggested that Monsanto could prevent
cannibalizing of its sales in traited seed by stacking its seeds with a
Terminator gene, which renders seed sterile, thus preventing replanting
through technological rather than legal means.355 Called genetic use
restriction technologies (“GURTs”), these function by inserting toxinproducing genetic material that terminates the seed after the plant
matures.356 This produces an edible and sterile crop unsuitable for

Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 51–55.
Id. at 53–54 (“Petitioner proposes that Monsanto require licensed farmers to sell only to grain
elevators that separately contract with Monsanto. Presumably, petitioner imagines that those
contracts would in turn permit sales only to parties that have also contracted with Monsanto. And
so on, until every potential user of Monsanto’s patented technology has signed a Monsanto
contract. The transaction costs, and disutility, of such an approach would be immense.” (citations
omitted)).
354 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 1, at 17.
355 See Jeremy P. Oczek, In the Aftermath of the “Terminator” Technology Controversy:
Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds and the Right To Save and
Replant Seed, 41 B.C. L. REV. 627, 627-28 (2000) (“On March 3, 1998, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office granted Patent No. 5,723, 765, titled ‘Control of Plant Gene Expression,’
jointly to the United States Department of Agriculture (‘USDA’) and the Delta and Pine Land Co.
(‘D&PL’) for a technology that blocks genetically altered seeds from germinating after one
season. This new technology, officially named the ‘Technology Protection System,’ provides the
ability to genetically alter seeds so that the crops produced from these seeds will in turn bear
sterile seeds.”); Jason Savich, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative Impact of Patent Exhaustion
on Self-Replicating Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 132 (2007) (“These technologies
function by introducing genetic elements into the plants which produce a toxin late in seed
maturation. The toxin kills the seed after the plant has matured, producing a safe but sterile crop
for the farmer, forcing him to purchase new seeds each year because the seeds produced in
growing the crop are not viable for replanting.”).
356 See MARTHA L. CROUCH, HOW THE TERMINATOR TERMINATES: AN EXPLANATION FOR THE
NON-SCIENTIST OF A REMARKABLE PATENT FOR KILLING SECOND GENERATION SEEDS OF CROP
PLANTS (1998), available at http://www.sbs.utexas.edu/genetics/genweb/Essays/Terminator.htm.
352
353
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planting.357 Like hybrid seeds, GURT seeds force farmers to buy new
seeds each season. Like digital rights management (“DRM”) software,
biotechnology allows technological “locks” to be programmed into
genetic code.358 Moreover, unlike DRM measures that are susceptible to
hacking by the casual computer geek, the high startup costs involved in
biotechnology research will severely limit those capable of
“jailbreaking.”359 Farmers would also be better placed than consumers
of copyrighted work to lobby for and improve upon the counterbalancing measures such as those found in the DMCA. The same
technology that makes Monsanto’s seed valuable also offers it a remedy
to meter its use.
A patent was granted to Delta in 1998 for genetic modifications
that rendered seeds sterile after planting.360 Farmers were outraged that
their right to save their seeds was taken from them. Public reaction
smothered the commercial future of the Terminator gene and it was
never introduced.361 Public opinion however, seems to be changing.
With the rise of organic farming, there is an appeal in restricting
transgenic crops to a single season of growing, thereby reducing the risk
of contamination.362 Research has provided alternatives to sterile seeds.
One way is to “switch off” the transgene in seeds, so that they grow into
new plants but do not pass on the benefits of the engineered trait.
Another way is to require use of a proprietary chemical in combination
with a switch in order to activate the transgene, forcing buyers to return
each year to purchase the chemical.363 Scientists believe that “[t]he
approach could even be used in nanotechnology, by making engineered
Savich, supra note 355, at 132.
Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological “Lock-Out”
Systems, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2004). However, others are less sanguine. See, e.g.,
Chen, supra note 75, at 110 (arguing that GURTs represent a “legal failure” as “resources
devoted to the enforcement of legal rights are spent at the expense of actual innovation.”).
359 Id. at 1571. See also Heidi Ledford, Seed-Patent Case in Supreme Court, NATURE (Feb. 19,
2013), http://www.nature.com/news/seed-patent-case-in-supreme-court-1.12445.
360 U.S. Patent No. 5,723,765 col. 36 ll. 22–60 (filed June 7, 1995). See also Elizabeth Winston,
A Patent Misperception, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 289, 297 n.50 (“This nickname is a
misnomer, as the modification is not actually a gene, but rather a process for programming a
plant’s genetic code so that the seed is fertile for only one planting and future generations are
sterile.”).
361 See Andrea Knox, A Seed Firm Kills Plan to Use Terminator Gene, PHILA. INQUIRER, (Oct.
10, 1999) (“Bowing to mounting pressure, Monsanto Co. last week pledged to call a halt to
development of the so-called terminator gene.”). See also ETC Group Communiqué, Gene Giants
Seek “Philanthrogopoly” (March 2013) (describing the United Nations Convention on Biological
Diversity’s moratorium on field-testing and commercial development of Terminator in 2000,
which was re-affirmed in 2006 due to campaigns by civil society, farmers’ organizations and
indigenous peoples).
362 Ledford, supra note 359.
363 Id. (describing “‘gene-guard’ technology: a genetic tweak that makes production of the
desired chemical dependent on a proprietary additive, supplied by Ginkgo, in its fermentation
medium.”).
357
358
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nanobots that are dependent on a proprietary raw material.”364 These
are, however, the early days yet and progress is difficult. Monsanto’s
Terminator technology requires three different genes to be inserted into
the plant genome.365 Other companies see patent law as the more
convenient alternative, and hope they do not have to use such
technology.366 More fundamentally, this solution has the distinct
disadvantage that unlike patents that expire after twenty years, the
technology lock is perpetual.367
3. New Weeds
A third suggestion is for Monsanto to build another mousetrap.
Over time, weeds may develop resistance to herbicide, as some already
have towards Roundup. In 2012, twenty-three species of weeds have
afflicted 16.8 million acres of farmland, up from 2.4 million acres four
years earlier.368 Similarly, crop-damaging insects are also evolving
resistance. In 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency warned that
Monsanto’s genetically engineered corn was losing effectiveness
against corn rootworms.369
Just as stronger viruses generate a demand for stronger vaccines,
there will be a continuous demand for new herbicides and genetically
engineered seeds that can be grown effectively with these herbicides.
Monsanto itself is introducing Roundup Ready 2 Yield soybeans, “a
‘stacked’ soybean variety to combat weed species that have developed
resistance to glyphosate.”370 Professor Rita S. Heimes argues that by
severing Monsanto’s ability to charge for every generation of seed, it
would be “encouraged to create new technologies that growers will
want to buy each year.”371
The problem is that the biotech model functions more like the

Id.
Id.
366 Id. (“Monsanto says it is currently not researching the techniques, and other companies are
hoping that they will not have to. ‘Perhaps these technologies could provide new ways to protect
investments,’ says Brett Lund, former head of intellectual property for the biofuels group of
Syngenta, an agri-giant headquartered in Basel, Switzerland. ‘But the easiest and best way is
through our patent system.’”).
367 Id.
368 Shand, supra note 103, at 13.
369 A.J. Gassmann et al., Field-Evolved Resistance to Bt Maize by Western Corn Rootworm,
PLOS ONE
(2011),
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.
pone.0022629. See also Claire Everett, University Study Reveals Pest Now Resistant To
Genetically
Modified
Corn,
THE DAILY ILLINI (Aug.
29,
2012),
http://
www.dailyillini.com/article_53457935-8612-5bc7-9b85-8b46340b26dc.html.
370 See Brief of Am. Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note
31, at 19–20.
371 Heimes, supra note 56, at 134.
364
365
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pharmaceutical model of innovation than like that of smartphones.372
Product lifecycles must be longer in order to appropriate the huge sunk
costs and lengthy periods of R&D involved in producing a
commercially viable product. Accordingly, a short-run revenue model
driven by meeting the latest industry fad is not sustainable.
4. Compulsory Licensing
Fourth, one could conceive of a system of compulsory licensing
similar to compulsory mechanical licenses under copyright law.373 On
January 4, 2013, Ohio Representative Marcy Kaptur introduced a bill
designed to allow farmers to save patented seed from an earlier crop
season in return for a royalty set by the Secretary of Agriculture.374
Under this system, famers can save their own crop for replanting even
when covered by a utility patent. In return, farmers pay a license fee
each season. This fee could be the difference in value of seed with the
technology over an unpatented seed. This solution has the appeal of
allowing patent owners to continue to rely on patent infringement to
police access to their technology, while allowing farmers the option of
paying a price which would be lower than the cost of a new bag of
seeds, whether patented and unpatented. This reduces the consumer
surplus that Monsanto appropriates while allowing Monsanto sufficient
incentive to innovate.
One flaw with this system, however, is that farmers may cheat by
under-declaring their seed. The cost of monitoring compliance may be
substantial. Another problem is determining what a reasonable royalty
would be. To the first objection, a possible solution to this may be to
charge by acreage rather than seed declarations.375 Since the number of
seeds used each season depends on the size of the field, that number
will in all likelihood remain constant. Monsanto’s field inspectors can
estimate the seeds needed by acreage. To the second objection,
Monsanto currently charges a “Technology Fee” of $6.50. The system
used to calculate that fee does not change since the number of seeds
subject to that royalty remains the same. One obvious change would be
that seed companies, the intermediaries in the chain, would be rendered
redundant. However, that sort of displacement has been seen with
bookstores, travel agencies, and other intermediaries as the upstream
See, e.g., YAHONG LI, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES (2010).
373 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010) (granting the rights to reproduce and distribute copyrighted musical
compositions on phonorecords). The issue of compulsory licensing raises other important
questions such as whether this would immunize cases of accidental cross-pollination.
374 Seed Availability and Competition Act, H.R. 193, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr193#summary/oursummary.
375 I am grateful to Chris Seaman for this suggestion.
372
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sellers transact directly with the downstream end-consumers.
The biggest obstacle may not be economic or legal, but political.
Representative Kaptur previously introduced the bill three times before,
but it has never made it out of committee.376 However, Monsanto’s win
may provide the momentum needed to get the bill passed eventually.
Patent attorney Kevin Noonan observed that patent holders have
“resisted the political pressure to permit farmers to replant seed instead
of purchasing seed for each planting. Although this has imposed legal
and public relations costs on these patentees, the patent grant permits
[patent holders] to impose these restrictions.”377 Professor Jerome
Reichman likewise observed that “Congress has consistently and
repeatedly declined to enact any such provision enabling the authorities,
purely on grounds of public interest, to allow third parties to use a
patented invention without the patentee’s permission and thus to supply
the market at more competitive prices.”378 Under these circumstances, it
may be more realistic to turn to the $20 billion the U.S. government
gives to farmers annually, as agricultural subsidies to offset the cost of
patent royalties, to agro-biotechnology companies, rather than attempt a
compulsory licensing scheme.379 To guard against creating a windfall
for Monsanto, the government should exercise its market power as a
monopsonist to push the market price close to one found at a
competitive level. Professors Andrew Gavil, William Kovacic and
Jonathan Baker have suggested that in markets where marginal costs are
minimal, a competitive price would be “equated with entrant average
cost.”380 At present, however, private ordering in U.S. agriculture seems
entrenched and it will be unlikely that a compulsory licensing scheme
will take root any time soon.

In 2011, 2009 and 2004. See Seed Availability and Competition Act, H.R. 193, 113th Cong.
(2013).
377 Kevin E. Noonan, House Considers Alternative Patent Royalty Scheme for Genetically
Engineered Seed, PATENT DOCS (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/01/houseconsiders-alternative-patent-royalty-scheme-for-genetically-engineered-seed.html
(“But
regardless of which side has the better policy argument in that debate, Rep. Kaptur’s bill is not a
remedy required by the politics or economics of the situation. Indeed, it would just impose
another government bureaucracy on U.S. agriculture that would not promote either agriculture or
technological progress.”).
378 Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions: Comparing United
States Law and Practice with Options Under the TRIPS Agreement, AALS MID-YEAR
WORKSHOP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, (May 14, 2006), http://www.aals.org/
documents/2006intprop/JeromeReichmanOutline.pdf.
379 The United States currently pays around $20 billion per year to farmers in direct subsidies as
farm income stabilization via U.S. farm bills. See Daniel A. Sumner, Agricultural Subsidy
Programs, in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (David R. Henderson ed., 2007),
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/AgriculturalSubsidyPrograms.html.
380 ANDREW GAVIL, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 1155 (2008).
376
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5. PVPA Protection Revisited
A fifth possibility is to rely on PVPA protection. It is possible that
finding for Bowman would herd biotech companies back to relying on
the PVPA. As Professor Mark Patterson noted, PVPA protection would
still prevent farmers from selling saved seed to others for replanting.381
Farmers like Bowman who buy grain as seed may be subject to
prosecution under the PVPA.382 The grain elevator may also be liable
under the PVPA by selling to Bowman PVPA-protected Roundup
Ready soybeans as seed.383
PVPA protection has the attraction of being more finely tailored to
the agricultural sector than “one-size fits all” utility patents. As
commentator observed, “the careful consideration Congress gave to the
relationship between farmers, seed saving practices, and the property
rights of seed manufacturers demonstrates the need for legislation
tailored to this unique industry.”384 In contrast, utility patents “simply
do not permit the fine-tuned remedies and exemptions appropriate to the
seed industry and judges should not try to force a fit.”385
The challenge as noted earlier in this Article is that utility patents
are now the de facto method of protection for patent varieties. Unless
the requirements for patentability are markedly different, there will be
little reason for patent applicants to forgo the more robust protection
patents afford in favor of PVPA certificates.
The discussion in the foregoing two sections begs this question: if
Monsanto can sue for every new making and if the nature of the
technology warrants that outcome, what implications does this have on
those who inadvertently or unintentionally “make” a new patented
article? The Court mentions that these two circumstances may warrant a
finding of non-infringement. But that compromise represents a roughly
hewn judicial exception for SRTs. Is there a better way to protect the
rights of licensees, purchasers and other downstream users?

Mark Patterson, Bowman v. Monsanto: A Primer and a Solution, MADISONIAN.NET (Feb. 18,
2013), http://madisonian.net/2013/02/18/bowman-v-monsanto-a-primer-and-a-solution/. See also
Hubbard, supra note 104, at 7 (“By establishing the PVPA as the sole means of intellectual
property protection over plants, farmers could regain the right to save seed and the right to choice,
as plant breeders would have better access to plant genetics that are currently off limits to
innovation because of patents.”).
382 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(5) (2006) (“using seed which had been marked . . . to propagate the
variety”); 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(10) (2006) (explaining infringement to “instigate or actively induce
performance of any of the foregoing acts”).
383 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541(a)(1), (6), (8), (10) (2006) (providing for a variety of direct and indirect
infringements). See Brief of Amicus Curiae Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. in Support of
Respondents Monsanto Company et al., Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No.
11-796), 2013 WL 315224.
384 Heimes supra, note 56, at 134, n.214.
385 Id.
381
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D. “Innocent” Infringers
As an initial matter, it is important to distinguish between three
groups of potential defendants. The first two groups of inadvertent users
were identified by the Bowman v. Monsanto Court are the inadvertent
users—those who unintentionally or incidentally replicate the patented
article. The third group is those who may have intentionally or
unintentionally purchased the patent article, but who would at most be
liable for contractual remedies had the Federal Circuit precedent in
Mallinckrodt been clarified as not representing the law.
1. Unintentional Users
The first group is unintentional users. Patented seed can be blown
off trucks and farm equipment, through mixing of grains in grain
elevators, and pollen drift.386 On the spectrum of infringers, they are
perhaps the least culpable. During oral arguments, the Justices seemed
most concerned for them.387 In the context of pollen drift, Federal
Circuit Judge Gajarsa, in a concurring opinion, wrote that no liability
should be found.388
In 2011, a coalition of organic growers, seed sellers and
Lynd, supra note 213, at 679 (“Pollen drift is the cross-pollination of agricultural commodities
and can be caused by the movement of animals or shared equipment, by the wind carrying plants
and seeds to other farms and contaminating the plants, or by planted, but dormant, seeds.”).
387 Justice Kagan wondered about traited seeds contaminating organic crop fields and
schoolchildren growing soybean seeds for science projects being sued for infringement.
Transcript of Oral Arguments at 41, Bowman v. Monsanto, No. 11-796 (Feb. 19, 2013) (“[S]eeds
can be blown onto a farmer’s farm by wind, and all of a sudden you have Roundup seeds there
and the person—farmer is infringing, or there’s a 10-year-old who wants to do a science project
of creating a soybean plant, and he goes to the supermarket and gets an edamame, and it turns out
that it’s Roundup seeds. . . . And, you know, these Roundup seeds are everywhere, it seems to
me. There’s, what, 90 percent of all the seeds that are around? So it seems as though—like pretty
much everybody is an infringer at this point, aren’t they?”). Justice Scalia was worried about
farmers unintentionally growing contaminated seeds bought from grain elevators. Id. at 27–28
(“[L]et me give you another horrible result, and that is if—if we agree with you, farmers will not
be able to do a second planting by simply getting the undifferentiated seeds from—from a grain
elevator because at least a few of those seeds will always be patented seeds, and no farmer could
ever plant anything from a grain elevator, which means—I gather they use it for second plantings
where the risks are so high that it doesn’t pay to buy expensive seed. Now they can’t do that
anymore because there’s practically no grain elevator that doesn’t have at least one patented seed
in it.”).
388 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“This [patented] compound raises a question similar to one that might
arise when considering the invention of a fertile plant or a genetically engineered organism,
capable of reproduction, released into the wild. Consider, for example, what might happen if the
wind blew fertile, genetically modified blue corn protected by a patent, from the field of a single
farmer into neighboring cornfields. The harvest from those fields would soon contain at least
some patented blue corn mixed in with the traditional public domain yellow corn – thereby
infringing the patent. The wind would continue to blow, and the patented crops would spread
throughout the continent, thereby turning most (if not all) North American corn farmers into
unintentional, yet inevitable, infringers.”).
386
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agricultural organizations, cognizant of Monsanto’s patent onslaught
and fearing that they would be next in line, sought declaratory judgment
against Monsanto for non-infringement and invalidity with respect to
twenty-three of Monsanto’s patents covering its Roundup Ready
technology.389 They did not want any of Monsanto’s technology and
were concerned that “if they do indeed become contaminated by
transgenic seed, which may very well be inevitable given the
proliferation of transgenic seed today, they could quite perversely also
be accused of patent infringement by the company responsible for the
transgenic seed that contaminates them.”390 The plaintiffs also sought a
waiver from Monsanto not to sue them for infringement.391 Monsanto
refused, but issued a statement on its website that it would not sue
farmers who had trace amounts of seeds with the patented trait in their
fields “as a result of inadvertent means.”392 The Federal Circuit held that
Monsanto’s website disclaimer, together with its representations to the
court, sufficiently eliminated standing for the farmers to sue because
“Monsanto’s representations unequivocally disclaim any intent to sue,”
and therefore create a judicial estoppel.393
The Federal Circuit concluded that one percent or less of seeds
containing traited seed constitutes “trace” amounts.394 However, it
provided no guidance on whether there was a threshold of tolerance
above that. Equally worrying is, as commentators have noted,

Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) aff’d, 2012-1298, 2013 WL 2460949 (Fed. Cir. June 10, 2013). The Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2010) (providing that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”). See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (citation omitted) (“‘Basically, the question in each case is whether the
facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
of a declaratory judgment.’”). As one commentator pointed out, “Thus, the question in this case is
not whether the appellants’ subjective fear of suit by Monsanto is genuine, but whether they have
demonstrated a “‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which may prompt [them] to
reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.” Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Monsanto
Avoids Declaratory Judgment Action Brought by Organic Farmers, MONDAQ (June 13, 2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/246248/Patent/Monsanto+Avoids+Declaratory+Judgmen
t+Action+Brought+By+Organic+Farmers.
390 First Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) at ¶ 2, Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v.
Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11–CV–2163), ECF No. 3.
391 Organic Seed Growers, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (quoting Am. Compl. Ex. 3 (Apr. 18, 2011,
letter from appellants’ counsel to Monsanto’s counsel)).
392 Monsanto’s Commitment: Farmers and Patents, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/
newsviews/pages/commitment-farmers-patents.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
393 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
394 Id.
389
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The statement that Monsanto made to the plaintiffs may not have
been enough to prevent declaratory judgment jurisdiction if
Monsanto had not relied on it in its efforts to dismiss this case for
lack of jurisdiction! Thus, the Federal Circuit decision here seems to
be as narrow as Monsanto’s waiver—Monsanto may not be
judicially estopped from asserting its patents against other organic
farmers who inadvertently infringe the Monsanto patents in trace
amounts.395

More fundamentally, the outcome in Organic Seed Growers &
Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co. also does not address permutations of the
same problem, and Monsanto’s right to sue still hangs like the Sword of
Damocles over the heads of farmers.396 Farmers who do not want to use
Monsanto’s seed run the risk of infringement simply by purchasing
seeds from a third party source, and it may be impossible for unwilling
users to prevent the unauthorized making of patented seed.397 This is
particularly problematic since there is currently “no worldwide uniform
standard about what constitutes an appropriate level of seed purity . . .
[and] . . . [t]he assumption is that no seed [on the market] is 100 percent
pure.”398 Further, “[e]ven if intent is considered when awarding
damages and the accused farmer does not have to pay damages, the
patent rights can still be costly because the farmer is not awarded legal
fees and must still remove the contamination from his fields. Removal
can leave the farmer without seed for the following years.”399 Riskaverse farmers may end up having to purchase a bundle of licenses to
avoid inadvertent liability for infringement from multiple patentees.400
As one commentator noted:
Brinckerhoff, supra note 389.
Christina L. Nargolwala, Renewable Agriculture: Contamination and Patent Enforcement
Threats, 26 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 20, 20–21 (2012). See also Downing-Howk, supra note
95, at 66 (“The problem remains that without the appropriate equipment and training, those
growing seed legally saved or obtained cannot tell if their crop has been pollinated or otherwise
compromised by patented seed or pollen.”).
397 Downing-Howk, supra note 95, at 67 (2004) (“Because the gene introduced into the
genetically modified (plant) expresses itself as a dominant gene, a ‘non-genetically modified . . .
plant can be transformed into a genetically-modified plant’ simply by pollen drifting on the wind,
insects transporting the pollen, or plants coming in contact with one another as well as the
methods previously listed, resulting in the pollination of a non-genetically modified plant by
pollen with the modified gene.”); Monsanto and DuPont Heat up Rivalry over Seeds,
NYTIMES.COM (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/business/global/
20seeds.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
398 Gregory M. Lamb, Are There Drugs in My Corn Flakes?, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Mar. 11, 2004), http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0311/p14s01-sten.html (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
399 Lynd, supra note 213, at 679–80.
400 Id. at 680 (“[P]ermitting infringement suits even when the court does not award damages
creates a system through which the high risk of using conventional seeds and being sued due to
unintended pollen drift incentivizes farmers to use GM seeds.”).
395
396
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[An] incentive farmers have for avoiding infringement and
voluntarily choosing to pay the technology fee is the cost of patent
infringement litigation. Not only would farmers have their own costs
(attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees, and lost time), but the Patent
Act permits courts to award attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in
“exceptional cases.” Willful infringement is one factor courts
consider in determining whether a case is exceptional. Patent
litigation is notoriously expensive, which likely provides a strong
incentive to avoid infringement.401

More broadly, because of the large number of patents in force and
the non-public nature of licensing agreements, end users of SRTs will
not be able to identify all patent licenses that are potentially
implicated.402 How then can unintentional infringers be better
protected?
One approach is to require commodity seed sellers to distinguish
between seeds that contain Roundup Ready traits and those that do
not.403 However amicus CHS, a grain elevator, warned that such
measures were unfeasible. According to CHS, farmers deliver crops to a
grain elevator as commodity grain rather than seed. Grain elevators
“sort grain by kind, type and quality and nothing else in the ordinary
course of its business.”404 CHS stated that grain elevators cannot
“implement a cost-effective or manageable system for handling a billion
bushels of grain per year as if some small portion of that grain were
seed to be used for planting.”405
The result, however uncomfortable, may be that growers and
others like them must live under the grace of patent owners like
Monsanto. As amicus Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation also
pointed out, “innocent” patent infringement is an “every day”
occurrence as consumers use cell phones that may be infringing on
another company’s patents, yet no suits have been filed against end-

Ryan Vacca et al., Food for Thought: Genetically Modified Seeds as De Facto Standard
Essential Patents, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
402 Brief of BSA | The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 167, at 22, (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 28 (2003)).
403 The district court found this argument “compelling” in light of Monsanto’s dominance of the
soybean seed market, the regenerating nature of the Roundup Ready trait, and “the lack of any
restriction against mixing of soybeans harvested from Roundup Ready crop from those that are
harvested from a crop that was not grown from Roundup Ready seed.” Monsanto Co. v.
Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (S.D. Ind. 2009), aff’d, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
However it noted that while it “may disagree with the decision to award unconditional patent
protection to Monsanto,” it “does not make policy; rather it interprets and enforces the law.” Id. at
37.
404 See Brief for Amicus Curiae CHS Inc. in Support of Respondents, supra note 134, at 8.
405 Id. at 9.
401
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users.406 Instead, it noted that “‘innocent infringement’ is a natural
byproduct of a strict liability patent system.”407 The relevant question
for patent owners policing their rights is whether the value
misappropriated as a result of the infringement is worth the lawsuit and
the risk of negative publicity. This proved to be insufficient reassurance
for the organic grower coalition, and it may not be in other instances as
well.
A second approach is through state legislation. Monsanto’s
patent enforcement policies prompted some states to enact legislation to
protect their farmers. For example, California’s Seed Law protects
famers from contractual liability
based on the presence or possession of a patented genetically
engineered plant on real property owned or occupied by the farmer
when the farmer did not knowingly buy or otherwise knowingly
acquire the genetically engineered plant, the farmer acted in good
faith and without knowledge of the genetically engineered nature of
the plant, and when the genetically engineered plant is detected at a
de minimis level.408

State legislation of this sort raises the issue of federal preemption
discussed earlier.409 One related question is whether the “de minimis
level” contemplated by the statute should be read in light of the one
percent threshold articulated by the Federal Circuit in Organic Seed
Growers. Whether laws like these will be challenged by Monsanto and
other patent owners like it will depend on whether growers with a
plausible argument for “de minimis” crop contamination raise them in
defense to a patent infringement suit.
A third way is to limit remedies available to patentees. In
Monsanto v. Swann, the court awarded damages for current planting,
but refused to extend those damages to potential future damages
resulting from planting seed produced from the current infringing
incident.410 In Monsanto v. Scruggs, the court only allowed injunctive
relief and not monetary damages that were based on speculative
Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Found. et al. in Support of Affirming the
Federal Circuit, supra note 337, at 26–27. See, e.g., Mauro Whiteman, Factbox: History of the
mobile technology patent war, REUTERS (July 5, 2012, 8:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/07/05/us-apple-google-patents-idUSBRE8640IX20120705 (“Mobile technology has
been a hotbed of patent litigation in recent years.”).
407 Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Found, supra note 337 at 26.
408 Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 52305 (West 2009) (emphasis added). See also Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 7, § 1053(2) (2009) (emphasis added) (stating that if a farmer possesses on his property a
genetically engineered product in either de minimis quantities or without his intent, “the farmer is
not liable for breach of a seed contract nor for any damages claimed by the manufacturer.”).
409
See supra Part II.C.1.
410 Monsanto v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d. 937 at 946 (E.D. Mo. 2001).
406
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claims.411 Following from the Court’s decision in eBay, courts are now
more willing to deny injunctive relief in appropriate cases, particularly
where an injunction would impose substantial hardship on the defendant
or the public interest.412
A fourth way is by raising the threshold of “making,” so that while
intent is not directly factored into the analysis, the circumstances as a
whole could be sufficient to distinguish between conniving free-riders
and victims of transgenic pollution. For example, under the facts of
Bowman v. Monsanto, the concern is that given the amount of
transgenic pollen “drifting in the wild,” infringement would be nearly
inevitable under the current threshold.413 On the other hand, limiting
infringement to the application of glyphosate would “raise the
infringement bar high enough to exclude unintentional
infringements.”414
More recently, the tables have turned on Monsanto. In May 2013,
it was reported that Monsanto’s Roundup Ready wheat had
contaminated wheat fields in Oregon.415 Since genetically modified
wheat is banned in many countries, U.S. farmers have not embraced it
as they have with corn and soybean.416 The recent discovery caused
several countries, including Japan and South Korea, to ban U.S. wheat
exports from Oregon and elsewhere.417 A wheat farmer has sued
Monsanto for negligence and claimed damages for cancelled orders and
price erosion.418 The same ease of contamination that struck fear into
farmers across the country is now giving them the means to access
Monsanto’s coffers. Ironically, it may now be Monsanto who will be
See Monsanto v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 758 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (stating that
quantification of “other damages, including that resulting from previous and potential future
unlicensed brown bag sales of Monsanto’s patented Roundup Ready® and Bollgard® technology,
are far less easily determined and computed. Equally difficult to discern are the resulting damages
due to loss of consumer good will, the effect on Monsanto’s efforts to control and steward its
technology, and the corresponding dampening effect on Monsanto’s research and development
activities in the agricultural arena” and found that injunctive relief was appropriate rather than
monetary relief.).
412 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2008). Server & Casey, supra note 232, at
640 (noting that “the distinction between a breach of contract remedy and a patent infringement
remedy has diminished in the wake of the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, blunting the impact of
using contract-based remedies in lieu of patent remedies.”).
413 Robert Cook-Deegan, Patenting Life: Genes and Generations, IPBIO NETWORK (July 11,
2013), ipbio.org/patenting-life-genes-generations.htm.
414 Id.
415 Nadia Arumugam, Illegal Genetically Modified Wheat Found In Oregon Farm: Should We Be
Worried?, FORBES (May 31, 2013, 3:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nadiaarumugam/
2013/05/31/illegal-genetically-modified-wheat-found-in-oregon-farm-should-we-be-worried/.
416 Id.
417 Id.
418 Daniel Fisher, Monsanto Says GM Wheat ‘Isolated Incident,’ But Lawyers Bet There Will
Be More, FORBES (June 5, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/
2013/06/05/monsanto-says-gm-wheat-isolated-incident-but-lawyers-bet-there-will-be-more/.
411
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pleading trace contamination and lack of intent.
2. Incidental Users
The second potential group of users liable for infringement is those
whose uses were incidental. Justice Kagan noted, when writing for the
Court in Bowman v. Monsanto, that incidental uses might not constitute
infringement.419 In the field of copyright law, Congress enacted an
“essential step defense” for the operation of software on a computer
system, which necessarily involves creating another copy.420 As the
United States argues, “[s]uch legislative action would have been
unnecessary if the copyright exhaustion doctrine (codified at 17 U.S.C.
109(a)) already provided such a defense.”421
Patent attorneys Patrice P. Jean and Friedrich B. Laub have noted
that courts may not find infringement for incidental users “independent
of the precise scope of the claims covering the stem cells” because
“self-replication would occur outside any human control, and because it
would be incidental to the overall therapy and not the primary
purpose.”422 Since claims over stem cells are normally directed at
isolated cells or cell cultures, “replication of patent protected stem cells
in vivo (in the body), once they have been administered to the patient,
will probably not constitute infringement because the resulting secondgeneration cells are not ‘isolated’ any longer.”423 According to Jean and
Laub, it is unlikely that incidental replication in stem cell-based
therapeutic processes will harm the commercial interests of patent
owners.424 Where patent claims cover stem cells that are grown in vitro,
the tissue culture is “outside of a living organism or patient” and may be
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013).
See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In order to use a
software program, a user’s computer will automatically copy the software into the computer’s
random access memory.”); see 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2013) (providing that “it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaption of that computer program” in the manner specified).
421 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 1, at 17.
422 Patrice P. Jean & Friedrich B. Laub, Protecting Self-Replicating Biotechnologies In View of
Bowman v. Monsanto, 86 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 376 (2013) (“The term ‘stem
cell’ refers to cells in multicellular organisms that can differentiate into a multitude of specialized
cell types and that can divide to produce more stem cells. Adult stem cells, which are found in
various tissues of the adult organism, are usually distinguished from embryonic stem cells, which
are present in the inner cell mass of blastocysts. Stem cells are also distinguished based on their
capacity to differentiate into any cell type or only into some cell types.”). See also id. (noting that
“patent-protected stem cells are used for research purposes in animals” would likely be noninfringing.).
423 Id.
424 Id. Similarly, patent attorneys Chris Jeffers, Carl B. Massey, Jr. and Thomas F. Poché note the
replication for the maintenance of culture cells during authorized use or in preparation for such
use would be not be infringing if the law implies a license for multigenerational use. Jeffers et al.,
supra note 211.
419
420
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infringing because replication is the primary purpose of the activity and
the activity is done under human control.425 While Jean and Laub
acknowledge that there may be close cases between short and long-term
cell cultures, they state that in practice the distinction is without
practical relevance because new stem cell cultures are bought to ensure
“optimal therapeutic capacity.”426
In contrast, a more serious threat is posed to patent owners who
have claims over genetically engineered bacteria and eukaryotic cells,
which better maintain their potency.427 How might patent owners
protect such inventions? One way, suggested by Jean and Laub, is
through license restrictions on use.428 Under such terms, buyers of
genetically engineered bacteria and eukaryotic cells can use the cells,
but cannot sell them to third parties. They note that such restrictions are
“routine in the industry.”429 Given that infringement will depend on how
the invention works and its intended use, the context provided by the
express grant of the license may be as important as its restrictions.430
Reinforcing the loose assurance by the Court in Bowman v. Monsanto
that a judicial exception might be available to them, the Federal Circuit
decision in Organic Farmers suggests that like de minimis infringers,
courts will exonerate these incidental users under the doctrine of
implied licenses.
3. “Mallinckrodt Users” and the Unfinished Business of Quanta
The third group consists of licensees who fall within the ambit of
the Federal Circuit’s Mallinckrodt case. The Mallinckrodt court held

Jean & Laub, supra note 422.
Id. (“Stem cells are inherently prone to differentiation in culture and unnecessary culture is
often avoided to maintain the cells’ capacity to differentiate into multiple cell types. Thus, similar
to Vernon Bowman who purchased seeds from Monsanto for his first-crop but not his less
economically important second-crop, customers might accept the cost of purchasing new stem
cells each time they use them to assure that the cells have optimal therapeutic capacity and are not
compromised.”); see also id. (noting that the foregoing also applies to plasmids, “small circular
DNA molecules that were originally derived from bacteria and that encode, for example,
resistance to certain antibiotics”).
427 Id. (“Genetically engineered bacteria and eukaryotic cells are primarily useful as research
tools or vehicles for the production of certain metabolites or proteins (e.g., antibodies).
Additionally, engineered bacteria are also used for the degradation of certain waste products and
the clean-up of oil spills, for example.”).
428 Id. Similarly, Jeffers, Massey, and Poché note that the multifunctional nature of DNA vectors
means that there are infringing purposes that do not specifically require replication. Jeffers et al.,
supra note 211 (“DNA vectors can be used for a variety of purposes, not all of which require
replication. For example, vectors can be used as probes or markers, they can be used to transport
sequences of interest for further manipulation, or they can be used as immunizing agents. . . . Of
course, some vectors are used in contexts where replication is likely or assumed (e.g., transfection
of cells or bacteria, generation of transgenic tissues or organisms).”).
429
Id.
430 Id.
425
426
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that patentees could restrict the use and sale of patented articles, and
that violation of the restriction amount to patent infringement.431 But if
the Court in Bowman v. Monsanto found every unauthorized new
growing of Roundup Ready crops to be infringing, this would obviate
the need in many cases for contractual restrictions. How then is
Mallinckrodt still relevant?
Farmers may buy transgenic seed covered by method patents from
authorized dealers. Under Mallinckrodt, the farmers would be liable for
patent infringement if they used those seeds in a manner prohibited by
the patentee, even though they were using the seeds bought (rather than
new seeds grown), as long as the patentee had restricted the permissible
uses through its license agreement. If the Court had held that Quanta
overruled Mallinckrodt, the farmers would not be liable for
infringement as the patent rights in those seeds would be exhausted.
Farmers would be liable for contractual remedies, but not patent
remedies. The same result would apply if farmers could buy transgenic
seed cover by product patents but not grow new seeds. And farmers
who had no contractual privity with Monsanto, for example, those who
bought seed from grain elevators, would not even be contractually
liable. The Court’s express expunging of Mallinckrodt in Bowman v.
Monsanto would have been helpful in clarifying the law. More
importantly, it would have provided a critical avenue out for these
farmers, whose rights must now be tested and defined by further
litigation.
Exhaustion prevents a situation in which “a patentee could impose
restrictions on the subsequent use and sale of patented articles,” and
“[t]he aggregation of such restrictions, through multiple downstream
transactions, would create vast uncertainty and greatly impede the flow
of commerce.”432 Consequently, if patent rights over an article can
never be exhausted until patent expiration, amicus Business Software
Alliance warns that patent holdups in the downstream market could
occur if the defendant had incurred sunk costs in adopting the
technology.433
Future cases taking up this issue should make a clear distinction
between licenses and sales. A license is an agreement by the patentee
not to sue the licensee for infringement of the patent, and is usually
granted with certain restrictions in order for the patentee to divide its
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (1992).
Kyle M. Costello, The State of the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, Post-Quanta v. LG
Electronics, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 263–64 (2010).
433 Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in
Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 517 (2011) (“If the patentee can catch
downstream violators by surprise it will be in a position to extract much higher royalty rates than
it could if the infringement notification were more timely.”).
431
432
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rights between different licensees.434 Importantly, patentees cannot use a
license to cover up what was actually a sale.435
One obstacle to this initiative is that courts have been lax in
making that distinction. In copyright law, software companies have
successfully used licenses as an end run around exhaustion. In Vernor v.
Autodesk, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
a copyright owner retained title to the software despite the “significant
transfer restrictions” it imposed on buyers of its software packages
including that it was non-transferable, geographical use restrictions, and
its termination upon authorized copying or failure to comply with
license restrictions.436 As a licensee rather than an owner of a copy of
the software, the defendant was not allowed even to resell copies under
the first sale doctrine.437 The Ninth Circuit rejected the “economic
realities” that customers possessed copies of their software indefinitely
without recurring license payments as evidence that they were
owners.438 The operating system animating an iPhone, for instance,
belongs to Apple Corp. and not to the device’s purchaser.
Similarly, under Monsanto’s business model farmers license their
use and it may be the start of a trend where consumers no longer own
what they buy.439 Monsanto argued that farmers “are both purchasers
and licensees” as they “purchase soybean seeds, which they then use to
‘make’ new patented articles under the authority of their license.”440 It
pointed out that it is paid a license fee with each purchase of seeds and
that the soybean seeds were conveyed as “a qualified sale for less than
value for limited use.”441 The soybeans Bowman bought from the grain
elevator were unauthorized because Monsanto had no contractual
relationship with the grain elevator and “did not authorize elevators to
do anything with its technology.”442 Grain elevators, then too, are liable
for infringing the right to sell seed with patented traits and for abetting
farmers like Bowman who plant and grow the seeds.
Downing-Howk, supra note 95, at 52–53 (2004) (“[P]atentees, under some circumstances
have maximized the exploitation of patent benefits by licensing another to make and vend the
patented product.”).
435 Richard H. Stern, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions After Mallinckrodt—An Idea in Search of
Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 4 (1994). See also id. at n.5 (transferring of possession of
a patented product was a sale regardless of whether or not it was “accompanied by what
purported to be a license.”).
436 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2010).
437 Id. at 1112.
438 Id.
439 See Caleb Garling, Monsanto Seed Suit and Software Patents, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
(Feb. 23, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/technology/article/Monsanto-seed-suit-andsoftware-patents-4303103.php.
440 Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 35, n.21.
441 Id. at 35, n.21 (citing Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16 (1913)).
442 Id. at 37, n.22.
434
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Further, Monsanto argued that selling soybeans to farmers was
“[t]he only practical way to license the Roundup Ready® trait
commercially.”443 In contrast with “more traditional technologies,” with
which patentees can license uses transferring title, the seeds “delivering
the patented technology to licensees are fully consumed when used;
they cannot be leased or rented because Monsanto could not require
return of those articles upon completion of the licensed use.”444 Neither
was a license appropriate, Monsanto asserted, because traited beans are
produced “only through propagation and cross-breeding of a seed that
already contains the patented invention.”445
In its brief, Monsanto argued that even if the sale was authorized,
buyers remained subject to licensing restrictions between the patent
owner and the manufacturer.446 It was true that in Quanta, unlike in
Bowman v. Monsanto, Intel’s authority to sell products embodying LG’s
technology was unrestricted. However, what was relevant was the fact
that an authorized sale was made.447 If one could simply contract around
exhaustion, this “would reduce the entire sale exhaustion doctrine to a
default contract rule, easily avoided by proper drafting of a license
agreement” and by “controlling the downstream uses of a patented item,
the patent owner would be able to assert a right to seek additional
royalties from subsequent purchasers of the product.”448
As a matter of precedent, Server and Casey argued that Quanta’s
rejection of the implied license rationale for patent exhaustion “called
into question [Mallinckrodt]’s treatment of a sale as a license,” and
noted that the Federal Circuit itself had treated the license like a sale for
exhaustion purposes.449 Recently, the Federal Circuit reiterated that
“‘lack of a sale’ was no barrier to the application of patent
exhaustion.450 Instead, exhaustion “occur[s] when the patented product

Id. at 13.
Id. at 45–48.
445 Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 47 (“That Monsanto must accompany each license for
a farmer to manufacture the patented technology with a sale of seeds that will be consumed when
planted should not convert a limited license to use the technology to grow one commercial crop
into a blanket authorization to become a direct competitor of Monsanto.”).
446 Id.
447 Brief of BSA | The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 167 at 21.
448 Id. See also Shubha Ghosh, Carte Blance, Quanta, and Competition Policy, 34 J. CORP. L.
1209, 1224 (2009) (“Once it is recognized that a patent owner can condition a transfer of patented
technology and that this condition prevents the exhaustion of the patent owner’s rights, then the
patent owner logically has the ability to bring patent infringement claims against anyone who
obtains the technology from the first purchaser and violates the contractual condition.”).
449 Server & Casey, supra note 232 at 594 (referring to LG Elecs, Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs, Inc., 453
F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
450
LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC, 2013-1271, 2013 WL 5878598 (Fed.
Cir. Nov. 4, 2013)
443
444
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‘passes to the hands’ of a transferee and when he ‘legally acquires a
title’ to it.”451
Professors Thomas Cotter and John Golden have separately
observed that the Court in recent years has been committed to reining in
patentee rights and restoring primacy to its own jurisprudence in patent
law.452 The starting point of recalibrating patent rights must be in the
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to “secur[e] for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries” and requires that such grants “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”453 In agriculture as in other
industries, patents fulfill this constitutional purpose.454
In interpreting the Patent Act, the Court has stated that the primary
purpose of the patent system is not to reward individual inventors, but
rather to promote technological advancement through disclosure and
dissemination of inventions that meet the requirements for
patentability.455 The purpose of the Patent Act is not to ensure the
greatest possible financial return, but to benefit the public. Once the
initial sale is made, the inventor has received his financial incentive to
invent and the purpose is fulfilled.456 Thus, “[a] restriction which would
451

Id. See Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. New York Times Co., 10-CV-4387, 2013 WL
4401378 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2013) (finding that patent exhaustion applied to patent licenses over
mobile wireless technology).
452 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, Part II: Reflections
on the (Counter) Revolution in Patent Law, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 365, 367, 371–72 (2010)
(“In the four years since . . . the United States Supreme Court has scaled back some of the Federal
Circuit’s more expansive readings of patent doctrine[,] . . . provided a necessary corrective to that
ever-expanding system . . . and reaffirmed the vitality of the first-sale doctrine.”); John M.
Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of
Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 658, 671 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has, in
the past six years, asserted its dominion over patent law with frequency and force. . . . [T]he
increased frequency and substance of Supreme Court review has [sic] coincided with an increase
in the rate and severity of adverse results for Federal Circuit decisions. In the last ten terms
studied, the Supreme Court has affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decisions in only two patent cases,
vacated the Circuit’s decisions in four, and reversed the Circuit’s decisions in six. All four of the
most recently decided cases ended in a reversal.” (footnotes omitted)).
453 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It is the sole constitutional grant of power that “begins with a
prescription of proper legislative purpose.” Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on
the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1153.
454 See J.E.M. AgSupply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130–31 (2001). See
also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (“The patent laws promote this progress
by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an incentive for their inventiveness
and research efforts.”).
455 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307 (quotations omitted) (noting that the legislative authority to
enact patent laws “is exercised in the hope that ‘[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have
a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better
lives for our citizens.’”) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)).
456 Motion Picture Patents Co.v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (“[T]he
primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents
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give to the plaintiff such a potential power for evil over an industry . . .
is plainly void, because wholly without the scope and purpose of our
patent laws, and because, if sustained, it would be gravely injurious to
that public interest, which we have seen is more a favorite of the law
than is the promotion of private fortunes.”457
From a competition perspective, post-sale restrictions facilitate
obtaining and maintaining monopoly power.458 To hold that anyone who
bought SRTs and used them for their intended purpose had violated
patent rights would be to authorize patentees to extract tribute from an
untold number of licenses for what was basically a single sale of the
patented invention. As amicus Business Software Alliance points out,
such licensing models will result in a “huge increase in litigation, with
little benefit to anyone other than patent lawyers.”459 Extending patent
rights beyond the first sale through the stream of commerce
disproportionately rewards patent owners and unduly interferes with the
free movement of goods in the marketplace.
Amicus Automotive Aftermarket Industry Association (“AAIA”)
confirms that “the threat of potentially devastating patent infringement
liability chills competition by aftermarket businesses.”460 The AAIA
explains that “[p]atent suits involve technically complex issues of
infringement, claim construction, and validity, and are extremely
expensive to defend. Enhanced damages, attorney fees, and preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief pose intolerable risks for small
entrepreneurial companies.”461 The AAIA argues:
Reaffirming the scope of patent exhaustion also will restore the
proper balance between patent rights and antitrust law. Post-sale

but is ‘to promote the progress of science and the useful arts’”) (citation omitted).
Id. at 519. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942). (“[W]hilst the
remuneration of genius and useful ingenuity is a duty incumbent upon the public, the rights and
welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded. Considerations of the
individual emolument can never be permitted to operate to the injury of these.”).
458 Winston, supra note 109, at 344 (“There has been a dramatic increase in private investment in
agricultural research, based on the realization that contracts can be used to essentially monopolize
the market.”).
459 Brief of BSA | The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 167 at 24.
460 Brief Amici Curiae of Automotive Aftermarket Indus. Ass’n, supra note 167 at 7 (“While
repair and supplies businesses can rely on patent marking and published patents to evaluate
whether their activities constitute repair and not reconstruction, they have no analogous public
information to determine whether devices are subject to post-sale restrictions. Businesses that
later upgrade or repair products (such as the computers at issue in Quanta) may be unaware of a
purported downstream restriction. Aftermarket competitors likely never will see the outer
container of the original vended item, and have no information to determine whether the outer
container was slapped with a post-sale restriction or whether such a restriction legally could
prevent repair.”).
461 Id. at 7–8.
457
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patent conditions and infringement lawsuits typically target
manufacturers and sellers of competing supplies and repair services,
not the purchasers that purportedly agreed to the post-sale
restrictions. By allowing post-sale patent restrictions to limit
exhaustion, the Federal Circuit necessarily proscribes lawful
aftermarket competition and limits antitrust defenses—thereby
restricting consumer choice, increasing consumer prices, and stifling
aftermarket innovation.462

A careful reading of Quanta suggests that the position may be
clearer than some might think. The Court quoted its earlier decision in
Keeler.463 The correct view seems to be that a post-sale condition cannot
continue to haunt subsequent purchases as long as their use of the
patented article does not involve a new “making.”464 The court held that
“regardless of the fact that Lexmark may not have received the full
value of its Prebate cartridges, after Quanta Lexmark may not invoke
patent law in order to enforce its Prebate terms” to limit post-sale use of
its printer cartridges.465
Thus, once patentees part with their patented articles in a manner
that does not constitute patent infringement by the seller, since it was
authorized under the patent, exhaustion results. Failure by the buyer to
adhere to any purported restrictions with respect to that article cannot
trigger an infringement suit. As observed by the United States in its
Bowman v. Monsanto brief, “the Federal Circuit had erred in fashioning
a ‘conditional sale’ exception to patent-exhaustion principles.”466
Servitude to the patent following an authorized sale is “the very thing
the exhaustion doctrine is intended to prevent.”467 Commentators such
as Professor Herbert Hovenkamp agree that Quanta has “reinstated a
strict patent ‘exhaustion’ (first-sale) rule against post-sale restraints.”468
Id. at 8.
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (“Whether a patentee may
protect himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a
question before us, and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a
question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and
effect of the patent laws.” (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637,
n.7. (2008)).
464 Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 582–86 (E.D.
Ky. 2009) (“Quanta . . . represents a change in the law . . . because the Court reasserted a broad
understanding of patent exhaustion in the face of Federal Circuit case law that had narrowed the
scope of the doctrine. That Federal Circuit case law had been followed as binding precedent by
the district courts, including this one. . . . Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt sub silentio. The
Supreme Court’s broad statement of the law of patent exhaustion simply cannot be squared with
the position that the Quanta holding is limited to its specific facts.”).
465 Id. at 586.
466 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 1, at 7.
467 Id. at 7.
468 See Heimes, supra note 56, at 118 (“Since the Scruggs case was decided, the U.S. Supreme
Court broadened the patent exhaustion doctrine in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
462
463
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Depending on the nature and scope of the SRT patents at issue,
owners could still appropriate some returns on their investment even if
contractual restrictions are not enforceable. In the context of genetically
engineered bacteria and eukaryotic cells, Jean and Laub point out that
owners could sell a companion product such as a growth medium that
was independently patented, as Monsanto did with its RoundupRoundup Ready pairing.469 A second method, they suggest, is to
“engineer cells that replicate slowly, or not at all, in culture” to prevent
the creation of second-generation cells.470 This is reminiscent of
Monsanto’s Terminator gene technology discussed earlier.471
Extinguishing post-sale restrictions would provide a bright line
rule preventing downstream purchasers from being caught unaware by a
requirement to pay royalties, reducing the incentive of patentees to
litigate against downstream purchasers, and increasing the incentive to
bargain for a royalty ex ante that better reflects the value of that
technology.472 This is consistent with a plain reading of the Court’s
observation in Quanta that “[t]he longstanding doctrine of patent
exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item
terminates all patent rights to that item.”473 Apart from freeing up
harvest seed for secondary market commerce, the seed will also be
available for use in research in developing new stacked traits, thus
enhancing competition in the upstream market for traits as well.
Extinguishing post-sale restrictions would also be consistent with
Quanta’s concern with “expectations of fairness and justice in the
public interest” and not merely to the advancement of innovation.474
III. MONSANTO AND THE IP-ANTITRUST INTERFACE
Antitrust and patent misuse claims were featured in Monsanto’s
earlier suits against farmers and licensees in relation to its Roundup and
Roundup Ready technologies, but none were successfully asserted.475
reversing the Federal Circuit’s narrow application of the doctrine.”).
Jean & Laub, supra note 422, at 4 (suggesting that plasmids could be “sold in conjunction
with proprietary reagents (with separate IP protection) that enable, or at least enhance, their
performance.” Giving an example of how “reporter” plasmids can be “marketed together with a
proprietary reagent that allows them to properly be assayed or function.”).
470 Id. (suggesting that plasmids could be prepared so that they self-replicate only after a DNA
sequence has been inserted, citing the example of TA-vectors “which are linearized plasmids that
become amplifiable only after they have been circularized with the help of an insert.”).
471 See supra Part II.B.2.
472 Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 535 (2010).
473 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008).
474 Rinehart, supra note 472, at 535.
475 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (distributor of
agricultural herbicides brought antitrust suit against the manufacturer alleging Monsanto
conspired with other distributors to fix resale prices and terminated plaintiff for price cutting);
469

Lim-galleyed-FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

202

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

12/21/13 12:55 PM

[Vol. 32:131

Commentators reflecting on the Bowman v. Monsanto decision wrote
that “[b]y holding that Monsanto’s restriction on replanting was within
the scope of its patent rights, the Supreme Court effectively immunized
that restriction from antitrust scrutiny.”476 That view, which found
currency with some judges in “pay-for-delay” cases, was recently
dispelled by the Supreme Court in Actavis; the Court clarified that
patent owners were not immune from antitrust scrutiny merely because
they were acting within the scope of their patent rights.477
The Court emphasized that an antitrust inquiry into the appropriate
scope of patent rights is not defined solely by “the length of the patent’s
term or its earning potential[,]” but rather “by considering traditional
antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming
virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations
present in the circumstances[.]”478 Thus, “[w]hether a particular restraint
lies ‘beyond the limits of the patent monopoly’ is a conclusion that
flows from that analysis and not . . . its starting point.”479 In that
analysis, the Court noted that “patent and antitrust policies are both
relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and
consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”480
Since patent misuse analysis typically starts with the analysis of patent
scope, the doctrine will likely have to be rethought in light of Actavis as
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (farmer accusing Monsanto of
misuse and antitrust violations through its “seed grower incentive programs, its seed partner
license agreements, its grower license agreements, and its alleged refusal to sell Roundup
Ready® cotton seeds without the Bollgard trait.”); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (farmer accusing Monsanto of misuse and antitrust violations by refusing to
allow the “untying” of the seed and the trait “by permitting the farmer to save and replant
ROUNDUP READY® seed each year, provided the farmer still pays directly to Monsanto the
required technology fee, rather than requiring a farmer to purchase both the seed and the genetic
technology together at the beginning of each growing season.”).
476 Cynthia Chen et al., Patent Exhaustion Rejected: Patented Seed Purchaser Has No Right to
Make Copies, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, (May 16, 2013), http://www.mwe.com/PatentExhaustion-Rejected-Patented-Seed-Purchaser-Has-No-Right-to-Make-Copies-05-16-2013/. See
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (declaring it unlawful for any person to “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)
(requiring, in section 1 of the Sherman Act, concert of action between two or more market
participants and, therefore, foreclosing unilateral action by a firm from giving rise to an antitrust
violation under that section).
477 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013) (“Solvay’s patent, if valid
and infringed, might have permitted it to charge drug prices sufficient to recoup the reverse
settlement payments it agreed to make to its potential generic competitors. And we are willing to
take this fact as evidence that the agreement’s ‘anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent.’ But we do not agree that that fact, or characterization, can
immunize the agreement from antitrust attack.”) (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm.,
Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012)).
478
Id.
479
Id. at 2231–32.
480
Id. at 2231.
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well.481
As antitrust cases involving Microsoft, Intel, Google and others
have shown, widespread adoption of a particular technology by
consumers does not mean that markets are functioning competitively.482
A 2009 report by the AAI warned that the conditions in the seed
industry create “an almost intractable situation for competition.”483 It
observed an absence of competition at an inter-platform level. 484
Growers are left with only one brand to choose from: Monsanto’s.485
Roundup Ready is used on approximately 95% of soybean acres in
America and Monsanto itself supplies 99.7% of the relevant market for
herbicide-tolerant traits in the United States.486 It is for all practical
purposes a near monopolist and the 325% price increase between 1995
and 2011 is evidence of its market power.
Intra-platform competition—where biotech companies license
popular patented traits from patentees to add new traits—has also been
impaired according to a 2009 report by the AAI.487 This lack of intraplatform competition stems from “high concentration, single-firm
dominance, and strategic conduct [that] forecloses rivals from the
access to technology that is critical for intra-platform competition.”488
Judge Clevenger, dissenting in Monsanto Co. v. McFarling noted:
[T]he purchaser cannot reasonably obtain the necessary goods or
services on alternative terms from any other source. Monsanto
widely licenses its patents on glyphosate resistance technology, and
over 200 seed companies offer Roundup Ready soybean seed. But
each and every one of those licenses requires that the ultimate
consumer (the farmer) sign Monsanto’s own Technology Agreement.
While Monsanto’s monopoly on glyphosate resistance technology
may be an entirely lawful one, Monsanto’s control of the market

481

See Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH. TELECOM. &
TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
482 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); in re Intel Corp. No. 9341,
F.T.C. (Oct. 29, 2010), available at http://ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/101102inteldo.pdf; Consent
Order, In re Google, Inc., F.T.C. No. 102 3136 (Jan. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf.
483 MOSS, supra note 136, at 12.
484 Id.
485 Id. at 11 (“[R]ivalry is between transgenic seed platforms. Seed containing traits that are
exclusive to a single firm are the product of such platforms.”); see Khan, supra note 7.
486 Defendants’ Amended Answer and Counterclaims at 27, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours and Co., No. 409-686 (E.D. Mo. July 10, 2009), 2009 WL 2589331.
487 MOSS, supra note 136. at 11–12 (“Intra-platform competition involves rivalry within
platforms whereby firms develop new transgenic seed products, in part, by obtaining access to
rivals’ patented traits.”).
488 Id. at 14.
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means that farmers have no place else to turn for glyphosate-resistant
seed.489

The AAI Report characterized Monsanto’s licensing model as a
“closed” platform “designed to frustrate rivals’ access to needed
technology.”490 It noted that allowing Monsanto’s seed-saving
restrictions of patented seed could cause anticompetitive effects to
“extend upstream to the market for genetic traits.”491 Rival genetic trait
developers and seed companies would be incentivized to adopt
Roundup Ready as an industry standard “because Monsanto’s policing
of its system ensures recurring annual sales.”492 Coupled with the
ubiquity of the Monsanto Roundup Ready trait, rivals would lose
incentive to compete vigorously to create rival soybean systems, which
would enhance Monsanto’s market power.493
DuPont’s Pioneer division sought to introduce what it claimed
were superior input and output traits that Monsanto did not offer.494
DuPont alleged that because of the widespread adoption of Roundup
Ready, the commercial viability of these next-generation output traits
depends on the biotech company being able to stack these traits on
Roundup Ready.495 Monsanto’s market share in seeds and seed traits
has led commentators to liken Monsanto’s business to “a classic
platform monopoly” similar to “AT&T’s telephone lines before the
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See Burke Bindbeutel, The
Beans of Wrath: Genetic Patent Holders Reap Further Protection Monsanto Co. v. Bowman,
Note, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 426, 449 (2013) (“An antitrust counterclaim against
Monsanto becomes more persuasive as the availability of seeds that do not contain Monsanto’s
patented traits decreases, or even simply on the market realities that have compelled farmers to
plant Monsanto’s seeds.”).
490 In contrast, “open” platforms interoperate with rival technologies. See MOSS, supra note 136,
at 12.
491 Brief of Amici Curiae the Am. Antitrust Inst. et al., supra note 172, at 30.
492 Id. at 30.
493 Id. at 30–31 (“If Monsanto’s share of the market for herbicide tolerant soybean traits allows it
to dictate the terms of rivals’ access to Monsanto traits for the purpose of developing plant
varieties that combine or ‘stack’ various genetic traits, Monsanto’s technology licensing practices
are likely to have increasingly greater influence in shaping or controlling the evolution of
competition in the market.”).
494 Pioneer sought to introduce Herculex, an insect resistant trait, in its corn, and offer Roundup
Ready traited soybeans with low linolenic and high oleic traits, which according to DuPont have
numerous practical and environmental benefits. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., DuPont
Asserts Anti-Trust, Patent Claims against Monsanto, DUPONT (June 16, 2009) (characterizing
Monsanto’s lawsuit as “seek[ing] to block innovative new soybean lines from . . . Pioneer HiBred” and asserting that “[w]e believe we have every right through our existing . . . license
agreement to ‘stack’ our Optimum® GAT® trait Pioneer soybeans already containing a Roundup
Ready® trait.”). See also Defendants’ Amended Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 486, at ¶
162 (“To prevent competition from the introduction of the OGAT corn trait, Monsanto has used
its monopoly power in the relevant markets to restrict Pioneer’s ability to stack that trait with the
Herculex® insect-resistant traits that Pioneer co-developed with Dow.”).
495 Defendants’ Amended Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 486, at ¶ 47.
489
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company’s 1984 breakup or Microsoft Corp.’s Windows operating
system in the 1990s.”496 That technology, they argue, is “a facility that
competitors need access to, to compete against the monopolist.”497 Like
Monsanto, Microsoft’s market share in the PC operating system market
exceeded 90%.498 The tying of its Internet browser to its operating
system foreclosed the secondary market for applications and hampered
the ability of rivals to compete.499 The technological tide in the years
that followed, however, has eroded Microsoft’s ability to leverage its
market power. While the exact figures vary slightly, Internet Explorer is
estimated to have slid from more than two-thirds of the Internet browser
market in 2008 to under a third in 2013, due in part to the introduction
of Google’s more popular Chrome browser, which some market share
estimates place as high as forty percent.500 In the market for herbicideresistant traits, however, it is a different story. Professor Bohannan
points out that Monsanto possessed substantial market power since “no
other competitors produced seed with the same herbicide-resistant
qualities.”501
Antitrust law equates neither the ownership of a patent with
monopoly power, nor the mere possession of monopoly power as a
violation.502 However, the possession of monopoly power opens the
conduct of Monsanto to scrutiny in extending or maintaining its
monopoly in violation of the antitrust laws. With increased antitrust
scrutiny, allegations of patent misuse, which require a lower, and in
some cases, a different threshold, will likely follow.503 Monsanto’s
victory against Bowman could fortify its market power against
Jack Kaskey & William McQuillen, Monsanto’s Seed Patents May Trump Antitrust Claims,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aXnemqNlsotQ.
497 Id.
498 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 51 & n.6 (D.D.C. 2000).
499 Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse As Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 504 (2011) (“[F]irst,
Windows was the only realistic choice for an operating system for most customers (there was
market power in the tying product); and second, browsers have no viable uses except in
conjunction with an operating system (there was no other incentive for rival firms to produce new
browsers). As a result, the tie had the effect of foreclosing competition in the tied-product
market.”).
500 See Top 5 Browsers from July 2008 to Oct 2013, STATCOUNTER GLOBAL STATS,
http://gs.statcounter.com/#browser-ww-monthly-200807-201310 (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
501 Id. at 503–04. See also Daryl Lim, Beyond Microsoft: Intellectual Property, Peer Production
and the Law’s Concern with Market Dominance, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
291, 301 (2008) (arguing that “if there is an alternative system of innovation that creates more
market players on a continuing basis, it should result in less dominance and, consequently, less
need for intervention by competition authorities in IP markets”).
502
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[M]erely possessing
monopoly power is not itself an antitrust violation . . . .”).
503 See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises Inc., 727 F.3d 856 (No. 11-15605), 2013 WL 3621763
(finding patent unenforceability for breach of royalty clause after the patent had expired). See
generally LIM, supra, note 348.
496
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consumers and competitors. Accordingly, it is useful to look ahead and
consider the broader issues at the IP-Antitrust interface that have
already arisen or will arise in light of Monsanto’s market activities.
Part A examines the proposition advanced by some commentators
that Roundup Ready is a standard essential patent, and considers how
the controversial essential facilities doctrine could help foster
competition in the market for genetically modified seeds and other SRT
markets like embryonic stem cell research. Part B examines the Accord,
an initiative by Monsanto and other agro-biotechnology companies to
encourage the development and commercialization of their technology
even after the patents covering those technologies expire, and how
Monsanto’s win may benefit Bowman and other farmers in the long run.
Part C examines the charge of “evergreening” patents raised against
Monsanto, and argues that a system similar to Paragraph IV challenges
under the Hatch-Waxman Act could facilitate generic competition in
agro-biotechnology and other markets.
A. Roundup Ready: A Standard Essential Patent?504
Even though the Roundup Ready patent expires in 2014, the
Court’s decision in Bowman v. Monsanto will still affect patents on
Roundup Ready 2 Yield. As the AAI notes, “Monsanto would maintain
its current ability to control access to the technology, agricultural
biotechnology innovators may continue to experience difficulty in
developing ‘generic [Roundup Ready]’ to generate competition.”505
Monsanto argues that such field-of–use restrictions are within the scope
of its patents.506 At the same time, Monsanto points out that competition
will increase as the market for crops matures.507 The fact that it is
licensing, Monsanto asserts, shows that it is “encouraging, rather than
hampering innovation.”508
Monsanto is partially correct. Generally, there is no duty to license
rivals under antitrust law.509 Antitrust law also allows patentees to grant
The discussion in Parts III.A and III.C have been adapted from an earlier newsletter article.
Daryl Lim, Rebooting the Bean: Genetically Modified Seeds and the Antitrust-Patent Interface, 3
A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST LAW, AGRIC. AND FOOD COMM. BULLETIN, at 2 (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/at800006_
newsletter_2012fall.authcheckdam.pdf.
505 Brief of Amici Curiae the Am. Antitrust Inst. et al., supra note 172, at 31 (“If Monsanto’s
existing contractual seed-saving restrictions, coupled with the Federal Circuit’s new exception to
the first sale doctrine for self-replicating technologies, simply migrate to [Roundup Ready 2],
there is little evidence to suggest a meaningfully different competitive outcome.”) (alteration in
original).
506 Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 13.
507 William Neuman, Rapid Rise in Seed Prices Draws U.S. Scrutiny, NYTIMES.COM (Mar. 11,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/business/12seed.html?pagewanted=all.
508 Id.
509 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). See also Verizon Commc’ns
504
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licenses limited to use in a defined field.510 Control over their
technology is integral to encouraging patentees to license it and spur
further investments in innovation. Supporters argue Monsanto
represents “an IP success to be emulated,” rather than “an antitrust
culprit to be eliminated.”511
At the same time, antitrust law prohibits patentees from creating or
maintaining their monopoly, for example, through limiting access to
intellectual property needed to compete in a secondary market.512 The
law is also clear that restrictions may be anticompetitive if used to
prevent the emergence of a market for second-hand goods that compete
with goods sold by the primary manufacturer.513 The refusal to deal can
be an actual refusal, or constructive—where the patent owner will only
license on unreasonable terms and conditions.514
Since Roundup Ready is so popular, other biotech companies
desiring to offer seeds with other traits need to offer Monsanto’s trait to
farmers as well. DuPont argued that by refusing to license those traits
for “stacking” within the seeds sold, Monsanto unlawfully excludes
competition, allowing it to set the minimum prices for seed without
significant impact on its market share.515 Commentators also point out
that the social waste of duplicating Monsanto’s effort makes it more
efficient to encourage DuPont and others to invest in other types of
traits.516 Access to Roundup Ready trait stacking would allow DuPont
and others to offer goods in the complementary output trait market. It
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (“We have been very
cautious in recognizing such exceptions [to the right of refusal to deal], because of the uncertain
virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct
by a single firm.”); 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 13.3 (2d ed. 2010)
(“[T]here is no general duty under either the intellectual property or antitrust laws to use or
license an intellectual property right.”).
510 Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938). The joint IP licensing
guidelines issued by the DOJ and FTC in 1995 are consistent with this position. See U.S. Dep’t of
Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 334, at § 2.3 (noting that field-of-use licenses may
increase the patentee’s incentive to license by “protecting the licensor from competition in the
licensor’s own technology in a market niche that it wants to keep to itself”).
511 Ronald A. Cass, Monsanto’s Seeds of Growth, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2010, 4:42 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/11/antitrust-intellectual-property-monsanto-dupont-opinionscontributors-ronald-a-cass_print.html.
512 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (tying patented machines and
copyrighted films); Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219–20 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding that Kodak’s refusal to sell patented parts to ISOs constituted monopoly
leveraging from parts to servicing). But see in re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d
1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that Xerox’s refusal to sell patented parts to ISOs did not
violate the antitrust laws).
513 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953).
514 See, e.g., DocMagic, Inc. v. Ellie Mae, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
515 Lim, supra note 504, at 2.
516 Purcell, supra note 34, at 1252.
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does not cannibalize on the Roundup Ready trait market, but instead
fosters its growth in the same way that more apps written for a software
platform would make that platform more attractive through network
effects.517
The essential facilities doctrine (“EFD”), a related concept,
prohibits actual or attempted monopolization of a single market by
denying potential competitors access to a facility of which the owner
has exclusive control.518 As Professors Phillip Areeda and Herbert
Hovenkamp explained:
It should be clear that the essential facility doctrine concerns vertical
integration—in particular, the duty of a vertically integrated
monopolist to share some input in a vertically related market, which
we call market #1, with someone operating in an upstream or
downstream market, which we shall call market #2. If the facility is
truly “essential,” then the #1 monopoly facility also establishes a #2
monopoly . . . Understanding the “vertical” nature of essential
facility claims helps to focus the analysis: the essential facility claim
is about the duty to deal of a monopolist who is able to supply an
input for itself in a fashion that is so superior to anything else
available that others cannot succeed unless they can access this
firm’s input as well.519

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in MCI
Communications Corp. v. AT&T held that where the owner denies
access to competitors of an essential facility it controls that cannot be
practically or reasonably duplicated, and that it can feasibly provide
access to, antitrust law can require compulsory sharing of that
facility.520 Courts are divided on the threshold for access. Some require
See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 275, 275–78, 304 (2013) (“The essential facilities doctrine is basically a subset of
the general antitrust duty to deal. Even where no essential facility is involved, a monopolist’s
unilateral ‘refusal to deal’ with a competitor can give rise to liability under section 2 of the
Sherman Act in exceptional circumstances.”). Some decisions have confused the two, equating
the essential facilities doctrine with monopoly leveraging. See, e.g., Advanced Health-Care
Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 150 (4th Cir. 1990) (“As with monopoly
leveraging claims, the central concern in an essential facilities claim is whether market power in
one market is being used to create or further a monopoly in another market.”). The offense of
monopolization is often said to require proof of the possession of monopoly power in a relevant
market, and “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
519 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW 2012,
134–36 (4th ed. 2011).
520 MCI Commc’ns. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1982)
(condemning AT&T’s refusal to grant competing suppliers of long distance telephone services
access to local telephone facilities that it controlled.). See also Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570
517
518
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elimination of downstream competition, while for others it is sufficient
that duplication is “economically infeasible” and denial inflicts a
“severe handicap on potential market entrants.”521
One of the main criticisms directed to advocates of the EFD is that
it has been invoked without proof that the owner actually intended to
increase market power in a downstream market.522 Denial by itself does
not indicate anticompetitive intent. The antitrust plaintiff must prove
that there was a “‘willful acquisition or maintenance’ of monopoly
power” or attempt to monopolize.523Antitrust plaintiffs alleging
essential facilities claims against Monsanto will face resistance from
those claiming the Supreme Court’s equivocal stance on the EFD.524
Notwithstanding this potential resistance, some maintain that there
is a clear role for the EFD. Ryan Vacca, Benjamin Cole and Brent
Horton argue that “patents governing GM seeds should be deemed de
facto standard essential patents (de facto SEP), when certain
requirements are met” with the result that “[o]nce the GM seed has been
labeled a de facto SEP, courts can find an implied license between
Monsanto and farmers.”525 They point to recent litigation involving
patented technology adopted as industry standards by standard setting
organizations being licensed on reasonable and non-discriminatory
(RAND) terms.526 This, they say, “changes the damages regime from
one based in compensation, deterrence, and punishment to one based in
F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978) (“To be ‘essential’ a facility
need not be indispensable; it is sufficient if duplication of the facility would be economically
infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap on potential market entrants.”).
521 Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Cf. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991).
522 Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The Twisted Journey
of the “Essential Facilities” Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10-11. See also Philip
Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841
(1989); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY §7.7 (3d ed. 2005) (“The so-called
essential facility doctrine is one of the most troublesome, incoherent and unmanageable of bases
for Sherman § 2 liability. The antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place if it were
jettisoned.”).
523 Kezsbom & Goldman, supra note 522, at 30; see also Amy Rachel Davis, Patented
Embryonic Stem Cells: The Quintessential “Essential Facility”?, 94 GEO. L.J. 205, 225-26
(2005) (calling the foreclosure of a downstream market the “fifth criterion” of MCI.).
524 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004)
(“[W]e find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here.”). See Spencer Weber Waller,
Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 359, 363-64 (concluding that
plaintiffs rarely won essential facility cases). Cf. Davis, supra note 523, at 230 (arguing that first,
the Supreme Court decision in Otter Tail used the EFD’s underlying rationale and applied the
elements in MCI, and second, that Verizon concerned a case where the industry had sector
specific legislation obligating access).
525 Vacca et al., supra note 401 (“Specifically, these requirements are that: (1) the patent holder
has achieved dominance in a given field; (2) it is impracticable to expect that a farmer could
operate without infringing the patent; and (3) the farmer is growing a crop used to meet a basic
human need.”).
526 Id.
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compensation only.”527 And they are not alone.
Applying the factors articulated by the MCI court, patent attorney
Joseph M. Purcell, Jr. argued that “[p]roperly applied, the essential
facilities doctrine would go no further than to ensure that no firm
captured an entire agricultural market with one key trait and thereby
used its monopoly power to garner market success for its other traits
and suppress those of its competitors.”528 Purcells’ analysis is as
follows:
• Monsanto did not refuse to license Roundup Ready per se, but its
licenses restricted trait stacking. Purcell notes that “[g]iven that
the anti-stacking provisions in Monsanto’s licenses had the clear
effect of restricting competition in stacked traits, it stands to
reason that these licenses count as denial for the purposes of
essential facility analysis.”529
• Monsanto’s patent over Roundup Ready confers monopoly
power.530 It has power over price and can exclude competition in
the market for the herbicide-resistant trait for soybeans in the
United States.531 Purcell acknowledged that “[d]efining the
relevant market as one that only incorporates the Roundup Ready
trait may severely undermine the patent,” but the overwhelmingly
widespread use of Roundup makes Roundup Ready a de facto
standard, which justifies defining the relevant market around that
standard as the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did in
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.532
• Monsanto’s refusal to grant access to Roundup Ready affects
DuPont’s market for traits in oleic acid output. The two traits are
not competing, but complementary. Therefore, “if Monsanto
refused to license Roundup Ready for stacking with competitors’

Id.
Purcell, supra note 34, at 1274.
529 Id. at 1271.
530 Vacca et al., supra note 401 (defining the product market as the crops that infringe the patent
without distinction between GM and non-GM seed. They define the geographic market as where
the community goes to buy seed, defined locally rather than regionally or nationally.). According
to the authors, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) a measure of dominance, stands at 8100.
See id. at 37, n.254. According to the guidelines used by the agencies, anything about 2500 is
considered highly concentrated. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TTRADE COMM’N., HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.3 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
hmg-2010.html.
531 Vacca et al., supra note 401 (“[B]ecause alternatives are unavailable, it is not reasonably
possible to exclude the GM crops from the alternative crops. In fact, it is impossible. Lack of
access to non-GM alternatives forces farmers to purchase GM seeds (and thus, license the
technology) even when the farmer may not desire to utilize the GM properties.”).
532 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314, 316 (3d Cir. 2007). For a discussion
of patent abuse in the standard setting context, see Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting:
The Case for Patent Misuse, 51 IDEA 559 (2011).
527
528
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output traits, that would resemble the leveraging theme present in
most essential facility cases.”533 Access would promote
competition and innovation in complementary markets without
harming incentives to innovate in traits that could become
“essential.”
• Monsanto’s refusal to grant access to stack Optimum GAT with
Roundup Ready constitutes a refusal to grant a competing product
access. DuPont’s Optimum GAT was only commercially viable if
offered together with Roundup Ready. Given that DuPont’s
technology enabled it to offer seeds with stacked traits without
Monsanto’s active assistance, by simply refraining from enforcing
the restriction, Monsanto would provide access to the technology.
The licensing would not require ongoing oversight by the
courts.534
As to the last point, at least one court has refused to apply the EFD
to intellectual property to deprive owners of a first mover advantage.
The antitrust plaintiff in that case argued that they deserved the same
timely and preferential access to interoperability information as the
owner enjoyed in order to develop competing products.535 Court who
have considered the EFD in the context of intellectual property cases
have also rejected its application on grounds of non-essentiality rather
than on the basis that the EFD cannot apply to IP.536 At the same time,
this objection should be properly contextualized. Antitrust law treats
intellectual and real property alike.537 Professor Marina Lao articulates
Purcell, supra note 34, at 1273.
Id. at 1269–74. See also id. at 1268–69 (“Stacking, or the combination of traits within a single
seed, allows for the possibility of crops containing multiple fruits of genetic research. The
application of antitrust law and the essential facilities doctrine to stacking and its prohibition may
therefore play a large role in the future of agricultural research, development, and consumer
choice.”).
535 In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 274 F. Supp. 2d 743, 746 (D. Md. 2003). For a
discussion of the essential facilities doctrine in the context of the Microsoft litigation, see Daryl
Lim, Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the Essential Facilities Doctrine and the
Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481 (2007). See also
Lim, supra note 501.
536 See Davis, supra note 523, at 228–30 (citing Montgomery Cnty. Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. v.
Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1995) (involving copyrighted “multiple
listing service”), aff’d, 91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185, 192 (D. Mass. 1991) (involving copyrighted computer diagnostic
software), aff’d in part, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Co. v. Donnelly
Info. Publ’g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (involving copyrighted telephone listings),
rev’d on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
537 See in re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.”). See also
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 334, at § 2 (“[F]or the purpose of
antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any
other form of property.”); Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S.
533
534
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skepticism towards the incentive-based objections to requiring sharing:
These incentive concerns, though widely accepted, seem overstated.
It is difficult to know the actual long-term economic effect of placing
some limitations on a monopolist’s reward through the imposition of
a duty to deal in limited circumstances. While reducing returns on
investment in innovation through compulsory sharing may reduce
future investments at the margins, economic analysis cannot tell us
how much less investment and whether it would actually decrease
useful innovation. Moreover, mandatory sharing may unleash
innovation and competition from rivals in the downstream market,
which ought to be taken into account in the calculus of the total
effects of compulsory access on innovation. Economic analysis, no
matter how rigorous, is probably inadequate to make these
assessments. Therefore, I am somewhat skeptical of incentive effects
as a macro policy rationale against compulsory access.538

The Court has been increasingly concerned with patents
preempting scientific advancement. In the context of another SRT—
embryonic stem cell research, Amy Rachel Davis has argued that the
EFD benefits consumers because it allows “many teams of researchers
to be working toward inventing useful, marketable products
incorporating embryonic stem cells—not just one—as competition in
the innovation market for stem cell products is likely to yield a wider
variety of consumer goods in a shorter amount of time.”539
With DuPont, it was not seeking to deprive Monsanto of a first
mover advantage in a software market where products have commercial
short shelf lives, but rather access in a market where product life cycles
are long and more akin to patented drugs. This minimizes harm to
Monsanto’s appropriation to its investments in Roundup Ready.
Assuming the foregoing is correct, a court would still need to
determine the appropriate royalty rate DuPont would pay Monsanto.
Recent developments in standards involving smartphones and tablet
PCs seem to suggest that where a patent owner owns a patent that forms
a core component of a widely adopted standard, it can be subject to
obligations to license its rivals.540 Vacca, Cole, and Horton point to
Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 452 (2002) (“[T]he essential facilities doctrine applies to
intellectual property no less than to tangible assets.”).
538 Lao, supra note 518, at 314.
539 Davis, supra note 523, at 213. See also id. at 232–33 (arguing first, that access to embryonic
stem cells was essential to compete in the market for stem cell therapies, second that patents over
purified stem cells create supply silos as no other firm can supply them without being liable for
infringement, third, access to the cells would be both feasible and profitable and there would be
no legitimate business justification in refusing access).
540 See generally Dan O’Connor, Standard-Essential Patents in Context: Just a Small Piece of the
Smartphone War Puzzle, PATENTPROGRESS (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.patentprogress.org/
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Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., as precedent for the court finding an
established royalty rate of 2.25% based on prior license agreements, and
argue that “[t]he case for using an established royalty in Monsanto’s
GM seed litigation is even easier because the established rate is for the
exact same product.”541
The European Union’s Directive on Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions provides for compulsory cross-licensing, where breeders
cannot acquire or exploit a plant variety right without infringing a prior
patent.542 A farmer or licensee can apply for a compulsory license for
non-exclusive use of the patent, which will be granted “subject to
payment of an appropriate royalty.”543 Compulsory licenses also apply
in situations where a patent holder cannot exploit an invention without
infringing a plant variety right.544 In addition, the Directive allows
soybean farmers to save patented seed from their harvests for
replanting.545
In March 2013, Monsanto and DuPont announced that they would
be settling the patent infringement and antitrust disputes.546 Under the
terms of settlement, Monsanto agreed to license its Roundup Ready
technology to DuPont for at least $1.75 billion and drop its $1 billion
jury verdict against DuPont for patent infringement.547 Under the terms
of the settlement with Monsanto, DuPont will receive “regulatory data
rights for the soybean and corn traits previously licensed from
Monsanto, enabling it to create a wide array of stacked trait
combinations using traits or genetics from DuPont Pioneer or others.”548
According to DuPont Pioneer President Paul E. Schickler, this
arrangement promises to help “both companies to expand the range of
innovative solutions we can offer farmers, and to do so faster than either
2013/03/05/standard-essential-patents-in-context-just-a-small-piece-of-the-smartphone-warpuzzle/.
541 Vacca et al., supra note 401, at 47.
542 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. 12, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998L0044:EN:HTML
[hereinafter Directive 98/44/EC]. See generally Michael Blakeney, Patenting of Plant Varieties
and Plant Breeding Methods, J. EXPERIMENTAL BOTANY (Jan. 2, 2012), http://jxb.
oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/01/02/jxb.err368.full.
543 Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 542, at art. 12.
544 Id.
545 Id. at art. 14 (confining protection to fodder plants, cereals, potatoes, oil and fiber plants). See
also id. at art. 11(1).
546 Carey Gillam, Monsanto, DuPont Strike $1.75 Billion Licensing Deal, End Lawsuits,
REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/26/us-monsantodupont-gmo-idUSBRE92P0IK20130326.
547 Id.
548 DuPont and Monsanto Reach Technology Licensing Agreements on Next-Generation Soybean
Technologies, MONSANTO (Mar. 26, 2013), http://monsanto.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=
27632&item=135196.
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of us could alone,” and provides “greater flexibility in developing
combinations of genetics and traits[.]”549
The settlement between DuPont and Monsanto testifies to the
importance of antitrust oversight in the biotechnology industries where
SRTs are created. It should be recalled that the settlement comes after
Monsanto had won a billion dollar victory against DuPont for patent
infringement. Yet the specter of antitrust scrutiny from the DOJ and the
threat of private enforcement from DuPont threatened to derail that
victory. By committing to a license of its standard patents, Monsanto
would have more control over the terms of access than a compulsory
court mandated license, or worse, a divestiture as was initially ordered
in the Microsoft litigation a decade earlier.550 At the same time, the end
result is that competitors benefit from increased access to patented trait
technology and farmers benefit from a wider variety of seed traits at a
lower cost.
Whether the DuPont settlement signals Monsanto’s willingness to
allow trait stacking on a wider scale remains to be seen. Monsanto has
every incentive to stay its course in opening up access to its
technologies in a manner that it can control, rather than to do so under
an antitrust decree. At present what is clear is that Monsanto and a few
other seed companies have undertaken a remarkable new initiative
called the Accord, whose success may depend on both the reassurance
of robust patent rights as well as a continued reluctance to test the
boundaries permitted under the antitrust laws.
B. Enter The Accord: Aligning Disparate Interests?
The Accord was presented as an invitation for members of the
agricultural value chain to participate and guide its evolution. It counts
among its signatories—BASF Plant Science, Bayer Crop Science, Dow
Agro Sciences, DuPont Pioneer and Monsanto.551 The Accord sets out
the rights and duties involved in commercializing patented single-gene
plant products and encourages patent holders to continue developing
and commercializing their technology while ensuring international
regulatory and stewardship responsibilities are maintained.552 These
goals are achieved via data access and compensation to the biotech
companies.553 Patent owners are required to notify interested parties to
the Accord three years prior to relevant patents expiring.554 Owners can
Id.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S.
1301 (2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
551 Generic Event Marketability and Access Agreement (GEMAA), supra note 19.
552 Factsheet, supra note 18, at 1.
553 Id. at 2.
554 Id. at 3.
549
550
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choose to share or transition regulatory responsibilities through
negotiation or arbitrations, if necessary.555
The Accord contains two agreements, the Data Use and
Compensation Agreement (“DUCA”) and the Generic Event
Marketability and Access Agreement (“GEMAA”).556 DUCA promotes
the range of crop options available to farmers through regulatory data
sharing arrangements. Currently, more than twenty-four trait
combinations are commercially available.557 After patents expire, seed
companies may want to use off-patent technology to develop and offer
seeds stacked with expired traits. For example, as Roundup Ready
expires in 2014, companies and universities with breeding programs
using its patents can continue offering products containing the traits.
It is clear from Bowman v. Monsanto that farmers must continue to
service their technology agreements with Monsanto and other seed
companies as long as the relevant patents are in force. The certainty of
reward over the life cycle of their products and potential for private and
government antitrust enforcement may encourage greater support from
patent owners, which will be crucial if farmers are to continue enjoying
better seed varieties and access to foreign export markets.
The measure of control that DUCA provides patent owners
encourages them to participate in the innovation and commercialization
of products containing traits going off-patent. It also encourages
licensing agreements without obliging farmers to pay post-expiration
royalties, as well as destroy or return seed after licenses expire.
Monsanto, for example, has committed not to exercise plant variety
patent rights against farmers saving seeds for replanting on their own
farms once the trait technology has expired.558At the same time,
Monsanto has stated that it will continue to enforce variety patents and
plant variety protection certificate rights against unauthorized
commercialization and development.559
GEMAA allows patent owners or generic competitors willing to
pay for the necessary data to obtain regulatory approval to do so without
conducting its own health and environmental studies.560 In this regard,
Id.
Id. at 2.
557 Monsanto
Company Statement on GEMAA, THE HAGSTROM REPORT, http://
www.hagstromreport.com/assets/2012/2012_1109_MonsantaGEMAA.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2013).
558 Greater Choices Are In The Hands Of Farmers, MONSANTO, http://sustainability.
monsanto.com/commitments/greater-choices-are-in-the-hands-of-farmers (last visited Oct. 22,
2013).
559 Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, MONSTANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/
newsviews/Pages/roundup-ready-patent-expiration.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
560 Thomas P. Redick & Norman W. Hawker, Legal Issues Arising from Generic Biotech Crops,
AALA, AGRICULTURAL LAW UPDATE (Dec. 2010).
555
556
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GEMAA bears similarities to an abbreviated process where generic
drug companies can “fast-track” approval of their drugs at the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) by showing bioequivalence to patented
drugs. The effect of GEMAA is to ensure that seed exports can continue
to be sold and processed after patents covering the crops expire.
The United States is the largest producer and exporter of
transgenic grain and crops.561 About ninety percent of soybeans, cotton
and corn grown the United States are transgenic.562 Grain traded
globally account for over $40 billion in export revenue annually.563
Unlike the United States, where the U.S. Department of Agriculture
accepts indefinite use of patented seed, foreign governments approve
use for a specific time period.564 Transgenic grain exports thus require
periodic renewals. Approvals in the European Union expire after ten
years, and those in China expire after three.565
While Monsanto may have the incentive to maintain these
approvals while its patents are in force, once those patents expire the
technology becomes part of the public domain, free to be used by all.
Predictably, that incentive is lost. Without someone to maintain
regulatory approvals, governments in key markets such as Europe,
China, and South America would become closed to U.S. transgenic
grain exports. In the European Union and China alone, that would mean
foregoing over $10 billion in export revenue.566
GEMAA benefits seeds covered by at least one U.S. patent that are
commercialized either by themselves or as stacked products in the
United States at least four years prior to the expiration of the last U.S.
patent. The events covered by GEMAA are fairly broad: patent term
expiration, lapse in maintenance fees, invalidity or unenforceability of
the relevant claims and a declaration of non-infringement by the patent
holder. One significant limitation of GEMAA is that it may be nullified
by a prior agreement to the contrary. Another limitation is that patent
holders are only obligated to good faith negotiations for expired patents.
While parties are to offer “reasonable and appropriate value,” neither is
bound to accept the offer.
The smartphone and tablet industries have been grappling with the
question of what constitutes a “reasonable” royalty for many years, and

Factsheet, supra note 18, at 1.
Id.
563 Id.
564 Daniel Grushkin, Threat to Global GM Soybean Access as Patents Nears Expiry, 31 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY Vol. 10, 10–11 (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/
v31/n1/full/nbt0113-10c.html.
565 Id.
566 Redick & Hawker, supra note 560, at 4.
561
562
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the courts are only now beginning to define what that means.567 These
cases may help inform the outcome of GEMAA disputes. Another
element in GEMAA that dilutes its efficacy is that even “joint
responsibility” parties who are bound by the arbitral award are not
obligated to execute it.568
Monsanto has chosen to independently maintain regulatory
responsibilities.569 It may refuse data access to companies seeking to
develop new stacked seed products. At the same time, it must maintain
global regulatory authorizations at no charge to users of its technology
unless the companies choose to share those responsibilities or
discontinue maintaining them. Choosing to discontinue starts a sevenyear transition phase where other seed companies can access data
necessary to continue seeking foreign regulatory approvals.570 The
Accord is an important private sector initiative and its impact on
competition, innovation and consumer welfare as it unfurls in the
coming years warrants further observation and study.
C. Patent Evergreening and Paragraph IV Challenges
In its complaint, DuPont observed that Roundup Ready 2 Yield
expresses the same enzyme that confers herbicide resistance in Roundup
Ready, differing only in the use of different promoters, which function
as “on switches.”571 DuPont asserted that these promoters do not
enhance either herbicide tolerance or yield. Rather, Roundup Ready 2
Yield’s enhancements result from non-patent-related factors, such as the
different points on the genome at which the trait is incorporated and
Monsanto’s requirement that farmers use its seed treatment.572 DuPont
also alleged that Monsanto forced Independent Seed Companies
(“ISCs”) to switch from Roundup Ready to Roundup Ready 2 Yield to
ensure that ISCs will offer seeds only with Monsanto’s patented
Roundup Ready 2 Yield trait and not those with a competing generic

See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
568 The Accord: Generic Event Marketability & Access Agreement (GEMAA), THE ACCORD, cl.
8(h) (May 9, 2013), http://www.agaccord.org/include/gemaa_firstamendedMay9.pdf.
569 The Accord: Generic Event Marketability & Access Agreement (GEMAA) Notice of Patent
Expiration,
THE
ACCORD
(Jan.
15,
2013),
http://www.agaccord.org/include/
NoticeofPatentExpirationMon810.pdf.
570 GEMAA, supra note 568, at cl. 2(i).
571 Id. at ¶ 65.
572 Id. at ¶ 66; Michael Stumo, Anticompetitive Tactics in Ag Biotech Could Stifle Entrance of
Generic Traits, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 137, 141 (2010) (“By using a different promoter,
Monsanto can pursue additional patents only for that promoter, enabling it to claim longer patent
protection for the identical RR gene. Furthermore, there appears to be no independent evidence,
outside of Monsanto assertions, that RR2 offers farmers increased yields or improved tolerance to
glyphosate over RR.”).
567
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Roundup Ready trait, and in doing so foreclose generic entry.573
Michael Stumo argued that Monsanto’s strategy resembles
“product hopping,” practiced by manufacturers of pioneer drugs to
delay entry of their generic competitors. Trivial changes are made to the
drugs, such as changing a capsule to a tablet. Pioneer drug companies
then apply for patents over the new formulations that have marginal or
no new benefits solely to delay the competition.574
In Abbott Labs v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., for example, Abbott
changed the drug Tricor from a capsule to a tablet and reduced the
amount of the drug slightly.575 Abbott also bought up its old products,
destroyed them and listed them as obsolete in a national drug database.
As a result, while Teva could sell its generic version of Tricor, it could
not take advantage of state generic substitution laws, because Abbott’s
changes prevented Teva’s drug from being equivalent and required
Teva to start over in seeking FDA approval for the modified drug. The
court concluded that the alleged manipulative and unjustifiable
formulation changes that allegedly blocked generic substitution for
Tricor barred cost-efficient distribution of generic versions of Tricor
and prevented consumer choice were sufficient to support Teva’s
antitrust claims.576 Generic entry would have facilitated inter-brand
competition. Stumo argues that in the same way, generic entry in the
seed trait market would result in “lower prices and more choice for
farmers,” as well as increased competition.577
Monsanto’s CEO, Hugh Grant, acknowledged the need to convert
users in order not to cannibalize profits for Roundup Ready 2 Yield,
which would cost 40% more than Roundup Ready, but that this would
be justified by a superior product that could increase yield by 7% to
11%.578 In light of impending generic entry post-2014, such a steep
Defendants’ Amended Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 486, at ¶ 2.
1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 509, at § 15.3.
575 Abbot Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415, 418 (D.
Del. 2006).
576 Id. at 424.
577 Stumo, supra note 572, at 148. Stumo also notes that Monsanto could protect its monopoly by
obstructing the re-importation of generic RR soybeans. About 40% of soybeans produced in the
U.S. are exported and grain elevators do not segregate them by destination. These exported
soybeans thus represent an alternative source of seeds to farmers. By letting its foreign RR
registrations expire or denying access to data required for foreign regulatory approvals for seeds
containing RR-traits, Monsanto could cut off the exportation of those seeds, cutting off its supply
at the source. Id. at 142. This concern has largely been addressed by Monsanto’s recent
commitment to maintain foreign import approvals during the transition to generic versions of RR
through 2017. See Kaskey & McQuillen, supra note 496.
578 Monsanto Company F3Q09 (Qtr End 5/31/09) Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA
(June 24, 2009), available at http://seekingalpha.com/article/152631-monsanto-company-f3q09qtr-end-5-31-09-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1&find=crop%2Band%2Bseeds;
MONSANTO
CO., MONSANTO ROUNDUP READY 2 YIELD INVESTOR PRESENTATION (2009), http://www.
monsanto.com/pdf/investors/2009/roundup_ready2_yield.pdf.
573
574

Lim-galleyed-FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES

12/21/13 12:55 PM

219

price increase, even with the increased yield, seems counterintuitive
unless Monsanto was confident of being able to exclude that entry
through its patents over Roundup Ready 2 Yield.
The question of whether Monsanto introduced Roundup Ready 2
Yield strategically to block lawful generic substitution for Roundup
Ready would have been determined at the antitrust trial, but in 2004,
Syngenta AG accused Monsanto of employing a similar switching
strategy. Syngenta owned an herbicide-tolerant corn trait, GA21,
originally licensed to Monsanto by GA21’s previous owner.579 Syngenta
alleged that, perceiving Syngenta to be a competitive threat, Monsanto
reacted by requiring its licensees then using the GA21 technology to
switch to another herbicide-tolerant trait that Monsanto owned.
Syngenta accused Monsanto of antitrust violations. Syngenta’s lawsuit
against Monsanto was eventually settled on undisclosed terms.580
Barriers to entry are high. An alternative to Roundup Ready could
cost DuPont between $100 million and $150 million to develop and
commercialize.581 Moreover, before seeds can be commercialized, they
need to receive approval from the Agriculture Department,
Environmental Protection Agency and Food and Drug Administration.
The process of developing new traits can span ten to fifteen years.582
Because the process is long and costly, farmers cannot turn in the
meantime to foreign suppliers that have not already been approved by
these regulatory agencies.583
As with the pharmaceutical industry, rival agro-biotech companies
need access to the patented technology before the patent expires in order
to develop substitute products and navigate the regulatory channels and
offer the generic substitutes when the patented version goes off-patent.
Such a system could look like one established under the Hatch-Waxman

Defendants’ Amended Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 486, at ¶ 159. See also Paul
Christiensen, Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Infringement Suit Between Monsanto and DuPont:
Part I Timeline, INTLCORN (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.intlcorn.com/seedsiteblog/?p=764
(“DEKALB/Monsanto sued Syngenta for use of GA21 patent infringement. Syngenta filed a
countersuit against Monsanto alleging antitrust violations. Pattern is similar to the pattern of
DuPont’s response Monsanto infringement suit in 2009.”).
580 See Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 482 (D. Del. 2006) (finding that
DeKalb Genetics Corporation—which Monsanto acquired—had misappropriated the technology).
The antitrust suit was settled on substantially undisclosed terms. See Syngenta Settles with
Monsanto,
THE
BUSINESS
JOURNAL
(May
23,
2008,
10:39
AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/triad/stories/2008/05/19/daily59.html. For a full history of the
litigation, see Paul Christensen, GA21’s Legal History, INTLCORN (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://intlcorn.com/seed%20site%202012/Intellectual%20Property/GA21.html.
581 Doug Cameron, U.S. Regulators Speed Seed Oversight After Delays, DOW JONES NEWSWIRE
(Sept. 2, 2009, 2:21 PM), english.capital.gr/news.asp?ID=805738.
582 Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, The Seed Industry in U.S. Agriculture, AGRICULTURE
INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 786 (Jan. 2004), at 51.
583 Defendants’ Amended Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 486, at ¶ 51.
579
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Act for pharmaceuticals that enables the promotion of generic
pharmaceuticals before they go off-patent. Amanda Wellers argues that
“[t]he Hatch-Waxman Act is a viable regulatory framework for the
agricultural industry. The similarities between the pharmaceutical and
agriculture industries, and the effectiveness of the Hatch-Waxman Act
in the pharmaceutical industry, suggest that use of such a framework
would be successful.”584
Manufacturers of new drugs are required to obtain the approval of
a new drug application (“NDA”) from the FDA before marketing the
drug.585 A drug approved under the NDA process is often referred to as
a “brand-name” drug. Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act (“Hatch-Waxman Act”) in 1984.586 The
Hatch-Waxman Act was designed to speed the introduction of low-cost
generic drugs to market while maintaining and refining the patent laws’
incentives for innovation.587 After a brand-name drug’s NDA has been
approved, another manufacturer can apply to market a generic version
by filing an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) with FDA.588
This process does not require independent clinical evidence of safety
and effectiveness, as long as the generic drug has the same active
ingredient as the brand-name drug and is bioequivalent.589
The Hatch-Waxman Act creates a framework where brand-name
drug makers identify to the FDA patents that can be asserted against
someone making, using, or selling its drug.590 Potential competitors
submitting an ANDA must in turn explain how the generic drug can be
marketed without infringing those patents by filing a “paragraph IV
certification,” which states that a given patent identified by the patentee
is invalid or will not be infringed by the making, use, or sale of the
generic drug.591
Amanda Welters, Note, Striking A Balance: Revising USDA Regulations to Promote
Competition Without Stifling Innovation, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 407, 423, 426 (2012) (“Due
to current regulations, a generic manufacturer will need proprietary information from Monsanto
to receive federal approval and the technical data needed to update licenses in areas like the
European Union (EU) and China, where regulations tend to be stricter. If the agriculture industry
adopted an act similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer could develop a generic
version based on the data provided in Monsanto’s patent and receive USDA approval through an
abbreviated process.”).
585 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)–(b) (2013). The NDA contains information relating to the drug’s
components, proposed labeling that describes the uses for which the new drug may be marketed,
and scientific data and other information demonstrating that the drug is safe and effective as
labeled. 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1) (2013).
586 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28,
and 35 U.S.C.).
587 See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–17 (1984); id. pt. 2, at 5–6.
588 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2013).
589 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv) (2013).
590 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2013).
591 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2013).
584
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The framework incentivizes both patentees and potential
competitors to engage in paragraph IV litigation. The first competitor to
challenge the patent is rewarded with a promise of 180 days of
exclusivity on the market if it is successful.592 That exclusivity insulates
the first filer from other entrants during the period of exclusivity and it
gives that manufacturer a head start in reaching commercial
arrangements with large purchasers, accounting for a “vast majority of
[its] potential profits”593 The Hatch-Waxman Act also encourage
patentees to promptly sue for infringement, which triggers an automatic
stay of FDA approval of the ANDA for thirty months.594 That
legislative injunction insulates against competition during the first thirty
months of litigation.
A Federal Trade Commission study revealed that potential
competitors have prevailed nearly three quarters of the time in
paragraph IV litigation against patentees.595 Paragraph IV litigation,
therefore, provides an important means of market entry, particularly
because, like patents over seeds, patents over drugs have grown in
recent years with the addition of “secondary” patents, such as “patents
on chemical variants, alternative formulations, methods of use, and
relatively minor aspects of the drug.”596 Those secondary patents may
be particularly susceptible to being avoided, in whole or in part, by
potential competitors.
The 2011 domestic market for drugs totaled approximately $320
billion.597 Brand-name drugs accounted for 18% of total prescriptions
for drugs and biologics (which include products such as vaccines), but
73% of total spending.598 This disparity reflects the monopoly reward
the patent laws offer for brand name innovation. As competition sets in,
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2013) (providing that FDA will not approve a later filed
ANDA to the same patent as an earlier-filed ANDA for 180 days after either a court decision
finding the patent invalid or not infringed, or the first commercial marketing of the drug under the
first ANDA, whichever is earlier).
593 Comments on Generic Pharm. Ass’n to FTC on Authorized Generic Drug Study 2 (June 27,
2006) FED. TRADE COMM’N, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/genericdrugstudy3/
062806gpha.pdf.
594 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2013).
595 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION 10, 19–20,
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (finding that generic
competitors prevailed over brand-name manufacturers with respect to 73% of the drug products
that were the subject of a court decision in paragraph IV litigation initiated between 1992 and
2000).
596 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 615, 619-23 (2011).
597 See IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE UNITED
STATES: REVIEW OF 2011 27 (2012), http://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/Insights/
IMS%20Institute%20for%20Healthcare%20Informatics/IHII_Medicines_in_U.S_Report_2011.p
df.
598 Id. at 16, 27.
592
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prices for generic drugs fall, on average, to about 15% of what the
branded manufacturer was charging.599 At the same time, patentees lose
about 90% of their market share to competitors.600 In the context of
traited seeds, companies such as DuPont seeking to offer generic
genetically engineered traits could be allowed an abbreviated FDA
approval process “if they can show generic equivalence to the name
brand version of the crop.” Paragraph IV challenges could also make it
less appealing for Monsanto to sue rival biotech developers who want to
get their R&D programs going.601
CONCLUSION
The landscape of American agriculture has changed. Where
independent farmers once characterized the industry, the work of
today’s farmers is intertwined with the technology they use and those
who sell such technologies. Limiting farmers to one growing season
effectively means that they never own the seeds that they tend.
Monsanto’s win against Bowman means that farmers must continue to
honor their license agreements or risk being liable for patent
infringement. Monsanto may also no longer need its restrictive
agreements. The decision, therefore, may loosen its practices, giving
seed companies more freedom to make their own choices.
The Article explained why alternative frameworks such as contract
law have critical limitations, which make them unsuitable replacements
for patent protection. Rather than fight the notion that every generation
of SRTs will be laced with patent protection, it would be more
constructive to focus on balancing consumer welfare and innovation
concerns ex post. Courts will have an important role in shaping the
contours of the legal landscape in SRT technology through
interpretation of permissible uses, judicious use of antitrust doctrines,
and drawing on experiences from the pharmaceutical industry in first
finding, then refining the balance between owners, users and the public.
Bowman v. Monsanto reassures owners of seed patents that
investment in their pipeline projects is secure. This reassurance should
encourage seed companies to join the Accord, which will helps
stakeholders focus on bringing farmers the best products possible while
working to advance innovation and long-term opportunity for

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8, (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112
payfordelayrpt.pdf.
600 Id.
601 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35
U.S.C.); see generally 1 HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 509 at § 15.3.
599
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agriculture. At least in theory, it opens the market to generic
competition. However, this coalition of the willing few may not be
enough. It will take an industry-wide adoption of the Accord, coupled
with a commitment to speedy dispute resolution and a willingness to
continually refine its terms to infuse it with the longevity, legitimacy
and effectiveness it needs to ensure product stewardship into the
foreseeable future.

